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A bstract
3
This thesis studies three aspects of the financial lives of poor people, using theory and 
empirical analysis of data from South Africa. The first chapter studies the effect of 
mode of payment on household savings behaviour. Savings have been linked to con­
sumption smoothing, investment and economic growth. A theoretical framework is 
set up to study four possible mechanisms through which electronic payment may have 
an effect on savings. Using difference-in-difference estimates around a policy change, 
it is found that households are more likely to have savings when their grant is paid 
directly into an account. These findings are mapped back to the theory in an attempt 
to identify the relevant mechanisms. The second chapter analyses funeral insurance as 
a distinct form of insurance. Funeral insurance is probably one of the oldest and his­
torically most important forms of insurance, and is still widespread in parts of Africa 
today. Though funeral insurance is often provided by informal risk-sharing groups, 
this analysis abstracts from organisational form and asks under what circumstances 
funeral insurance is preferred to general life insurance. A model is set up in which 
there is an inter-generational conflict of interest over funeral expenditure, which fu­
neral insurance may resolve. Predictions from the model are consistent with results 
from empirical analysis. The third chapter investigates an assumption which is nearly 
ubiquitous in development economics — that of constrained household liquidity. Di­
rect empirical evidence of such constraints is surprisingly scarce. Many observations 
consistent with liquidity constraints are equally consistent with precautionary saving 
or a lack of forward planning. Using a South African panel data set and a source of 
anticipated income, the standard model with perfect capital markets is rejected. Find­
ing that it fails, further analysis attempts to distinguish between liquidity constraints, 
precautionary saving and myopia as possible explanations.
4A cknowledgem ents
First and foremost I would like to thank my advisors, Tim Besley and Maitreesh 
Ghatak. I am grateful for their support and guidance, and for the opportunities they 
provided me with. I would also like to thank Oriana Bandiera and Robin Burgess 
for the discussions we had and for their helpful suggestions. Tim and Robin lectured 
the development economics course I took as a masters student, thereby triggering my 
interest in research in the field. I am also grateful to Jprn Rattsp at the Norwegian 
University of Science and Technology (NTNU) for his advice and support.
I thank all my friends and fellow researchers at the LSE, and STICERD/EOPP 
in particular, for discussions and comments on my work, and for creating such a 
stimulating research environment. I have also benefited enormously from the thriving 
community of Goodenough College.
Thanks are also due to Jonathan Leape and Rashad Cassim for facilitating my 
visit to the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in 2005.
Financial support from the LSE, the Economic and Social Research Council and 
the Research Council of Norway is gratefully acknowledged.
I owe a lot to my friends for their support over the past few years. Niraj and 
Wenche deserve special mention.
I am also grateful for my family’s support and understanding. I have not been 
able to spend as much time with them as I would like.
I dedicate this thesis to my wife Shipra, who makes it all worthwhile.
5C ontents
Abstract 3
Acknowledgements 4
Contents 5
List o f Figures 7
List of Tables 8
Preface 9
1 D oes payment into bank accounts encourage saving? 12
1.1 Introduction.................................................................................................. 12
1.2 Related lite ra tu re ........................................................................................  14
1.3 B ackground.................................................................................................. 15
1.3.1 The child support g r a n t .................................................................. 16
1.3.2 The bank account program m es...................................................... 16
1.4 Theoretical fram ew ork................................................................................  18
1.4.1 The one-person household............................................................... 19
1.4.2 The two-person (couple) household...............................................  25
1.4.3 The difference in programme effect across household types . . .  28
1.4.4 Summary of predictions on binary savings variables ..................  29
1.5 D a ta ..............................................................................................................  30
1.6 Identification and results..............................................................................  31
1.6.1 Ordinary least squares.....................................................................  31
1.6.2 Instrumental variab les.....................................................................  33
1.6.3 Stronger effect on households with b a b ie s ...................................  36
1.6.4 Portfolio composition .....................................................................  36
1.6.5 A cost reduction s to r y ? ..................................................................  37
1.7 Discussion.....................................................................................................  38
1.8 T a b le s ...........................................................................................................  41
A P ro o fs ...........................................................................................................  50
A.l Optimal savings in the single-agent household c a s e ....................  50
A.2 Optimal savings in the two-person househo ld .............................  51
A.3 Signing   54
A.4 Signing ........................................................................................  55
2 Funeral insurance 56
2.1 Introduction..................................................................................................  56
2.2 Funeral societies and the history of in su rance .......................................... 57
CONTENTS 6
2.3 Funerals and funeral insurance in South A f r ic a ....................................  59
2.4 Related literatu re ........................................................................................  60
2.5 T heory ...........................................................................................................  61
2.5.1 The model .......................................................................................  61
2.5.2 A solution..........................................................................................  62
2.5.3 Mapping theory to d a t a ..................................................................  66
2.6 Em pirics........................................................................................................  67
2.6.1 D a ta .................................................................................................... 67
2.6.2 Main results.......................................................................................  68
2.6.3 Funeral insurance and the informal s e c to r ...................................  70
2.6.4 Further analysis ..............................................................................  71
2.7 Discussion and conclusion.........................................................................  72
2.8 Figures and t a b l e s .....................................................................................  74
A Proof of the p roposition ............................................................................  81
B Data variable construction..........................................................................  84
3 Liquidity constraints 86
3.1 Introduction..................................................................................................  86
3.2 Related literatu re ......................................................................................... 88
3.3 T heory...........................................................................................................  90
3.3.1 A consumption model with liquidity constraints..........................  90
3.3.2 Implications.......................................................................................  92
3.4 Evidence........................................................................................................  93
3.4.1 The old age pension and the child support g r a n t .......................  93
3.4.2 D a ta ....................................................................................................  94
3.4.3 Identification and main r e s u l t s ......................................................  95
3.4.4 Using household savings to test between liquidity constraints
and precautionary motives..............................................................  98
3.4.5 Expenditure response to an anticipated reduction in income . . 100
3.5 Discussion and conclusion.......................................................................... 102
3.6 Figures and t a b l e s ......................................................................................  104
References 111
7List o f Figures
2.1 Illustration of p ro p osition ..........................................................................  74
2.2 Take up of life and funeral insurance amongst respondents with own 
c h ild re n .........................................................................................................  75
3.1 Household take-up of old-age pension by age of oldest member . . . .  104
List o f Tables
1.1 Predicted programme effects on binary savings variab les..................... 41
1.2 Descriptive statistics for the full s a m p le ................................................  42
1.3 Descriptive statistics for households receiving the child support grant . 43
1.4 Descriptive statistics for households receiving the child support grant -
common trend check 2000-2002 .................................................................  44
1.5 OLS r e s u l ts .................................................................................................. 45
1.6 IV r e s u l ts ..................................................................................................... 46
1.7 Reduced-form regressions by the age of the youngest household member 47
1.8 Portfolio composition..................................................................................  48
1.9 Exploring the transaction cost s t o r y ....................................................... 49
2.1 Summary statistics (weighted) ................................................................  76
2.2 Regression results, main specification....................................................... 77
2.3 Regression results, blacks and coloureds o n l y ..............................  78
2.4 Regression results, formal insurance o n ly .......................................  79
2.5 Regression results, insurance holders o n l y .............................................  80
3.1 Descriptive s ta tis tic s ..................................................................................  105
3.2 Household age-eligibility predicts pension take-up .................................  106
3.3 Expenditure response to pension incom e................................................. 107
3.4 Response in first-differenced expenditure to pension in c o m e ................  108
3.5 Response in household savings to pension incom e.................................  109
3.6 Response in first-differenced expenditure to the foreseeable lapse of the
child support g ra n t ......................................................................................  110
Preface
9
An important function of financial markets is to allow households to shift consumption 
between periods and across stochastic states. Credit, savings and insurance are three 
ways of achieving this: Credit can bring consumption forward in time, savings can push 
it back, and insurance can shift it between different possible future states. However, as 
Besley (19956) makes clear, the three serve overlapping purposes. If credit is available, 
it can be drawn upon on a rainy day and hence provide a substitute for insurance. 
Savings can serve a similar function, a notion explored by Deaton (1991). Nor are 
they always clearly distinguishable: Udry (1994) discusses a context in which state- 
contingent loan repayments blur the boundary between credit and insurance.
Households do not act in isolation. Pooling the risks of many households is the 
basic mechanism underlying mutual insurance. And what is saved by one household 
may be lent to another, often via banks or other financial intermediaries. The role 
of these intermediaries is to channel savings to the best investment projects. The 
importance of financial markets in development therefore goes beyond consumption 
smoothing: If the markets are dysfunctional, many worthwhile projects are unlikely 
to be financed, and this in turn will stifle economic growth.
For these reasons, it is not surprising that household finance is seen as a key to 
development. But our understanding of day-to-day financial decisions of households 
in poor countries is still sketchy. This thesis looks at aspects of the financial lives of 
poor households. The three chapters are laid out along similar lines: Each of them 
looks at behaviour relating to credit, savings or insurance. A theoretical framework is 
presented, from which predictions are extracted. The predictions are then subjected 
to empirical analysis using data on South African households.
Encouraging households to save is typically seen as desirable, but it is not clear 
how to go about it. The first chapter looks at whether the mode of payment of 
social grants matters for savings. The findings presented here suggest that, holding 
the amount constant, it makes a difference whether a payment is made in cash or 
deposited in a bank account. A model of household saving is laid out and used to 
identify four classes of mechanisms by which mode of payment may matter for savings: 
First, it may increase the return on saving or reduce the associated transaction cost. 
Second, there may be an income effect due to the time saved by not having to queue 
up for the cash pay-out at a specific time and place. Third, it may help households 
with time-inconsistent preferences to control their impulse expenditure. And fourth, 
it may increase the bargaining power of women in the household and thereby change 
the household’s joint savings decision.
In 2003, social grant beneficiaries in three of South Africa’s nine provinces were 
offered bank accounts into which their grants would be paid. It was a voluntary 
scheme, so many people already receiving grants continued to take them out in cash. 
There is anecdotal evidence that new mothers signing up for a child-support grant
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were especially targeted for the new scheme, partly because they were deemed to be 
younger and more receptive to the use of new technology than the other large group 
of grant holders, the old age pensioners.
Using difference-in-difference estimates around the policy change, it is found that 
households receiving a child support grant are more likely to have savings of some 
form when they have the option of having the grant paid directly into an account. 
The story seems to be confirmed by the finding that the bulk of the increase is in bank 
account savings as opposed to in other forms, and there is also no evidence that the 
results are driven by a portfolio reallocation rather than by fresh savings. Mapping 
the findings back to the theory, there are indications that an increase in the return on 
savings may explain at least part of the effect. Behavioural effects may also matter, 
but there is little evidence of an income effect or an effect linked to the increased 
bargaining power of women. The estimated effect is largely driven by households 
headed by women. This may be due to actual differences in behaviour between male- 
and female-headed households. But it is also possible that the gender difference is due 
to a measurement error: If women have savings but do not tell their husbands about 
them, then the savings will only be reported if the female account-holder is herself the 
head of the household.
At least since classical Greece, people have formed risk-pooling groups with the 
specific aim of covering the funeral expenses of group members or their close relatives. 
These funeral societies are well-known to historians, and are documented to have ex­
isted at some point in most parts of the world. Even today, they remain widespread 
in many developing countries. In Sub-Saharan Africa they may represent the most 
common form of explicit insurance contract. Given their importance, funeral societies 
have received remarkably little attention from anthropologists, sociologists or econo­
mists. Dercon, De Weerdt, Bold, & Pankhurst (2006) is one of the few exceptions, 
documenting funeral associations in Ethiopia and Tanzania. They highlight a remark­
ably consistent feature of these societies: The terms of the contract are explicit and 
well-known to the members even if not always written down, yet they operate outside 
the formal economy.
Clearly, the large literature on informal insurance is relevant to the study of funeral 
societies. But the main focus of that literature is on testing for full insurance, and 
explaining the shortfall in terms of their reliance on self-enforcing contracts. The 
study of the specific insurance product offered by funeral societies has been largely 
neglected. The aim of the second chapter is to start filling the gap by discussing 
funeral insurance as a distinct type of insurance.
The starting point is the observation that the primary purpose of a funeral society 
is to arrange dignified funerals for covered individuals, whereas the payout from a 
modern life insurance is typically freely disposed of by the beneficiary. The strategy 
followed here is to abstract from both organisational form and enforcement constraints, 
and ask under what circumstances funeral insurance is preferred to general life insur­
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ance. A model is set up in which there is an inter-generational conflict of interest over 
funeral expenditure, which funeral insurance can help resolve. Predictions are drawn 
from the model, though the available data prevents clean testing of the model as a 
whole. The main prediction tested is that holding household income fixed, greater 
wealth (assets) is associated with a shift from funeral insurance to life insurance. The 
prediction is consistent with results from analysing a large, nationally representative 
survey data set.
That households face credit constraints is close to being a standard assumption 
in the theory of economic development. But most of the existing empirical work at­
tempting to document household liquidity constraints in a rigorous manner rely on 
data from rich countries. It is paradoxical that there is very little unequivocal evi­
dence of liquidity constraints from the developing economy contexts with which the 
constraints are most commonly associated. Furthermore, many observations described 
as violations of the standard model with perfect capital markets are arguably as con­
sistent with precautionary saving, or a lack of forward planning, as they are with 
liquidity-constrained but forward-looking households.
In the third chapter, the generous South African social pension is used as a source 
of anticipated income to study the resulting response in household expenditure in a 
panel of households. In the standard model with perfect capital markets, a version 
of which is laid out here, an anticipated increase in income should not be associated 
with a jump in consumption. Hence the standard model with perfect capital markets 
is rejected by the finding that expenditure breaks out of its household-specific trend 
when a household member reaches the pension-qualifying age, controlling for other 
demographics. Finding that the standard model fails, further analysis attempts to 
distinguish between liquidity constraints, precautionary saving and short-sightedness 
as possible explanations. Though data limitations reduce the power of some of the 
tests, the findings are on balance more supportive of liquidity constraints than of 
precautionary saving or a lack of forward planning as explanations of the expenditure 
jump.
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1 D oes paym ent into bank ac­
counts encourage saving?
1.1 In trod u ction
Economists and policy-makers have long been interested in the determinants of house­
hold saving, for several reasons. At the macro-level, Schumpeter was an early pro­
ponent of the idea that financial intermediation is a critical determinant of economic 
development. Under this view, policies that increase household savings and bring it 
into the formal financial sector are clearly of interest. At the micro-level, savings may 
be even more important in poor countries than in rich ones, because it allows house­
holds to smooth consumption and to invest even when insurance and credit markets 
are dysfunctional. And nowhere do these issues seem more pressing than in Sub- 
Saharan Africa. Its economic under-performance over the last decades compared to 
other developing regions has been linked to a lower savings rate and a higher rate of 
capital flight.
This paper asks what happened to savings when, in 2003, South African social 
grant beneficiaries got the option of having their benefits paid into a bank account 
rather than in cash. A simple model is set up and used to shed light on how the bank 
account programme might have an effect on saving in both single-person (unitary) 
and two-person (collective) households. It is shown that the two-person household 
case reduces to the single-person case but with a discount factor which is a function of 
the individual discount factors of the two household members. Difference-in-difference 
estimates of the effect of the programme on savings variables are computed using space 
and time variation in the availability of the bank account programme.
The main finding of the paper is that female-headed households are much more 
likely to have savings of some form when they have the option of having their child 
support grant paid electronically. Most of the effect is, as expected, related to savings 
in bank accounts. The finding is corroborated by supplementary analyses indicating 
that subgroups who were plausibly treated more intensively displayed stronger effects. 
In most specifications there is no significant effect on male-headed households. But it 
is not possible to determine whether the difference in estimated effect across house­
hold types (female- versus male-headed) reflects a genuine behavioural difference or a 
measurement problem related to imperfect information-sharing within the household.
This raises the question of how mode of payment affects saving. Four possible 
mechanisms are studied in the theory section. First, it may have been caused by 
an increase in the return on savings. By directly depositing the grant into a bank 
account, the recipient avoids the costs associated with a trip to the bank. These could 
include travel and opportunity costs as well as ‘embarrassment’ in front of a bank 
teller. It may also increase the expected return on savings by reducing the risk of
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appropriation. The increasing returns story is tested in the paper, and the evidence 
seems to support it.
Second, there could be a wealth effect. South African cash grant beneficiaries spend 
a considerable amount of time collecting their money. Furthermore, the system is quite 
rigid in that the beneficiaries have to be present at the paypoint on a specific day each 
month or risk losing that month’s grant. With the electronic payment programme, 
both of these problems were alleviated, so the beneficiaries should be unambiguously 
better off. But although the predicted effect on saving of making an additional transfer 
to the household in each period is positive, in the present setup it does not make a 
non-saver start saving or vice-versa.
Third, there is a possible ‘behavioural’ effect. It may be easier to control spending 
when one’s money is in an account. For instance, someone who plans to spend a 
certain amount on household items may withdraw only that amount. Spending more 
would then require a separate trip to the ATM, incurring a cost which may be enough 
to deter an impulse purchase. The findings are consistent with a behavioural effect.
Fourth, the programme may shift the balance of power within the household. Since 
it is the woman who receives the bank account, her relative bargaining power may 
increase. But the theoretical predictions of this mechanism are not in line with the 
empirical results.
Comparing the empirical findings with the theoretical predictions, a reasonable 
conclusion is that the programme effect is most likely to be driven by an increase in 
the returns on savings, and/or by a behavioural story in which the bank account acts 
as a commitment device for savers with time-inconsistent preferences. However, it 
should be added that it is not difficult to think of variations of the model presented 
here in which an income effect could drive the observed results.
The main contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that mode of payment mat­
ters for household saving behaviour. This should be of interest to policy-makers, for 
at least three reasons: One is that paying social grants electronically can increase 
the proportion of households that save. This in turn will have beneficial effects on 
people’s capacity to smooth consumption and to invest, particularly in the context 
of dysfunctional credit and insurance markets. Another is that the increase comes 
primarily in the form of savings in bank accounts. Under the widely held view that 
savings mobilisation and financial intermediation are important precursors to devel­
opment, the form in which savings are held is critical. Finally, there is an ongoing 
debate on the link between financial exclusion and poverty. It has been claimed that 
people who don’t have bank accounts (the ‘unbanked’) are deprived of many oppor­
tunities, and that access to a bank account can function as a ‘gateway’ to the formal 
sector of the economy and thereby help these people escape poverty. However, the 
exact mechanisms are sometimes unclear, and robust empirical evidence is scant. By 
showing that electronic payment can increase the households’ propensity to save, the 
paper establishes one way in which ‘being banked’ can make a real difference.
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The findings come with caveats. One is that the savings variables analysed here 
are binary. That is, they provide information on whether a household has savings, 
and on the form in which these savings are held, but not on amounts. Therefore, the 
empirical results concern what makes a household more (or less) likely to have savings, 
but is silent on whether households who already have positive savings save more or 
less as a result of the programme. Still, it is natural to assume that a programme 
which makes non-savers start saving can also make those who already save, save more, 
and the theory presented here is supportive of this interpretation.
Another caveat is that although the bank accounts programme was available to all 
social grant beneficiaries in the relevant provinces, there is evidence to suggest that 
it was marketed more intensely to young mothers receiving the child support grant. 
This fact will be exploited in the empirical analysis, but also makes it more difficult 
to extrapolate the findings to other demographic groups.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section briefly reviews the re­
lated literature. Then some institutional background is provided on the child support 
grant and grant distribution system in South Africa. Thereafter a simple theoretical 
framework is set up and used to analyse the possible programme mechanisms, before 
describing the data and presenting the empirical strategy and results. Finally there 
is a brief discussion section.
1.2 R e la ted  literature
Gersovitz (1988) provides an overview of the literature on saving and development 
with a focus on the determinants of savings, both at the micro- and macro-level. In 
a later survey, Besley (19956) reviews the literature on the relation between financial 
intermediation and growth. King & Levine (1993) find that the ratio of liquid liabilities 
of the financial system to GDP in 1960 is a robust predictor of GDP growth in the 
following three decades in a panel of countries. Attanasio, Picci & Scorcu (2000) is a 
more recent study that finds robust links between savings, investment and growth in 
a panel of countries.
Aryeetey & Udry (2000) provide an overview of saving in Africa, and point out the 
possible link between a low savings rate and economic under-performance. In their 
attempt at explaining why Africa has performed worse than other developing regions, 
Collier & Gunning (1999) emphasise Africa’s poorly functioning credit markets and 
especially a severe problem of capital flight and a suboptimal flow of financing between 
the informal and formal sectors. It follows that an increase in formal savings could 
be beneficial for the economy as a whole whether it stems from an increase in overall 
savings or a portfolio re-allocation. Household savings may also be less prone to 
capital flight. An overview of recent research on household finance in South Africa is 
provided by Ardington, Lam, Leibbrandt & Levinsohn (2004).
There is a large literature on incentives to save and their responses in rich countries,
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particularly on tax-advantaged retirement saving plans in the US. Poterba, Venti Sz 
Wise (1996) and Engen, Gale, Scholz, Bernheim &; Slemrod (1994) summarise the 
empirical findings. Although there is no clear consensus on whether these schemes 
affect the amount of savings, it seems clear that they do have an effect on portfolio 
composition. Besley & Meghir (1998) predict limited usefulness of tax-based savings 
incentives in developing countries, raising the stakes for finding a savings-stimulating 
policy in that context.
The literature providing micro-level evidence on savings devices and incentives 
in developing countries is small but growing. Ashraf, Karlan Sz Yin (2006a) offer a 
random subsample of bank clients in the Philippines a savings account with a built-in 
commitment device. The funds are either inaccessible before a certain date, or they 
cannot be withdrawn until the balance has reached a certain amount. The authors 
find that people who display hyperbolic preferences in hypothetical survey questions 
are more likely to take up the product, and that the group which is offered the product 
saves significantly more than the control group. Anderson & Baland (2002) argue that 
rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) provide a mechanism for women 
in Nairobi slums to safeguard savings from their husbands. Gugerty (2007) also looks 
at Kenyan data, and argues that ROSCAs may encourage saving by providing a 
commitment device.
There is also growing body of research on ‘financial exclusion’. Claessens (2006) 
is an international overview, whereas Porteous & Hazelhurst (2004) focuses on the 
South African case. The importance of access to financial services is stressed, in part 
motivated by the perceived potential of bank accounts to serve as ‘gateways’ to other 
financial services and to the formal sector more generally. Bertrand, Mullainathan 
& Shafir (2004) discuss behavioural-economics insights in the context of poverty, and 
argue that small institutional shifts can lead to large changes in behaviour. They 
propose that making government transfers electronic by default may encourage poor 
people to open bank accounts, and suggest that “policies that encourage the take-up 
of bank accounts may naturally lead to improved savings and budgeting in general” . 
Stegman (1999) also argues that a planned move to electronic payments of social 
benefits in the United States might increase savings amongst the recipients. Yet the 
body of robust empirical knowledge on whether and how access to financial services 
matters is very limited.
1.3 B ackground
Until recently, black South Africans were largely excluded from the formal financial 
system. During Apartheid, this was intentional policy on the part of the government. 
But even after the introduction of democracy it was hard to obtain fully-fledged bank 
accounts, because most banks required proof of formal-sector employment. As late as 
in 2003, only 48% of South Africans aged 18 and over had a personal bank account.
1 DOES PAYM ENT INTO BANK ACCOUNTS ENCOURAGE SAVING? 16
The proportion among black people would have been even lower, and many of these 
would be simple savings books as opposed to full transactional accounts, but even this 
represents a substantial increase compared to the situation in 1994 when democracy 
was introduced (Porteous & Hazelhurst 2004). The post office savings book was 
always available to everyone, but it was a very basic product and did not, amongst 
other limitations, allow direct crediting of transfers such as social grants.
1.3.1 The child support grant
The child support grant was introduced in 1998 to replace the state maintenance grant 
(Case, Hosegood & Lund 2005). The new grant was intended for primary caregivers 
(in practice mothers) of poor children. To qualify for the grant, the personal monthly 
income of the caregiver could not exceed ZAR 800 (psUSD 130) if the caregiver lived 
in formal housing in an urban area, or ZAR 1,100 otherwise. As of 2005, the means 
test limits had not been updated (Budlender, Rosa & Hall 2005).
The grant is payable per child, for an unlimited number of biological children and 
up to six non-biological children. In September 2002, the monthly grant value per 
child was ZAR 110. It was increased several times, and by September 2004 it had 
reached ZAR 170 (National Treasury 2005). When the grant was introduced, it was 
available for children up to and including the age of 6. From 1 April 2003 this was 
increased to 8 years, and from 1 April 2004 children up to and including 10 years of 
age were eligible (Rosa & Mpokotho 2004).
The grant is a substantial supplement to the income of poor households. As a 
benchmark, the legal minimum wage for full-time domestic workers for most of 2003 
was ZAR 650 per month in rural areas and ZAR 800 in urban areas (Hertz 2005).
During the period studied in this paper, the grant was under rapid expansion. 
In April 2002, 1.9 million children were enrolled in the scheme. By April 2004, this 
number had increased to 4.6 million (National Treasury 2005).
The child support grant is one of a range of social grants which the South African 
government offers to individuals meeting certain criteria. At the end of the 1990s the 
old age pension was by far the most important of these, both in numbers of benefi­
ciaries and amounts disbursed. Since then, the number of pensioners has essentially 
been stable, while the number of recipients of the disability and child support grants 
has increased rapidly.
1.3.2 The bank account programmes
Although eligibility criteria for the grants are the same across the country, their distri­
bution was until recently the responsibility of the nine provincial welfare departments.1 
This gave rise to the institutional variation across provinces which this paper exploits.
1 This changed in 2006 with the new centrally controlled South African Social Security Agency.
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Before the programmes, a large majority of beneficiaries received their grants 
in cash.2 Initially, grant disbursement was handled by government staff in most 
provinces, but by late 2002 all nine provinces had outsourced cash distribution to 
external contractors. In 2003, four contractors shared the nine provinces between 
themselves: PostBank, CPS, Empilweni and AllPay.
In August 2003, schemes were introduced whereby social grant beneficiaries in 
three of the provinces could open bank accounts and receive their grants by electronic 
transfer.3 They differed somewhat in the details, but the main thrust of all of them 
was to pay the grants into accounts rather than in cash. The main expected benefit 
for the clients was one of convenience, as they would no longer be required to queue up 
at their designated cash payout point at a specific time every month in order to claim 
their money. Instead, the money would be paid into their account on the first day of 
the month, after which they could access it at any time and at any ATM. Arguably 
this was a better deal in Gauteng than in the other two provinces, since it is largely 
urban and has better ATM coverage.
From the banks’ point of view, it was good business. The government paid a 
substantial fee for each grant they handled. In addition, the legal requirements of 
cash payment locations had become increasingly demanding in terms of seating space, 
toilet facilities, etc. By moving some beneficiaries over to electronic payments, the 
pressure on these facilities was eased. The cash payment ‘caravans’ had also been the 
targets of armed robberies on several occasions, so shifting cash management over to 
the existing ATM infrastructure will have reduced security costs substantially.
Although the scheme was open to beneficiaries of all government grants, women in 
receipt of the child support grant were the main targets of the programme in at least 
two of the three provinces. Not only were they the fastest growing group of grant 
beneficiaries, but compared to the pensioners they were younger and thus deemed to 
be more open to using technology such as debit cards, ATMs and PIN numbers. Also, 
compared to pensioners and disabled people, they were likely to be more pressed for 
time and therefore stood to gain more from time-saving and convenience associated
2There was always an option of having the grant paid into a bank account; the difficulty was ob­
taining an account in the first place. The banks typically required proof of formal-sector employment, 
which most beneficiaries did not have.
3PostBank offered accounts in the Northwest province, FNB and Standard Bank offered accounts 
in Eastern Cape, and AllPay offered ‘Sekulula’ accounts with ABSA Bank in Gauteng. In 2004, 
AllPay also started offering accounts in Eastern Cape.
In KwaZulu-Natal, and in Limpopo from 2004, CPS provided all beneficiaries with biometric smart- 
cards to aid identification and facilitate disbursement. By 2003 it was possible to store money on 
these cards, in other words withdraw less than the full amount of the grant in cash and leave the rest 
on the card. CPS had also developed a card terminal whereby vendors could accept payment directly 
from these smart-card. However, in an interview with the author in 2005 CPS said that the vast 
majority of beneficiaries withdrew the full amount of the grant in cash each month, possibly because 
they did not understand or trust the technology. The fact that very few vendors had invested in a 
card terminal also limited the usefulness of the technology. Also, beneficiaries were still required to be 
present at the paypoint each month for the grant to be loaded onto their cards and then withdrawn. 
Hence the CPS technology is quite far from a fully fledged bank account, and KwaZuluNatal and 
Limpopo are taken as ‘control’ provinces in this paper.
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with the programmes.
It is important to consider why these particular provinces were chosen. Although 
it is not possible to provide a complete answer, in the Northwest and Eastern Cape 
provinces the programmes were initiated at least in part by the provincial welfare 
departments. AllPay chose to start its programme in Gauteng only, although they 
were distributing grants in four out of the nine provinces of South Africa at the time. 
This was presumably because it is predominantly an urban province and thus has a 
relatively good network of ATMs. It may also be because the pressure on the cash pay 
points was the greatest in this province. By September 2004, 26% of AllPay social 
grants in Gauteng were paid into bank accounts, and most of these were child support 
grants. In Eastern Cape, 8% of AllPay’s grantees were paid via their bank accounts.4 
This type of information is not available for the other two contractors involved in the 
treatment.
1.4 T h eoretica l fram ew ork
To clarify thoughts, this section presents a simple theoretical framework. The aim is 
to shed light on how the programme may affect household saving through the following 
possible mechanisms. It may:
• increase the return on bank savings,
• reduce the time spent accessing the grants,
• help control impulse spending, and/or
• increase the bargaining power of the woman in a two-person household.
Assume there is a single consumption good. Households live for two periods and 
earn an income y in each period. There are two available savings products, A  and B , 
with risk-free gross returns R a and R b , respectively. Borrowing is not possible. Let 
sa and sb denote the amount the household saves in each product, and define the 
total household savings variable s = sa E s b -
In what follows, the four possible mechanisms mentioned will be related to the 
optimal savings levels. But the data set used in the empirical section below provides 
only binary savings information. So the binary savings decisions (whether to save or 
not) are also of interest:
S
1 if s > 0
0 if s =  0
and , i = A, B.
'Numbers obtained from AllPay.
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Two types of households are considered: One-person households consist of a single 
male or female agent. Two-person households consist of one man and one woman. 
(There may be children, grand-parents and other household members present in both 
types of households, but it is assumed that they do not influence the level or allocation 
of savings.) Each agent maximises his or her lifetime utility from consumption,
where c* denotes the agent’s private consumption in period t. The discount factor de­
pends only on the agent’s gender, g 6 {m, /} . This gender difference will be discussed 
further below, but note that for simplicity the subscript will be dropped whenever the 
distinction is irrelevant.
All agents have identical CES instantaneous utility functions with elasticity a > 0:
1.4.1 The one-person household
The single agent’s problem is to maximise lifetime utility from consumption subject 
to the intertemporal budget constraints
Since the preferences satisfy non-satiation, the budget constraints will bind. Sub­
stituting these into the expected utility, the problem becomes
Note again that both savings technologies are safe; uncertainty plays no role in the 
model.
The solution is as follows. (Calculation in the appendix.) Let R  = max (Ra , R b )- 
Then the optimal amount of total savings is given by:
u(ci) +  Sgu(c2),
Cl < y -  SA -  SB
C2 <  y  +  s a R a +  s b R b
and the non-borrowing constraints
s i > 0, i = A,B .
max u(y — sA — s b ) +  Su(y +  saRa +  s bR b )
S A , SB
subject to
s i > 0, i — A, B.
1 + R ( S R )
otherwise.
(i.i)
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If the returns on the two products are equal, the agent is indifferent between them 
and the allocation of savings is indeterminate. Otherwise she will put all her savings 
in the product with the higher return.
Note that the expression for s* is equal to the solution to the case with a single 
savings product with return R. In other words, the agent ignores the inferior savings 
product. This observation will simplify the following analysis.
The possible programme mechanisms will now be considered in turn.
T he  p rogram m e m ay increase th e  re tu rn  on bank savings For most black 
South Africans, saving money in a formal bank account before the programme would 
have implied physically depositing cash in a bank branch or post office. Compared to 
this, the programme may have increased the return on account savings in two ways. 
First, by reducing the cost of saving. This includes the time and outlays associated 
with travelling to the bank to deposit cash, and also the possible psychological cost of 
dealing with bank tellers for people who may be illiterate or feel inferior (Bertrand, 
Mullainathan & Shafir 2004, Verhoef 2001). And though the technology to keep 
savings safe from burglars and robbers was always available through products such as 
post office savings books, the programme probably did reduce the cost of safekeeping.
Second, it may have made bank savings safer from 'appropriation’ by making 
it more secret. Anecdotal evidence suggests that people sometimes hesitate to save 
because family members, friends and neighbours will ask for contributions if they know 
someone has spare money. With the programme, saving in a bank account is simply a 
matter of withdrawing less than the full grant amount, so it is virtually unobservable. 
A risk of appropriation would correspond to a lower return in the current framework 
without uncertainty.5
Next, consider what happens to savings when there is an increase in the rate of 
return. Starting with the total amount of savings and assuming for now that 8R > 1 
so that there are positive savings, one may write:
The sign is determined by the expression in the curly braces. When a > 1 it is positive
welfare consequences are not clear. First, if one takes a household welfare perspective, appropriations 
may represent a welfare-enhancing transfer even if it represents a private loss to the would-be saver. 
Second, even if the household as a whole is better off by increasing its stock of savings, it is not clear 
that a policy of reducing ‘approprations’ is welfare-enhancing. For example, it could interfere with 
an informal credit-based insurance scheme and thereby reduce global welfare.
ds*
~dR y
a (5R)~a R - 1 (1 P R  (5R) - Q) -  (l -  (8R)~a) (1 -  a) (8R)~a 
(1 + R(8R)~a) 2
y
y
'’Though a reduced risk of appropriation is modelled here as an increase in the return on savings, the
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for all R. For a < 1 it is positive when R  is small (R  — ► |) ,  but turns negative as 
R  increases. Regardless of a, will approach zero as R  — ► oo. In fact from the 
expression for optimal savings above, one can see that its limits are
lim s* — 0
and
10 when a < 1 when a = 1 . y when a > 1
So savings are only guaranteed to be increasing with the rate of return when the 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution is larger than 1, otherwise there will first be 
an increase with R  and then a decrease. At the boundary a =  1 savings will converge 
to a fixed proportion of income.
Intuitively, this result can be understood in terms of a substitution effect and a 
wealth effect. The substitution effect results from the fact that when the interest rate 
increases, consumption today becomes more expensive relative to consumption tomor­
row. But this will only tend to postpone consumption, and thereby boost savings, if 
the intertemporal substitution a is greater than one. Otherwise it will tend to reduce 
savings. The wealth effect on savings is unambiguously positive since the present value 
of lifetime income falls when the interest rate increases, reducing consumption today. 
The total effect is therefore positive when a > 1, and ambiguous otherwise (Besley & 
Meghir 1998).
Besley and Meghir also review empirical estimates of the intertemporal elasticity 
of substitution. The weight of evidence seems to be that it is less than 1, especially 
in developing countries. In the framework presented this would imply that the effect 
on savings of an increase in the rate of return is ambiguous.
Returning to the question of allocation, let the return on product B  (bank) increase 
from Rb  to R b ■ The effect on the amount and allocation of savings will depend on 
the allocation of savings before the change. If the agent saved in A before the change, 
then either Rb < Ra  in which case there is no change in amount or allocation, or 
Rb Ra  in which case savings are shifted into B  and the amount changes according 
to the analysis for the single-product case above. However if the agent saved in B  
before the rate increase, then the savings stay in the bank but the amount will change 
e l s  per the above.
If none of the products were attractive enough before the change (5R < 1), then 
either the new rate R b is still not attractive enough and there are still no savings, or 
8Rb  > 1 and the agent now saves in B. (For simplicity only the cases where the rates 
are unequal are discussed; it should be clear that whenever the rates are equal there 
is an indeterminate allocation across the products).
Turning to the binary decision variables, it is clear from (1.1) that optimal savings
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is positive whenever 8R > 1. So while an increase in the bank return R b  can make 
a saver out of a non-saver, it will not make someone who already saves stop saving 
completely. Therefore, the effect on the optimal S * is non-negative. Similarly the 
increased return may make people who do not save in bank accounts start doing so, 
but nobody who already saves in the bank will stop. So the effect on S'# is also 
non-negative, and the effect on S \  non-positive.
T he program m e may free up tim e for g ran t beneficiaries The programme 
may also reduce the amount of time spent accessing the grant. In many cases people 
queue a whole day to receive the cash payout. There are also costs associated with 
the inflexibility of the payouts: Unless the beneficiary is present at the pay point on a 
fixed date, he or she will lose that month’s grant. The programme is an improvement 
on both counts: When the grant is paid into the account, it can be accessed at any 
time from any ATM.6
Since this will benefit the agent equally in every period, in the present framework 
this effect is most readily conceptualised as an increase in income y. From (1.1) it is 
clear that whenever there are positive savings, they are proportional to y. Hence an 
increase in y will encourage further saving for agents who already save. But there will 
be no effect on portfolio allocation, and also no change for those who did not save 
before.
In terms of the binary decision variables it will have no effect: No non-savers 
become savers or vice versa, and there is no reallocation between the product types.
T he p rogram m e m ay help contro l im pulse spending  It is also possible that 
the programme has 'behavioural’ effects on saving. Though there are several possible 
such effects which might play a role (see Bertrand, Mullainathan & Shafir (2004) for 
a discussion), only one will be considered here: Control over impulse expenditures. 
Consider someone who knows she has a problem with time-inconsistent spending pref­
erences. If all her money is in her purse, the barrier to making a spontaneous purchase 
is likely to be low. But if the money is in a bank account, she may be able to control 
her expenditure by only withdrawing just enough money for planned expenditures. 
An impulse purchase will then necessitate a separate trip to the ATM, and that may 
be costly enough to control the ‘urge’.
To conceptualise this, a framework is needed in which the agent plans in advance 
how much to save. A ‘zeroth’ period, the planning period, is introduced before the 
two periods described above. In period 0, the agent plans her savings sp , but actual
6 Some beneficiaries live far from the nearest ATM and therefore need to spend a considerable 
amount of time and/or money travelling to withdraw cash. However, these beneficiaries are likely to 
live in remote areas without many facilities. It is therefore plausible that many of them would need 
to travel to a local centre regularly for other purposes (such as shopping or visiting a health service) 
in any case. If these centres have cash machines, and if such trips take place at least once a month, 
then the marginal cost of making a cash machine withdrawal is likely to be negligible.
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saving will still happen in period 1. For simplicity, consider a single savings product 
which is attractive in the sense 5R > 1; later it will be made clear that relaxing this 
is straight-forward. Time-inconsistent preferences are modelled in the usual way by 
introducing an extra discount factor (3 < 1 on future periods. Also assume that the 
agent has no income in period 0, and that 'u(O) = 0.
Without a commitment device, the agent’s expected discounted future utility in 
period 0 is:
0 -|- (35u{y — s) + (3S2u(y  + s R )
The only difference between this and the expected utility in the non-behavioural case 
above is a multiplicative constant (35, so the optimal level of savings from that analysis 
is unchanged. Therefore, the agent sets sp = s*.
But in period 1, the myopic agent’s expected discounted future utility is
u(y  -  s)  +  (35u(y -I- s R ) .
Compared to the non-behavioural case, this is a decrease in the discount factor. (Ear­
lier it was 5 , now it is (35.) Rewrite the expression for the optimal savings rate in the 
benchmark case as
5°  -  R ~ a
S ~  V  + R l-
and calculate
ds*  _  (<5Q + R1-Q) -  ( 5Q -  R ~ a ) a S * - 1
95 ~ V (Sa + Rl ~a)2
g.5a ~l R ~ a (R  + 1) 
V (5a +  R l ~a )2 
> 0.
Intuitively, this is clear: The more highly you value consumption tomorrow relative 
to consumption today, the more you save.
Therefore, when the time comes to save (in period 1), the myopic agent will save 
less than she had planned (in period 0). If s denotes the optimal savings level from 
the point of view of period 1 in the absence of a commitment device, then clearly 
S < Sp = s*.
Now introduce a commitment device which makes it costly for the agent to deviate 
from her savings plan. In its simplest form, assume that there is a penalty F  incurred 
in period 1 if the agent does not stick to her plan. It represents the cost of making an 
extra adjustment to the stock of savings in period 1, e.g. travelling to an ATM.
With the commitment device, the discounted utility in period 1 is
u(y -  s -  F  ■ l{s ±  sp}) + (35u(y +  sR).
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Here, l{s ^  sp} is an indicator function that is equal to 1 if the agent deviates from 
the savings plan, and 0 if she complies.
Clearly there is a critical level F(sp ) such that if F > F_(sp), the penalty outweighs 
the benefit to the agent of deviating from sp. Assume first that F > F(s*), so that s* 
is enforceable. Then the agent will set sp =  s*. To show this, note that the discounted 
utility in period 0 is now
0 +  (35u(y -  s -  F  • l{s ^  sp}) + P52u(y +  sR).
Since the penalty is large enough to enforce s*, the penalty will not be incurred when 
sp =  s*. Therefore, the expected utility of setting sp = s* has not changed compared 
to the case without commitment problems. Since sp — s* is as attractive as before, 
and no other sp can have been made more attractive by introducing a non-positive 
penalty, the agent will set sp = s*.
Since s* > s, the savings amount planned in period 0 is higher than the preferred 
(ignoring the penalty) savings amount in period 1. Therefore, the introduction of a 
sufficiently high penalty F  will tend to increase savings (from s up to s*).
Furthermore, since the penalty is linked to the bank account, an agent who has 
more than one savings product available, and who is sophisticated in the sense that 
she foresees her time inconsistency, will tend to shift her savings portfolio into the 
account with the penalty in order to safeguard the money from her future self.
Above it was assumed that F > F(s*), so the penalty was sufficiently large to 
enforce s*. But even if it is not, the device may allow a sophisticated agent to plan 
and enforce an intermediate amount such that s < sp < s*. As long as F > F(s), 
there is an increase in savings associated with the device.
In terms of the binary variables, the commitment device may also turn non-savers 
into savers. By increasing the effective discount factor faced in period 1 from to 
<5, myopic agents with 5f3R < 1 < SRp will shift from zero to positive savings, in the 
bank account, after the introduction of the device. Generally, the effects on S * and 
Sq are non-negative while the effect on S \  is non-positive. But note that the device 
cannot turn a fundamentally unattractive savings technology, in the sense 8R < 1, 
into an attractive one.
The above analysis applies to sophisticated time-inconsistent agents, in the sense of 
Strotz (1956). Naive agents do not foresee that their time-inconsistency will continue 
in the future. Hence they will not see the impulse-control advantage of leaving their 
savings in the account as opposed to keeping it in cash, and the response in their 
savings behaviour will be weaker than for sophisticated agents. However, if they 
decide to keep their savings in the account for other reasons, such as higher returns 
in the account than for cash holdings, then they will benefit from the commitment 
device and save more than they would without the account.
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1.4.2 The two-person (couple) household
In the empirical part of the paper it will be shown that the effect of the programme 
on saving is driven by female-headed households, so it is useful to think about why 
this might be the case. It may be a measurement issue: Spouses may lead separate 
economic lives with limited information about each other’s savings. Since the grant 
is almost always paid to the child’s mother, she will be the one whose saving is 
more directly affected by the programme. But the survey respondent is usually the 
household head. So in a male-headed household, the survey respondent may not know 
about any changes in the savings situation of his spouse. By contrast, in female-headed 
households the respondent will typically be the account holder herself. Therefore, the 
observed effect may be larger for female-headed households.7
An economically more interesting explanation of the gender heterogeneity in ob­
served effects is related to intra-household decision-making. Men may have different 
preferences from women, and the household’s saving may be thought of as the out­
come of internal decision-making process. This section is devoted to studying the 
programme’s effects on saving in a two-person household.
Household behaviour has often been modelled in essentially the same way as in­
dividual behaviour. Though the household might consist of more than one person, 
it was assumed that the intra-household decision processes would result in prefer­
ences that have the same properties as individual preferences. However, the literature 
has repeatedly rejected this framework, known as the unitary model, as a basis for 
explaining household behaviour.
One of the most promising alternative approaches to understanding household 
behaviour is the collective household model, see e.g. Vermeulen (2002). A major part 
of the appeal is its parsimony of assumptions. Essentially the only assumption needed 
is that the outcome of the household bargaining process is Pareto efficient. This 
assumption has for the most part not been rejected in the literature. In the case of 
South Africa in particular, Quisumbing & Maluccio (2003) test and reject the unitary 
household model but cannot reject that household allocations are Pareto efficient.8
The assumption that there is only private consumption will be retained. The op­
posite extreme, where consumption goods are public within the household, has been 
studied by Browning (2000). He also points out that an intermediate and more re­
alistic assumption, where both private and public goods are allowed for within the 
household, is much more complicated because each household member would have 
more than one decision variable. From what is known of African household behav­
7 In the data used, about 45% of respondent households are headed by a female. But in less than 
3% of the cases does a female head of household report living with her spouse or partner. In contrast, 
about 60% of male household heads report living with their spouse or partner. So for practical 
purposes ‘female-headed household’ is synonymous with ‘single mother’ whereas male households 
head may live with or without a partner.
8However, Duflo & Udry (2003) reject Pareto efficient allocations within the household in their 
study from Cote d’Ivoire.
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iour, arguably assuming purely private consumption assumption is more realistic than 
assuming purely public consumption.
A two-person household (couple) lives for two periods and has household income 
y in each period. What is not consumed in period 1 is saved for period 2 in savings 
products A and B  as before. The household cannot borrow. The household members 
have identical instantaneous utility functions u() of the CES type with parameter a, 
consume privately and maximise lifetime utility as before. Let ca be i ’s consumption 
in period t.
Critically, assume that the only difference between the spouses is that the man is 
more impatient, so that
5m < 5f.
Browning (2000) defends this assumption in the context of saving by pointing out 
that men are typically older and have shorter life expectations than their partners. 
The implication is that women tend to outlive their partners, and therefore put more
weight on future consumption. There is also empirical evidence that men are more
impatient, for instance Kirby &; Marakovic (1996)9.
Following the collective household literature, it is assumed that the outcome of the 
intra-household allocation process is Pareto efficient. The basic result of the collective 
model is that household’s problem can then be written as a weighted average of the 
(net present) utilities of its members. In the current framework, the household solves
max fi [u(cf i) +  Sfu{cf2)\ +  (1 -  /x) [u(cml ) +  5mw(cm2)],
C/1 iC /2 iC m l
subject to the intertemporal budget constraints and non-negative savings:
C/1 T  Cml 5; V S B
C/2 +  Cm2 <  y  +  S a R a  A  S b R b
sa , sb  > 0
The conventional interpretation of the utility weight f.i is that it represents the relative 
bargaining power of the woman. For now, assume that p, does not depend on the other 
parameters of the model; later it will be argued that fi is likely to increase with the 
introduction of the programme.
Note that though there is only private consumption in this framework, it does 
allow for ‘caring’ preferences of a specific form. Introducing the net present utility 
of one person as an additive term in the net present utility of the other implies a 
household problem which reduces to the above expression, except that the bargaining
9This study looks at a sample of American college students. So although one can probably assume 
most of the men and women in the study are in a similar family situation (i.e., no dependents), there 
is no guarantee that the observed gender difference in patience remains the same in the presence of 
children. However, the age argument is still valid, and in the absence of evidence to the contrary it 
seems reasonable to assume that the gender difference persists.
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power coefficient shifts in favour of the most ‘cared for’ member.
In the appendix it is shown that the solution to the household problem is
s* ('~8, f?)
where ‘the household discount factor’ 8 is defined by
~a _  +  (1 -  ll)° <5„
and R  =  max(i?,4 , R b ) as before. So essentially the solution is the same as for the 
single-agent household, but with a household discount factor which is a ‘generalised 
weighted average’ of the spouses’ discount factors, with weights determined by the 
bargaining power parameter.
Therefore, the analysis from the case of the single-person household largely applies. 
The effect of an increase in R  and ?/, and the introduction of a commitment device, 
will be exactly parallel to what was found above, only with a different discount factor.
The programme may increase female bargaining power However, there is a 
new mechanism to consider: The programme may increase the bargaining power of 
the woman, [i. It is the woman who has access to the savings device with higher 
return and/or less risk of appropriation, it is she who saves time in the payout queue, 
and it is she who directly gets access to what may function as a savings commitment 
device. All of these things may increase her bargaining power in the household.
It is clear from the expression for <5 above that it is increasing in 8f and 8m, and 
that its magnitude lies between that of the two spouses:
3m  <  8 <  8 f
Not surprisingly, ^  has the same sign as 8/ — 8m (shown in the appendix).
In other words, increasing the bargaining power of the woman will increase the 
household discount factor, bringing it closer to the individual discount factor of the 
woman. This in turn will tend to increase savings levels for saving households.
In the present model, an increase in /i has no effect on savings allocation. But 
stepping outside of the model, one would expect the extra savings to come in the 
form of bank savings since the increased bargaining power is directly linked to the 
availability of a private bank account.
Increasing the effective discount factor may turn non-saving households into savers 
if 8R was less than unity before but becomes larger than unity with increased female 
bargaining power. The effect on S* is therefore non-negative. It is also plausible that 
the effect on Sg  is non-negative and that on S*A is non-positive, though this does not 
strictly follow from the model.
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1.4.3 The difference in programme effect across household types
It is of interest to look for heterogeneous treatment effects across household types. The 
programme under study was linked to the child-support grant, which is almost always 
paid to women (mothers of young children). Ignoring children, grandparents and 
other relatives as economic decision-makers, there are basically two household types 
to consider: Single mothers and two-person (couple) households. Therefore, there are 
two potential sources of heterogeneous treatment effects: Two-person households have 
lower discount factors than single women, 5 < 5f. Also, only two-person households 
are exposed to the potential effect of an increase in the woman’s bargaining power fi.
The effective discount factor in the two-person household is intermediate between 
that of single women and single men. In particular, it is lower than that of households 
with a single female decision-maker. This will give a lower savings rate for the male­
headed household (single men or couples) than for the female-headed household for 
any rate of return and income.
But whether the effect of the programme is smaller or larger for male-headed 
households is sensitive to the parameters. It is shown in the appendix that for positive 
household savings s* (<5, R ), that is when SR > 1, one may write
d2s*
> 0  if a < 1,dddR
but for general a the sign is indeterminate. This means that male-headed households 
will have a lower savings rate for any rate of return R , but without making further 
assumptions it is not possible to say whether their response to an increase in R  will 
be stronger or weaker than that of female-headed households.
Above it was noted that part of the increase in the return on savings might be 
due to a ‘secrecy effect’: By keeping the savings secret the risk of appropriation may 
be reduced. Although it has not been modelled explicitly, it should be noted that to 
the extent that husbands represent a significant appropriation risk, the increase in the 
return on savings associated with the programme might be larger for couples than for 
single females (but also less likely to be reported).
Since a larger proportion of income is saved in female-headed households, an in­
crease in income y will lead to a larger increase in savings for them than for male­
headed households.
The behavioural effect may also differ depending on the type of household, but
o2 *again the direction is not clear. As shown in the appendix, is of indeterminate 
sign, which means it is not possible to make a general prediction about what type of 
household will have a larger divergence between planned (in period 0) and preferred 
(in period 1) savings levels. Thus it is not clear whether the programme’s possible 
behavioural effect would be larger for male- or female-headed households.
Since bargaining power is not a feature of single-person households, this effect 
would tend to show a larger increase in savings for two-person households.
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1.4.4 Summary of predictions on binary savings variables
This section summarises the above findings with special emphasis on the binary savings 
variables. The aim is to identify predictions which can be tested empirically.
An increase in the bank return R q may generally increase or decrease total savings 
s*. But while it can make a saver out of a non-saver, it will not make someone who 
already saves stop saving completely. Therefore, the effect on S* is non-negative. 
Similarly it may make people who do not save in bank accounts start doing so, but 
nobody who already saves in the bank will stop. So the effect on Sg  is also non­
negative, and the effect on S \  non-positive.
An increase in y may change the amount saved but will never make a saver out of 
a non-saver or vice versa, nor will it change anyone’s allocation across the products. 
Therefore, there is no effect on either S*, S*± or Sg. However, it is worth noting 
that this prediction is particularly sensitive to the simple framework used here. For 
instance, by introducing a subsistence requirement, that is a minimum consumption 
level below which the household would save nothing, it would be possible derive a 
set of conditions under which an increase in income would make the household start 
saving. Introducing a fixed transaction cost on savings could give similar results.
The introduction of a withdrawal penalty F  can make a non-saver into a saver, 
and also make some people shift their savings into the bank account from elsewhere. 
But in the current framework it will not make anyone stop saving, nor move their 
savings out of the bank. Therefore, the effect on both S* and Sg are non-negative, 
and the effect on S*A is non-positive.
The above applies to both single- and two-person households. Under the assump­
tions, female-headed households will generally have higher discount factors than male­
headed households. This implies that they are more likely to be savers for any given 
interest rate. But depending on the prevailing rate of return R b before the policy 
change, the reform could see both types becoming savers, only female-headed house­
holds becoming savers because the new rate is still not attractive enough for male­
headed households, only male-headed households becoming savers if female-headed 
households already save, or none. The same applies for the commitment device, 
whereas an increase in y is not expected to have an effect on the binary variables 
for any household type.
The collective household model implies that the effective household discount factor 
should increase (become closer to the personal discount factor of the woman) if the 
programme increases female bargaining power. For single-person households, there 
is no such effect. As mentioned above, the model itself does not predict a change in 
savings allocation with bargaining power, but as the increased bargaining power is 
somehow linked to the bank account, one might expect the extra savings to come in 
the form of bank savings.
Table 1.1 summarises the predictions in terms of the expected programme effects
1 DOES PAYMENT INTO BANK ACCOUNTS ENCOURAGE SAVING? 30
on the binary savings variables.
1.5 D a ta
The main source of data is the Labour Force Survey, a six-monthly series of surveys 
collected by Statistics South Africa. The September 2002 and September 2004 waves 
form a repeated cross-section data set.10 The outcome variables are derived from the 
following question:
“Does this household, or a household member, own any of the following financial 
assets?
1 = Money in a savings account at a bank
2 = Savings in a stokvel [South African term for ROSCA]
3 =  Savings in pension plan or retirement annuity
4 =  Unit trust, stocks or shares
5 =  Cash loans which are expected to be repaid
6 — Life insurance
7 =  Other savings, specify”
For each of the seven options, the household could answer “Yes” or “No” . There 
is no information on amounts. The primary interest is in two binary savings variables 
derived from this question: Whether the household has savings in a bank account, 
and whether the household has any savings at all. The household is taken to have 
savings in some form if the respondent has answered “Yes” to at least one of the 
options above. There is no data on savings amounts.
For simplicity, only African (black) households are considered, defined as house­
holds headed by a person of African ethnicity. There were 20,114 black households in 
the 2002 survey, and 21,725 in 2004. Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1.2. It 
is promising that there are changes in the savings variables, but that the household 
demographics seem fairly stable across groups.
In some specifications only households in receipt of the child support grant will be 
considered. Descriptive statistics for this subsample are shown in Table 1.3. The first 
two rows, bank savings and any savings, foreshadow the regression results. For this 
subsample, there are also other significant difference-in-differences when the sample is 
compared across years and provinces, in age, gender, marital/cohabiting status and 
education of the household heads, indicating the possibility of non-random selection. 
The following analyses will attempt to overcome this problem.
The econometric identification below relies on computing difference-in-difference 
estimates between Gauteng and the control provinces before (2002) and after (2004) 
the bank accounts programme was introduced. It is therefore of interest to verify that 
Gauteng and the other provinces were on a ‘common’ trend in the period before the
10Though the LFS is intended as a rotating panel survey series, there was a complete break in 
September 2004; the panel rotation in effect ‘started over’.
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programme. Table 1.4 presents summary statistics and difference-in-difference esti­
mates for 2000-2 for key variables. A common trend cannot be rejected for many of 
the key variables, although the difference-in-difference estimate is significantly differ­
ent from zero for the age of the household head and one of the five education variables.
The provincial unemployment data for 2002 and 2004 are taken from Statistics 
South Africa (2005).
1.6 Identification  and results
The basic approach is to estimate the difference-in-difference in savings associated with 
the programme. The change in probability of having savings between 2002 and 2004 
for treated households will be compared to the equivalent quantity for the households 
that were not treated. Since it is not known which households took up the bank 
account programme, only the effect of being offered the programme (‘intention to 
trea t’) can be identified.
The focus is on Gauteng as a treated province because it is known that the pro­
gramme was widely marketed to households receiving the child support grant, and 
that the take-up was substantial by September 2004. This kind of information is not 
available for the Eastern Cape and Northwest provinces. In particular the worry is 
that the programmes there were not widely marketed. Therefore, these two provinces 
are excluded from the analysis. (In general the results below are robust to the inclusion 
of all three programme provinces for some specifications, but not for all.)
The remaining six provinces serve as controls: Western Cape, Northern Cape, Free 
State, KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga and Limpopo.
1.6.1 Ordinary least squares
Begin by looking at the sub-sample of households receiving the child support grant. 
The difference-in-difference estimator is equivalent to the coefficient d in the following 
regression equation:
y% — & +  bAi +  cGi +  dAiGi +  (3Xi +
Here, Ai is a binary variable equal to 1 if observation i was made in 2004 (after the 
reform) and 0 if it was made in 2 0 0 2  (before). Gi is equal to 1 if observation i is of 
a household living in the treatment province Gauteng, and 0 otherwise. Note that 
the variable is not indexed over t since panel data are not available. One advantage 
of computing the difference-in-difference through a regression is that it allows for a 
vector of control variables (X) to be included.
The results are shown in Table 1.5. Except for the column 6 , only households who 
receive the child support grant are included in these regressions.
Column 1 is the basic regression without control variables. Households affected
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by the reform are 11 %-points more likely to have savings of any form. By way of 
benchmark, this increase corresponds roughly to moving the household up by about 
ZAR 200 (psUSD 25) in monthly expenditure, or increasing the years of schooling of 
the household head by approximately 4.5 in the sample studied.
In column 2 control variables are included (see table caption for details). The 
estimate falls to about 10  %-points but remains significant.
Columns 3 and 4 indicate that these increased savings rates are indeed driven 
by bank account savings. In column 3, the bank savings dummy is the dependent 
variable. The specification is otherwise identical to the one in column 2, and as 
one might expect the magnitude of the effect increases. In column 4 the dependent 
variable is ‘any savings except bank savings’. As expected the programme does not 
have a significant effect on this variable.
To check whether the estimated effect is really driven by the bank accounts pro­
gramme, a ‘placebo’ regression is run in column 5. Instead of looking at the change 
between 2002 and 2004, this regression examines the change between 2000 and 2002. 
The aim is to rule out that the households receiving the child support grant in Gaut­
eng were on a higher ‘savings trend’ compared to those in the other provinces. A 
positive effect in this regression would go against the finding that the programme has 
an effect on savings. The result is presented in column 5, and it seems clear that there 
was no such trend. The estimated coefficient of interest is negative and not significant 
at the 5% level. The smaller number of observations in this column is due to the 
large-scale increase in the take-up of the child support grant in the latter part of the 
period studied.
Even if child support grantees in Gauteng were not on a higher ‘savings trend’ 
compared to the control provinces, it could have jumped from 2002 to 2004 for reasons 
unrelated to the bank accounts programme. But unless there is a specific reason to 
believe that the jump applies only to households that receive the child support grant, 
one should observe it for the population at large. The regression in column 6  is similar 
to the one in column 2 , except that all black households are included whether they 
receive the child support grant or not. There is no evidence of a general increase in 
savings in Gauteng.
Column 7 begins to look at whether the effect on male-headed households (in which 
the grant-receiving mother’s spouse is present) is different from that on female-headed 
households (typically single mothers), by interacting the basic difference-in-difference 
variables with a dummy indicating whether the household is female-headed. Though 
the effect on male-headed households is still significant, it falls to 4 %-points. The 
effect on female-headed households is all of 13 %-points higher, and the difference is 
significant.
Thus the preliminary findings indicate that the programme does have an effect 
on the savings of households receiving the child support grant. It is not driven by an 
increasing trend for these households stretching back to 2000, nor is Gauteng generally
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on a higher savings trend. There is indication that the increase in overall probability 
of having savings is driven by an increase in bank account savings, and the effect is 
stronger for female-headed than for male-headed households.
Note that in most of the regressions discussed above, the coefficient on ‘Gauteng’ is 
negative and significant. The literal interpretation of this is that in 2002, child-grant 
households in Gauteng were less likely than the their counterparts in other provinces to 
have savings. In the next section, however, it will be shown that the coefficient loses 
significance in the instrumental variable estimation. This may indicate that child- 
support grantees in Gauteng differ systematically from grantees in other provinces, 
providing further indication that the use of the instrumental variables technique is 
warranted.
1.6.2 Instrumental variables
Although suggestive, the above analysis suffers from a possible bias. Because the child 
support grant expanded so rapidly in the period studied (take-up tripled between 
September 2002 and September 2004), it is hard to rule out a priori that the set 
of households receiving the grant changed differentially across the provinces. Indeed 
the difference-in-differences computed in Table 1.3 are suggestive of this. This could 
violate the underlying assumptions of the OLS analysis, and bias the results. But one 
may attempt to get around this by using grant eligibility as an instrument for grant 
take-up.
The two main criteria for accessing the child support grant are being the ‘primary 
caregiver’ (in practice, mother) of a young child, and being sufficiently poor. To avoid 
potential endogeneity of material wellbeing, the focus will be on the former criterion. 
A household will be considered age-eligible for the child support grant in a given year 
if there is a child below the age limit for the child support grant in the household in 
that year. For 2002 the grant was paid to carers of children up to the age of 6 , and 
by September 2004 carers of children up to the age of 10 years were eligible.
The standard assumptions required in order to use age-eligibility as an instrument 
for grant take-up are that age-eligibility predicts take-up, and that age-eligibility will 
not influence changes in savings decisions differentially across provinces, other than 
through take-up. The first will be verified by the data. The second assumption cannot 
be tested but seems plausible.
The starting point for the estimation is a triple-difference: Consider the increase in 
savings incidence from 2002 to 2004 for child support grantees in Gauteng. Subtract 
from this the corresponding increase for non-grant households in Gauteng. Finally, 
subtract from this difference-in-difference the equivalent quantity computed in the 
control provinces. The resulting estimate corresponds to the triple-interaction term 
in the specification below:
Hi — a + bA{ +  cGi +  dCi +  eA{Gi + f  A{Ci -f- gG{C{ -t- hA{GiCi 4- (3X -t- £i
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As before, Ai and Gi are binary variables indicating post-reform and Gauteng province 
observations. Ci is a new binary indicating that household i receives the child sup­
port grant. The triple-difference specification allows for variation in savings propensity 
across time and provinces, grantee vs. non-grantee households and all two-way inter­
actions of these.
Now the endogeneity concern described above corresponds to a possible co-determination 
of the take-up of the child support grant and the error term. In attempt to deal with 
this, an age-eligibility binary variable is constructed to serve as an instrument for 
child-support grant take-up. In 2002, the age-eligibility variable is 1 for households 
whose youngest member is six years or younger, and 0 for the others. In 2004, it is 1 
if a household’s youngest member is 1 0  or younger, and 0  otherwise.
The results are presented in Table 1.6. Column 1 represents the uninstrumented re­
gression for the complete sample of households. The coefficient on the triple-interacted 
term corresponds to a triple-difference estimate of the effect of the programme. The 
estimate of 5.7 %-points is significant. But here the worry about endogenous selection 
of grant beneficiaries remains.
Column 2 is a first-stage regression of grant take-up on age-eligibility. Based on 
this regression, a predicted value for child grant status is created. As expected, age 
eligibility is a powerful instrument for take-up.
The second stage is given in column 3. It corresponds to the base regression 
from column 1 , but with the original grant take-up variable replaced by the predicted 
variable. Because the predicted take-up is itself an estimate, the standard errors are 
estimated by bootstrapping with 200 iterations. The effect of the programme becomes 
insignificant.
Columns 5-7 repeat the exercise for the subsample of female-headed households.
The raw OLS estimate is 13.4% and significant. But this time the second-stage es­
timate is also significant, and the magnitude is almost unchanged at 13.1%. (Again, 
the standard errors were estimated by bootstrapping with 2 0 0  iterations.)
So it seems that the programme increases female-headed households’ propensity 
to save by about 13 %-points, though it has no detectable effect on the sample as a 
whole. For the subsample of female-headed households, this increase in the likelihood 
of having any savings roughly corresponds to increasing the schooling of the household 
head by almost 9 years.
Standard two-stage least squares regression analyses were also run, where age 
eligibility and its interactions were used as instruments for child grant take-up and 
its interactions. The results were qualitative similar and significant for female-headed 
households.
One potential concern with the instrument used here is that if poor people have 
more children, then age-eligibility may affect savings other than through take-up of the 
child-support grant. In particular, the concern is that poor people may be more likely 
to be age-eligible because they have more children, and also save less, thus violating
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the exclusion criterion. It is difficult to get around this by correlating age-eligibility 
with poverty measures based on income, consumption or assets, since poverty status 
may be partly determined by the number of children a household chooses to have. 
However, household demographics, including children aged 0-4 and 5-9, are controlled 
for in the above regressions. Also the notion that eligible households are poorer and 
hence less likely to save than other households is at least partly allayed by the fact that 
the correlation between having savings of any form and age eligibility in the sample 
is positive at .052.
More generally, Heckman (1997) has pointed out that the using instrumental vari­
ables in the context of programme evaluation is invalid whenever individuals select into 
the programme on the basis of unobservables in the outcome equation or variables cor­
related with these. Here, the relevant question to ask is whether unobservable factors 
which matter for the effect of the programme on savings may influence take-up of the 
child support grant after controlling for age-eligibility. For instance, assume that some 
households are more likely to start saving as a result of the bank-accounts programme 
than others because of an unobservable characteristic (say, ‘financial astuteness’). If, 
within the subset of age-eligible households, financially astute households are more 
likely to take up the child-support grant than the others, then this defeats the instru­
mental variable strategy.
This is a subtle argument which makes it difficult to establish definitively the 
validity of an instrument. But note that any characteristic which is controlled for 
in the regression passes the test, so that if the influence of ‘financial astuteness’ on 
saving can be captured by education and education is controlled for, the strategy 
is valid. The instrument is also valid if financially astute people are generally more 
likely to save than other households, but have the same response to the bank accounts 
programme. The same applies if financially astute people are more likely to save as a 
consequence of the programme but this does not correlate with their decision about 
whether to apply for the child support grant.
Columns 4 and 8  show the results of reduced-form regressions, where actual take- 
up is ignored completely. Take-up is replaced by age-eligibility in all the interaction 
terms. Though this should alleviate any concern related to the instrumental variables 
estimation, a difficulty with this specification is that age-eligibility qualifies people for 
the child-support grant as well as for the bank accounts programme. So if the take-up 
rate changed differentially across provinces (as there is some evidence for in Table 
1 .2 ) then the resulting difference-in-difference estimate may confound the effect of the 
grant itself with that of the bank accounts programme. It is found that female-headed 
treated households were 3.7 %-points more likely to have savings of any form, but the 
estimate is only marginally significant.
In all these regressions, control variables for household demographics, the educa­
tion of the household head and province dummies are included.
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1.6.3 Stronger effect on households w ith babies
There are reasons to believe that the effect on households with very young children 
might be stronger than that on households with slightly older children. Anecdotes 
suggest that the bank accounts programme was ‘pushed’ when mothers first applied 
for child support grant after giving birth. As there is paperwork to do in any case 
when signing up for the grant, it seems an opportune time to try to convince people 
to take part in the new programme. Even from the beneficiary’s point of view, the 
procedure may seem less burdensome when it is part of the general grant application 
process.
Children born after the introduction of the programme (August 2003) would have 
been 0 or 1 year old at the time of the September 2004 survey. Therefore, separate 
reduced-form regressions are run for two subsamples of households: Those where the 
youngest child was 0 or 1 year old, and those where the youngest child was 2 or 3 years 
old. It is expected that the programme effect is stronger for the former subsample.
The results are given in Table 1.7. There is no significant effect on either subsample 
as a whole in columns 1 and 2. But when coefficients are allowed to differ by gender 
of the household head in columns 3 and 4, a significant effect of 28.8% is found 
for the households with babies, and a much smaller and only marginally significant 
effect for the households with children in the age group 2-3. In columns 5 and 6  the 
following control variables are included: Age, education (binary variables indicating, 
respectively, any education, at least six years, at least nine years, at least 12  years, 
and higher education) and marital status of the household head, counts of the number 
of male and female household members in the age groups 0-4, 5-9, 10-19, etc for every 
decade of age up to 70+, dummies for household size (1 , 2, 3, 4-6 and 7+ members) and 
province. Here it is found that there is a significant programme effect on the savings 
of female-headed households of both categories, but the estimated coefficient for the 
‘baby households’ is about twice as large as the one for households with somewhat 
older children, and the difference is statistically significant.
These reduced-form regressions thus corroborate the main finding, by identifying 
the expected heterogeneous treatment effects.
1.6.4 Portfolio composition
It seems clear that the programme increased the likelihood of having savings of some 
form, at least for female-headed households. The initial analysis suggested that this 
increase stems from an increase in bank account savings. To verify this, an instrumen­
tal variables regression similar to those reported in Table 1.6 was run for each of the 
savings types recorded in the survey. Only female-headed households were included 
in this analysis.
The results are given in Table 1.8. Only the second-stage regressions are reported. 
Standard errors were estimated by bootstrapping with 200 repetitions. As expected,
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the biggest sub-component in the savings increase appears to be bank savings. But 
there are also significant increases in the propensity to save in stokvels (ROSCAs) and 
life insurance.
None of the savings types are significant and negative, which speaks against a pure 
portfolio reallocation story. The results indicate that the programme led to an overall 
increase in savings, as opposed to a portfolio re-allocation, and that this increase 
was primarily in the form of bank savings. However, there is an important caveat to 
this conclusion: There is only binary information on savings in each of these forms. 
So the analysis would not be able to capture partial portfolio re-allocations, where 
amounts held in some of these asset classes were reduced without running them down 
completely.
1.6.5 A cost reduction story?
In the theory section it was shown that one possible mechanism by which the pro­
gramme could increase savings was by increasing the return on savings, in particular 
by reducing the cost of depositing cash in a branch. If this is so, then households with 
high initial cost of saving should display a stronger effect from the programme. The 
aim of this section is to investigate that hypothesis.
The main formal savings product available to the general black population before 
the programme was the post office savings book. Therefore, distance to the nearest 
post office should provide a rough measure of the costs of saving before the programme. 
The surveyed households were asked: “How long, in minutes, does or would it take 
from here to reach the nearest of each of these facilities using the usual means of 
transport?
a. Food market
b. Public transport
c. Pre-Primary/Pre-school centre
d. Primary school
e. Secondary school
f. Clinic
g- Hospital
h. Post office or post office agent
i. Welfare office”
For each of the listed options, the possible answer options were 0-14 minutes, 
15-29 minutes, 30-44 minutes, 45-59 minutes, 60 minutes or more, or “Don’t know.” 
Consider the following stylised story: Before the programme, a grant recipient 
wishing to save regularly in a postbank account would have to 1 ) travel to the grant 
cash payout point once a month, and 2) travel to the post office once a month. After 
programme treatment, a client would no longer have to travel to receive the grant as 
it would be paid directly into her account. However, she would still have to travel to
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an ATM at least once a month in order to withdraw some money.
There is no direct information on the distance to either cash payout point or ATM 
location, but they are both likely to be in the community centre. If it is assumed 
that the ATM and the cash payout point are equally distant from the household’s 
dwelling, then the effect of the programme is to save one trip a month to the post 
office. Therefore, the programme effect should increase with distance to the post office.
To test this, reduced-form regressions (i.e., ignoring grant take-up) were run in 
which the reform effect was allowed to vary by distance to the nearest post office. 
1 Post-reform’, ‘treatment province’ and their interaction, were each interacted with 
distance variables. The results are presented in Table 1.9.
One would expect the coefficient of interest to increase as the distance to the 
nearest post office increases. This is indeed what is found for the first three distance 
brackets. In column 1 the full sample is used. It is found that for households living less 
than 15 minutes away from a post office, the coefficient is negative and not significant. 
The effect for the next two distance brackets are sequentially higher, and significantly 
so. But for the fourth bracket there is significant drop which effectively brings the 
effect back down to zero. For the fifth bracket there is again a positive increase in the 
effect, bringing the effect up to a high level as expected. In column 2 only female­
headed households are included. The pattern is similar, except that the last distance 
bracket only brings the reform effect back up to the level of the third distance bracket. 
Note that again it appears that the effect is stronger for female-headed households.
Overall the results support the transaction costs story, at least in part. Both 
regressions are in accordance with the story except for the fourth distance bracket, 
at which point the effect seems to ‘dip’ down to around zero before recovering to the 
expected level at the next bracket.
In addition to the increased return on savings mechanism, the behavioural mecha­
nism may also have a heterogeneous effect with respect to distance. If the programme 
increases the propensity to save because beneficiaries only withdraw enough money for 
planned purchases, then the cost of additional withdrawals may increase with house­
hold distance from the nearest ATM. On the other hand, it is perhaps more plausible 
that the correct metric in this case is the distance between the ATM and the place 
where the temptation to buy on impulse is most likely to occur. If these are both 
located in a village or urban commercial centre, then there is less reason to expect the 
behavioural effect to increase with the household’s distance to the nearest post office.
1.7 D iscu ssion
Referring back to the predictions made in Table 1.1, it is clear that the general finding 
that the programme was associated with an increase in savings, primarily in bank 
accounts, is consistent with three of the proposed mechanisms. It could be explained 
by an increase in the return on bank savings, the use of the bank account as a com­
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mitment device, and/or an increase in female intra-household bargaining power. On 
the other hand, the finding is not consistent with a pure income effect in this setup. 
So one may reject the hypothesis that the only effect of the programme is to make 
the grant beneficiaries better off in terms of saved queuing time and easier access to 
grants.
There is also some support for the claim that the effect increases with the expected 
preprogramme cost of saving, which strengthens the increased-return hypothesis.
It seems clear that the identified programme effect is driven primarily by female­
headed households. However, in this setup the only mechanism that unambiguously 
predicts a differential effect across household types is increased female bargaining 
power, and its prediction is the opposite of what the empirics suggest. This weakens 
the bargaining-power mechanism as a potential explanation.
The increased-return and commitment-device stories predicted an indeterminate 
differential effect across household types. They are both potentially consistent with 
the gender effect. An increased return on savings could explain the observed findings if 
the increase is large enough to make previously non-saving female-headed households 
into savers, but not enough to attract male-headed households with lower effective 
discount factors. Similarly if the withdrawal penalty is enough to deter female-headed 
households from changing their savings plans but not enough to do the same for the 
more impatient male-headed households, this could also drive the observed effect.
But another possible explanation for the gender effect cannot be ruled out: There 
could be a measurement error due to an imperfect flow of information within the 
household. It is likely that in most cases the survey respondent is the household head. 
But it may be that only the grant recipient, the woman, knows about the savings kept 
in the bank account. Thus it is possible that increased savings will only be observed if 
the grant-receiving mother herself is the head of the household, which would explain 
why the effect can only be detected in these households. It is not possible to distinguish 
this mismeasurement bias from a true cross-gender difference in saving.
In summary, it seems likely that the effect is driven at least in part by an increased 
return on savings. The results are also consistent with a behavioural (commitment- 
device) effect. Participants probably also benefit from easier grant access, but in the 
current framework this has no predicted effect on savings and therefore cannot on its 
own explain the findings. However, as mentioned, it is not particularly difficult to 
think of plausible extensions of the model where an increase in income could have 
an effect on the binary savings variables. Though it may be present, any effect of 
increased female bargaining power will tend to work in the opposite direction from 
what was found here, so it is probably not the main mechanism. It may be that the 
discussed mechanisms drive the stronger effect for female-headed households, or it 
may be due to survey measurement error stemming from imperfect intra-household 
information flow.
There are some caveats to the findings. One is that it only looks at binary sav­
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ings variables; clearly information on amounts would have provided for richer results. 
Hence the results on portfolio allocation should be treated with caution as it is not 
possible to identify a savings draw-down in a product unless it is emptied completely. 
Also, the focus of the analysis has been on households in receipt of the child support 
grant, and it is not possible to guarantee that other groups would show the same type 
of response.
There is also a concern related to what people perceive as savings. Imagine a 
household with very little money. If this was held in a bank account, they may 
have answered in the affirmative when asked whether they have savings. But it is 
important to ask whether the same amount, held in cash, would have been thought 
of as savings. If not, the variables used in this study would be mismeasured and the 
results potentially biased. But even if this were to be the case, the programme does 
seem to have an allocative effect in that bank savings do increase. Even if no new 
savings were engendered, driving savings into the formal part of the economy through 
financial intermediaries is important because it addresses the wedge between savings 
and investment that has been pointed to in the literature on African development.
Gauteng is an urban province with relatively good infrastructure. Therefore, one 
should be cautious in concluding that the identified effect of the programme in Gauteng 
could be replicated in the rest of the country, or in rural areas more generally.
In future research, it may be interesting to look at the longer-term effect on the 
savings variables. For example, one might look at whether the results hold up two, 
three or five years. In a follow-up paper to their original article on commitment 
savings devices, Ashraf, Karlan & Yin (20066) find that two and a half years after 
the savings accounts under study were originally opened, the treatment group no 
longer had significantly more savings than the control group. The authors suggest 
four possible explanations, of which one is that it may be necessary for the bank to 
constantly ‘market’ the product for it to be used continuously. An advantage of the 
programme studied here is that it does not need to be re-marketed or re-issued to keep 
working. Once set up, electronic payments recur until the child graduates from the 
grant scheme. This may mean that the increased propensity to save may be a more 
long-lasting effect than the effect identified by Ashraf et al.
This paper has argued that how income is received matters for household saving. 
In principle it was always possible for beneficiaries of the child support grant to save 
money, either in a postbank savings account, in a stokvel (ROSCA) or at home. But 
the results show a strong increase in the incidence of savings associated with payment 
of the grant directly into a bank account, indicating that these other options were 
too costly, too risky or too easily accessible for impulse spenders. Electronic payment 
is put forward as a practical way of increasing intermediated household savings in 
developing countries. This is one concrete example where ‘being banked’ matters.
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Table 1.1: Predicted programme effects on binary savings variables
Effect on binary variables 
Possible ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Differential effect across
mechanism - M _ w. 0 Savings except household typesAny savings Bank savings bank
Increased return on K1 .. Kl .. Kl ... . . .. . Non-negative Non-negative Non-positive Indeterminatebank savings
Income effect None None None None
Commitment device Non-negative Non-negative Non-positive Indeterminate
Increased female Kl .. Kl .. 0 m o  Effect only on male-. . . Non-negative Non-negative? None? . . . . .bargaining power headed households
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Table 1.2: Descriptive statistics for the whole sample
Gauteng
2004
Control
2004
Gauteng
2002
Control
2002
DID
(a-b)-(c-d)
Any savings 0.619
[0.486]
0.525
[0.499]
0.548
[0.498]
0.483
[0.500]
0.0297
[.0184]
Bank savings 0.568
[0.495]
0.377
[0.485]
0.481
[0.500]
0.367
[0.482]
.0774***
[.0133]
Any savings except 
bank
0.293
[0.455]
0.359
[0.480]
0.271
[0.445]
0.296
[0.457]
-.0409*
[.0201]
ROSCA savings 0.098
[0.298]
0.116
[0.320]
0.052
[0.222]
0.102
[0.302]
0.032
[.0362]
Pension fund savings 0.095
[0.293]
0.103
[0.303]
0.114
[0.318]
0.087
[0.282]
-.0344**
[.0131]
Unit trust savings 0.017
[0.129]
0.008
[0.090]
0.026  
[0.160]
0.011 
[0.104]
-.00644*
[.00274]
Loans to others 0.019  
[0.137]
0.021 
[0.142]
0.029
[0.169]
0.022  
[0.148]
-.00843***
[.00212]
Life insurance savings 0.190
[0.393]
0.216
[0.412]
0.182
[0.386]
0.186
[0.389]
-.0222*
[.0114]
Other savings 0.004
[0.066]
0.034  
[0.182]
0.022  
[0.147]
0.014  
[0.116]
-.0383*
[.0163]
Child support grant 0.154
[0.361]
0.288
[0.453]
0.053
[0.224]
0.106
[0.308]
-.0808***
[.0187]
Age of head 42.7
[13.5]
46.8
[16.4]
42.7
[14.0]
46.6
[16.2]
-0.187
[.472]
Female head 0.311
[0.463]
0.481
[0.500]
0.301
[0.459]
0.440
[0.496]
-.031**
[0119]
Head married 0.537
[0.499]
0.463
[0.499]
0.541
[0.498]
0.502
[0.500]
.0343*
[.0156]
Head any education 0.907
[0.290]
0.754
[0.431]
0.914
[0.280]
0.770
[0.421]
0.00875
[00978]
Head at least 6  years 
of schooling
0.785
[0.411]
0.562
[0.496]
0.785
[0.411]
0.571
[0.495]
0.00763
[0163]
Head at least 9 years 
of schooling
0.531
[0.499]
0.343
[0.475]
0.537
[0.499]
0.329
[0.470]
-0.0202
[0102]
Head at least 12 
years of schooling
0.280
[0.449]
0.163
[0.370]
0.277
[0.447]
0.163
[0.370]
0.00337
[0102]
Head has higher 
education
0.052
[0.221]
0.024
[0.153]
0.059
[0.236]
0.028  
[0.164]
-0.00365
[00262]
Household size 3.1
[2.2]
4.1
[2.7]
3.3
[2.4]
4.1
[2.8]
-0.155
[0862]
Observations 2708 13753 2817 11744
Standard deviations for columns 1-4 in brackets. Standard errors for the DID 
column are clustered by province.
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Table 1.3: Descriptive statistics for households receiving the child support grant
Gauteng
2004
Control
2004
Gauteng
2002
Control
2002
DID
(a-b)-(c-d)
Any savings 0.531
[0.500]
0.498
[0.500]
0.409
[0.493]
0.483
[0.500]
.107**
[032]
Bank savings 0.455
[0.499]
0.324
[0.468]
0.336
[0.474]
0.334
[0.472]
.129***
[0332]
Age of head 44.0
[13.2]
47.3
[15.5]
46.1
[14.7]
47.8
[15.4]
-1.57**
[619]
Female head 0.392
[0.489]
0.572
[0.495]
0.477
[0.501]
0.543
[0.498]
-.113***
[00542]
Head married 0.600
[0.490]
0.550
[0.498]
0.497
[0.502]
0.556
[0.497]
-| *** 
[0131]
Head any education 0.876
[0.330]
0.708
[0.455]
0.899
[0.302]
0.725
[0.447]
-0.0147
[019]
Head at least 6 years 
of schooling
0.715
[0.452]
0.485
[0.500]
0.725
[0.448]
0.506
[0.500]
0.00344
[0372]
Head at least 9 years 
of schooling
0.443
[0.497]
0.263
[0.440]
0.430
[0.497]
0.250
[0.433]
-0.00761
[0177]
Head at least 12 
years of schooling
0.189
[0.392]
0.090
[0.286]
0.087
[0.283]
0.088
[0.284]
.0939***
[00691]
Head has higher 
education
0.010
[0.097]
0.003
[0.050]
0.000
[0.000]
0.003
[0.057]
0.0108
[00687]
Household size 5.2
[2.3]
5.9
[2.7]
5.9
[3.1]
6.5
[3.0]
-0.187
[105]
Observations 418 3963 149 1244
Standard deviations for columns 1-4 in brackets. Standard errors for the DID column are
clustered by province.
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Table 1.4: Descriptive statistics for households receiving the child support grant - 
common trend check
Gauteng
2002
Control
2002
Gauteng
2000
Control
2000
DID
(a-b)-(c-d)
Any savings 0.409
[0.493]
0.483
[0.500]
0.279
[0.451]
0.322
[0.468]
-0.0312
0.025
Bank savings 0.336
[0.474]
0.334
[0.472]
0.209
[0.409]
0.221
[0.416]
0.0138
0.025
Age of head 46.1
[14.7]
47.8
[15.4]
50.5
[14.8]
48.2
[15.2]
-3.980***
0.69
Female head 0.477
[0.501]
0.543
[0.498]
0.628
[0.486]
0.606
[0.489]
-0.0885
0.048
Head married 0.497
[0.502]
0.556
[0.497]
0.279
[0.451]
0.435
[0.496]
0.0960*
0.042
Head any education 0.940
[0.239]
0.735
[0.442]
0.860
[0.349]
0.709
[0.455]
0.0529
0.029
Head at least 6 years 
of schooling
0.765
[0.425]
0.516
[0.500]
0.698
[0.462]
0.482
[0.500]
0.0338
0.032
Head at least 9 years 
of schooling
0.470
[0.501]
0.260
[0.439]
0.326
[0.471]
0.264
[0.441]
0.148***
0.026
Head at least 12 
years of schooling
0.128
[0.335]
0.098
[0.298]
0.128
[0.336]
0.085
[0.280]
-0.0130
0.011
Head has higher 
education
0.034
[0.181]
0.013
[0.113]
0.035
[0.185]
0.025 
[0.157]
0.0109
0.011
Household size 5.9
[3.1]
6.5
[3.0]
5.9
[3.0]
6.4
[3.2]
-0.00682
0.069
Observations 149 1244 86 398
Standard deviations for columns 1-4 in brackets. Standard errors for the DID column are
clustered by province.
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Table 1.5: OLS results
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Dependent
variable Any savings Any savings
Bank
savings
Any savings 
except bank Any savings Any savings Any savings
Post-reform 0.015 .113*** 0.0484 .14** .17*** .0613*** .116***
[ .0 3 2 ] [ .0 2 2 8 ] [ .0 2 7 6 ] [ .0 4 2 3 ] [.0 3 1 1 1 [ .0 1 3 7 ] [ .0 2 5 4 ]
Gauteng -.0737* - 124*** -0.0237 -.232*** _ 118*** -.0958** -.112***
[ .0 3 2 7 ] [ .0 1 3 2 ] [ .0 1 5 4 ] [ .0 2 1 4 ] [ 0 1 7 9 ] [ .0 3 8 2 ] [.0229]
Post-reform * .107** .0953** .113*** 0.0525 -.0583* 0.0247 .0 4 0 7 * *
Gauteng [ .0 3 2 ] [ .0 2 9 7 ] [ .0 2 8 8 ] [ .0 3 2 3 ] [ .0 2 4 2 ] [ 0 1 8 5 ] [ .0 1 4 7 ]
Female head -0.0412
[ .0 6 2 4 ]
Female head * post-reform -0.00546
[ .0 3 6 5 ]
Female head * Gauteng -0.0232
1-0472]
Female head * post-reform * Gauteng .13***
[ .0 3 1 1 ]
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period studied 2002-4 2002-4 2002-4 2002-4 2000-2(placebo) 2002-4 2002-4
Households
Child
Support
Grantees
Child
Support
Grantees
Child
Support
Grantees
Child Support 
Grantees
Child
Support
Grantees
All
Child
Support
Grantees
Observations 5774 5774 5774 5774 1877 31022 5774
Standard errors, shown in brackets, are robust and clustered at the province level. The control variables used are the 
age, gender, marital/cohabiting status and education indicators (any education, 6+, 9+, 12+ years of schooling and 
higher education) for the household head, household size (indicators for 1, 2, 3, 4-6 and 7+ members), household 
demographics (the number of household members by gender/age groups 0-4, 5-9, 10-19, etc for every decade of age up 
to 70+), the provincial unemployment rate at the time of the survey, and province fixed effects. The unemployment rate 
was not available in 2000 so it’s not included in column 5. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
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Table 1.6: IV results
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Dependent variable: Anysavings
Child
support
grant
Any
savings
Any
savings
Any
savings
Child
support
grant
Any
savings
Any
savings
Post-reform 0.0534** 0.158*** 0.0312 0.0439 0.0786*** 0.186*** 0.0655* 0.0745**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.033) (0.024) (0.017) (0.022) (0.036) (0.022)
Gauteng -0.102*** 0.0659*** 0.0593 -0.102*** -0.184*** 0.0608*** 0.0263 -0.180***
(0.0080) (0.012) (0.048) (0.011) (0.0068) (0.015) (0.070) (0.011)
Post-reform * Gauteng 0.0303 -0.0760*** 0.0427 0.0307 0.0338* -0.0899*** 0.0423 0.0380
(0.019) (0.019) (0.031) (0.024) (0.017) (0.022) (0.031) (0.022)
Child support grant 0.00776
(0.022)
0.0950
(0.063)
0.0363
(0.038)
0.114
(0.12)
Child support grant * post-reform -0.0207
(0.017)
-0.000162
(0.033)
-0.0489
(0.025)
-0.0606*
(0.035)
Child support grant * Gauteng -0.153***
(0.023)
-0.0834
(0.052)
-0.125**
(0.035)
-0.137**
(0.069)
Child support grant * post-reform * Gauteng 0.0569**
(0.018)
-0.00196
(0.031)
0.134***
(0.026)
0.131**
(0.066)
Age-eligible 0.209***
(0.022)
0.0207
(0.012)
0.222***
(0.020)
0.0282
(0.027)
Age-eligible * post-reform 0.00415
(0.016)
-0.0159
(0.019)
Age-eligible * Gauteng -0.0399**
(0.016)
-0.0495**
(0.015)
Age-eligible * post-reform * Gauteng 0.000721
(0.017)
0.0365*
(0.018)
Regression type OLS 1 st stage 2nd stage Reducedform OLS 1 st stage 2nd stage
Reduced
form
Sample All All All All Female­
headed
Female­
headed
Female­
headed
Female­
headed
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 31022 31022 31022 31022 13472 13472 13472 13472
Counts of the number of male and female household members in the age groups 0-4, 5-9,10-19, etc for every decade of age up to 70+, 
education level of household head (any education, 6 years or more, 9  years or more, 12 years or more and higher education) and 
province dummies, are included as controls. Standard errors, shown in brackets, are clustered at the province level for columns 1, 2, 4 
and 5. For columns 3 and 6 they are bootstrapped with 200 repetitions. *'* significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
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Table 1.7: Reduced-form regressions by the age of youngest household member
Dependent variable: Any savings 1 2 3 4 5 6
Post-reform 0.0347
[.0194]
0.0333
[.0193]
0.0303
[.0275]
.0411*
[0184]
0.0307
[0263]
.0689***
[0155]
Gauteng .0524***
[.0139]
.109***
[.0185]
.0854***
[.0202]
.096***
[0243]
-.0987***
[0139]
-.0287*
[0143]
Post-reform * Gauteng 0.0318
[.0194]
0.00129
[.0193]
-.0574*
[0275]
-0.0171
[0184]
0.0123
[0246]
-.0707***
[0153]
Female head -.153***
[0329]
-.1*
[0461]
-.0795*
[0355]
-0.0253
[0349]
Female head * post-reform 0.0181
[0338]
-0.00511 
[0189]
0.0236
[0376]
-0.00491
[0222]
Female head * Gauteng -.196***
[0329]
-0.00366
[0461]
-.139***
[0294]
-0.0664
[0349]
Female head * post-reform * Gauteng .288***
[0338]
.039*
[0189]
.209***
[0371]
.0975***
[0172]
Age of youngest household member 0-1 2-3 0-1 2-3 0-1 2-3
Control variables No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 4027 3536 4027 3536 4027 3536
The results indicate that the programme effect is stronger for households where the youngest child is 
0 or 1 year old. This corroborates the story that mothers of babies born after the introduction of the 
programme were primary targets of the programme, possibly because they in any case needed to do 
some paperwork in order to apply for the grant. Standard errors, shown in brackets, are clustered at 
the province level. Control variables are the age, education (binary variables indicating, respectively, 
any education, at least six years, at least nine years, at least 12 years, and higher education) and 
marital status of the household head, counts of the number of male and female household members 
in the age groups 0-4, 5-9,10-19, etc for every decade of age up to 70+, dummies for household size 
(1, 2, 3, 4-6 and 7+ members) and province. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 
10%.
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Table 1.8: Portfolio composition
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Dependent variable Banksavings
ROSCA
savings
Pension
savings Unit trust
Loans
outstanding
Life
insurance
Other
savings
Gauteng .0764** -0.0224 0.00999 .00578* -0.00447 0.0322 0.00526
[ .0 3 6 1 ] [ .0 2 5 5 ] [ .0 1 2 9 ] [ 0 0 3 3 7 ] [ 0 0 3 8 7 ] [ 0 9 3 2 ] [ 0 1 5 3 ]
Post-reform .0633*** 0.0168 0.0169 -0.00322 0.00177 0.0245 0.0266
[ .0 1 4 4 ] [ .0 3 8 4 ] [ 0 1 4 1 ] [ 0 0 5 1 8 ] [ 0 0 2 5 6 ] [ 0 2 7 ] [ 0 2 1 6 ]
Post-reform * Gauteng 0.021 0.046 -.0573** 0.00182 -.00737* -0.0264 -0.0356
[ .0 1 7 7 ] [ .0 3 7 7 ] [ 0 2 8 6 ] [ 0 0 3 7 3 ] [ 0 0 3 8 6 ] [ 0 2 3 9 ] [ 0 2 6 5 ]
Child support grant -0.0256 0.0902 -0.00895 0.00814 -0.0235 0.0503 0.0217
[ .0 5 9 ] [ .0 5 8 9 ] [ 0 4 8 3 ] [ 0 1 3 8 ] [ 0 1 6 6 ] [ 0 6 9 8 ] [ 0 3 2 ]
Gauteng * child support grant -.11* -.0987** 0.00427 -.0132** 0.0152 0.0101 .0308*
[ .0 6 1 9 ] [ .0 4 9 1 ] [ 0 1 0 8 ] [ 0 0 6 7 ] [ 0 1 2 7 ] [ 0 1 5 9 ] [ 0 1 7 7 ]
Post-reform * child support grant -0.0793 -.0765*** -0.0158 -0.00616 0.00345 -.0383** 0.00226
[ .0 4 9 6 ] [ .0 2 4 ] [ 0 2 1 8 ] [ 0 0 4 3 8 ] [ 0 0 9 6 7 ] [ 0 1 9 2 ] [ 0 1 9 4 ]
Post-reform * Gauteng * child support grant .211** .087** .0812* -0.00754 -0.00942 .0802** -0.0236
[ .1 0 7 ] [ .0 4 3 1 ] [ 0 4 2 4 ] [ 0 0 5 6 5 ] [ 0 0 9 4 4 ] [ 0 3 9 5 ] [ 0 1 9 5 ]
Observations 13472 13472 13472 13472 13472 13472 13472
Second stage IV regressions with take-up of the child support grant predicted by age eligibility. Standard errors, shown in brackets, are 
bootstrapped with 200 repetitions. The number of household members in the age groups 0-4, 5-9,10-19, etc for every decade of age 
up to 70+ separately by gender, and province dummies, are included as controls. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant 
at 10%.
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Table 1.9: Exploring the transaction cost story
Distance to nearest post office/agent
1 2 
Any savings Any savings
All distances -0.0296
[.0221]
-0.0326
[.0231]
15 minutes or more .0459**
[.0148]
.0951***
[.0111]
30 minutes or more .0209**
[.00843]
.0487***
[.00894]
45 minutes or more -.0783***
[.0157]
-.164***
[.0149]
60 minutes or more .144***
[.0278]
.168***
[.0279]
Households All
Female­
headed only
Observations 30852 13397
Savings regressed on reform effect interacted with distance to nearest 
post office or post agent. If the effects of the reform are driven by 
transport costs alone, one would expect the estimated interaction terms 
to increase with distance. Only the coefficients on the triple-interaction 
terms (post-reform * treatment province * distance) are shown, but the 
double interactions (post-reform * distance and treatment-province * 
distance) were also included for each of the distance bands, along with 
the control variables: Age, education (any education, at least six years, 
at least nine years, at least 12 years, and higher education) and marital 
status of the household head, counts of the number of male and female 
household members in the age groups 0-4, 5-9, 10-19, etc for every 
decade of age up to 70+, and dummies for household size (1, 2, 3, 4-6 
and 7+ members) and province. Robust standard errors, shown in 
brackets, are clustered at the province level. *** significant at 1%, ** 
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
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A  P roofs
A .l  Optimal savings in the single-agent household case 
The Lagrangian function corresponding to the problem is
L ( s A , Sb,  I A i I b )  = u (y ~  SA — SB ) + 5u{y  + SAR a  +  S b R b )  + 1 a s A + 1 b s Bi
where 7  ^ are the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the inequality constraints. The 
solution satisfies
- u ' ( y  -  s A -  s B ) +  S Ri u ( y  +  s AR A +  sb R b ) +  7 ; =  0, i = A ,B
liSi  =  0, i = A ,B
l i  > 0, i = A, B
Si > 0, i = A ,B
First consider the case where positive amounts are held in both savings products. 
This implies = 7 # =  0 and so
W( y  - s A -  s B ) =  =
u’(y +  sa RA + sb R b )
So both products are used only when the associated returns are equal. Total savings
s — s 4^ T sB can be determined as if there were a single product with return R  =
R a =  R bi but the allocation between the two products is indeterminate. (The client 
is indifferent as the products are identical.)
Next, if the client does not save at all one may write
“^  + 0 +  0 ! = 1 < ^ ,  i =  A, B.u'{y +  0  + 0 )
So when none of the two products provides a return which ‘beats’ the discount factor, 
nothing is saved.
Finally, consider the case where one non-negativity constraint is binding and the 
other is not. Assume that sa > 0 and sB =  0. This implies
u’{y - s A -  sB) =
u'(y +  sa R a +  sb R b )
So when one product gives a better return than the other, the agent saves as if only 
the product with the higher return were available. She saves nothing in the product 
with the lower return.
To summarise, define R  =  max (Ra , R B). The client will save nothing if 5R < 1
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and a positive amount if 5R > 1. The total amount saved is given by:
u'(y -  s)
u'(y +  sR)
{ y - s ) ~ °
{y + sR)~& 
y + sR
= 5R 
= 6R
(■5R)a =  9y -  s
y +  sR  =  y9 — s6 
0 - 1
s =  y
= y 
=  y
R  + 9 
1 - 0 - 1 
1 + R 0 - 1 
1 -  {SR)-1 
1 + R {SR)~
where the temporary variable 9 has been introduced.
If R a =  R b  the agent is indifferent between the products and allocation is inde­
terminate, but otherwise she will put all her savings in the product with the higher 
return.
A .2 Optimal savings in the two-person household
The first thing to realise is that the household will not use a savings product with 
inferior return. So the household will behave as if there were a single product with 
return R = max(i?y4 , R b )-  Non-satiation guarantees that the budget constraints are 
binding. Using them to eliminate cm\ and cm 2 from the system, the problem becomes
max fi [u(cf i) +  Sfu{cf2)\ + (1 -  /x) [u(y -  s -  cn ) + Smu{y + s R -  cf2)\
C f l , C f 2 , S
s.t. s > 0 .
The corresponding Lagrangian function is
£ (c /1}c/2 , s,7) =  y  [u(cfi) + Sfu{cf2)\+{ 1 -  fi) [u{y -  s -  cji) +  Smu{y +  s R - C f 2 )]+ 7'
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where 7  is the Lagrange multiplier for the non-negative savings constraint. The solu­
tion must satisfy:
l i u { c f i ) - { l - f i ) u ' { y - s - C f i )  =  0
fid fu' (cf  2 ) — (1 — /x) 5mu'(y +  s R - C f 2) = 0 
(1 -  /i) [ ~ u ' ( y -  s -  c/i) + 6mRu>'(y + sR -  cf2)] + 7  =  0
7 s =  0
7  > 0
s > 0
When s > 0 this yields a system of three equations in three unknowns:
u'(y -  s -  cf i) _  y
1 -  f i
u'(y +  sR  -  C f 2 ) Sf /I
^ (c /2) &m 1
u'(y -  s -  cf l )
u'(y + sR — cf2) —  Sm.R
Rearranging:
y — s — Cfi — 1 1 =  a
cf  1 V M
t/ +  s i ? - c / 2  _  f l - f i S = b
C/ 2  \  fi S f
y s r>\~a   jjy---------- -- (SmR) — dy + s R -  cf2
where the temporary quantities a, b and d are introduced. Solve the first two equations 
in terms of Cf\ and Cf2, and divide the first by the second to simplify the third equation:
y — s
cf i  =
Cf 2 =
1 Cl
y +  sR
1 + b
o f n  =  d 
bcf2
Substitute the solutions for c/i and Cf2 into the third and simplify to find
J L L ' = l + ± * d = edi
y +  sR  1 + b a
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where another temporary quantity e has been introduced. Now solve for s to find
1 — ed
with
or
=  y 
- y
=  y
1 + eRd 
1 -  e (<SmR)~a 
1 +  gR  (5mR)
1 -
1 -  R  (^ 6 R y a
S a  =  - 6 °
Si
e
o 6 + 1  
l +  o b
I + 1 -
( \ a
f t )  + 1
f ia SJ  +  (1 -  /i)Q <5a xq m
+ (1  -  M)‘
When s =  0, the following system results:
u' ( y -  c/ i )  =  A*
u'(cfi) 1 -M
u ' ( y - c f2) Sf  y
Sm 1 f i
_ r 0 , 7 1 r p
, /  \  —  d 771 XL +  . . >  O m - t lu ' ( y - c f2) 1 - f i u ' { y - c f2)
Proceeding as above it is not difficult to show that 7  > 1 implies
RS < 1 .
So the household saves a positive amount only when the available return ‘beats’ the 
household discount factor. Again this exactly parallels the individual case.
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D ifferentiating  th e  household discount facto r w ith  re sp ec t to  fi Differentiate 
£ with respect to /i to find:
OS
d/i
aix° 1S J - a ( l  - n ) a J <5“  [ ^ “  +  ( 1 - / * ) “ ] 
-  {fia SJ  +  ( 1  -  m ) “  C ]  f a / * 0 " 1 -  a  ( 1  -  / * ) “ _ 1
f101  (1 -  /<)“ («/ (1 -  /*) -  C /*  +  /*<*/ -  «m(l -  /*))
Lu° +  (l -  M) “ ]2
a/i0 " 1 (1 -  r «, ™ ,
=  [M« + ( i - , r f  {4' " u
Since a > 0, the term in the final curly braces has the same sign as Sf — 8m. Also, 8C 
is an increasing function of 5. Therefore, has the same sign as Sj — 8m.
A.3 Signing
d2s* _  d ds*
08dR ~  dR~dS
^  .a_1 R 1- a + R - a
d R ya  ((5Q + R 1~Q)2
yaS
ya5
((1 -  a )  R~a -  aR~a~l ) (8a +  R}~af  
q_ 1 - 2  (5Q +  R : - Q) (1 -  a) R~a (Rl~Q +  R~a)
(5a +  R 1-*)4
Q_ 1 ((1 -  a) R~a -  a R - * - 1) (Sa +  R1“a) -  2 (1 -  a) R~a (R1^  +  R~a)
— rv \ 3{5a + R 1- a)
y a S ^ R - 1
(5a + R l ~a) 
yaSa~l R~a
{5Q +  R ! - q) 
yct5a~l R~a
3 { ( 1 - a - a f T 1) ((5Q +  i?1~a ) - 2 ( 1 - a )  {R + l ) R ~ a}
3 {R~a [R(l -  a) -  a -  2 (1 -  a) (R +  1)] +  <5Q (l -  a  -  a i T 2) }
{R~a [R(a -  1) + a  -  2] +  5Q (l -  a  -  a / T 1) }
(■5a + R 1~Q)3
This is positive whenever the expression in curly braces is positive, that is when
2]+(5Q( l - a - a JR~1) > 0
R~a [R(a -  1) + a -  2] > ^  {R(a -  1) +  a)
R{RS)~a > R(a  — 1) +  aR(a — 1) +  a — 2
R (R8)~a > 2R(a — 1) +  a —
R{R5)-Q -  1 >
2
(i2+ l ) ( a - l ) - l ‘
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Though it is generally not determined whether this inequality holds, it does hold when 
a < 1: Conditional on a < 1 the left-hand side is strictly positive since
R > (RS)a ,
and the right-hand side is strictly negative.
o2 * • . « *So the sign of is positive when a < 1 but generally indeterminate.
A .4 Signing ^
d2s* 0 a8a- 1R - ° ( R +  1)
-y-d62 08* (8a + R l -°tf
{a -  1) 8a~2 (8Q T R 1-* ) 2 -  5a~l 2 (<5a +  R 1-*) ada~l
y a R  a (R + 1) +  R i-c j  _  2a(j0 j
(6° +  R
= yaR  ° ^  f   ^ {R '~ a ( a -  1) -  Sa (a +  1)}
which is negative when a < 1 but generally indeterminate.
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2 Funeral insurance
2.1 In trod u ction
Funeral insurance is probably one of the earliest forms of insurance. Its popularity is 
well documented throughout history and across the globe, and it remains the single 
most popular insurance type in large parts of today’s Africa. Yet the study of this 
phenomenon has been largely neglected by economists. The purpose of this paper is 
to provide an explicit treatment of funeral insurance as a distinct form of insurance.
Funeral insurance is not life insurance. What these two types of insurance have 
in common is that the covered event is the death of a specified individual. But it is 
a remarkably consistent feature of death-triggered insurance, both historically and in 
modern-day developing countries, that the payout takes the form of funeral-related 
goods and services. In contrast, a life insurance policy typically pays out in cash. 
It is a central claim of this paper that the distinction is fundamental, and that the 
type of insurance preferred will depend on the circumstances and characteristics of 
the decision-maker.
Today insurance companies in many parts of the world offer formal funeral in­
surance policies. But the history of funeral insurance, and by implication the his­
tory of insurance more generally, is closely linked to that of funeral societies. From 
ancient Greece and Rome, via mediaeval Europe and Victorian Britain, to large 
parts of modern-day Sub-Saharan Africa, the most common way to take out fu­
neral insurance has been to join a funeral society. The primary function of these 
groups is precisely to pool the risk associated with the death of members or their 
close relatives, by using members’ contributions to organise funerals. Historians 
have argued that funeral societies are the precursors of modern insurance companies 
(Fingland Jack 1912, Trenerry 1926). More recently, funeral societies have attracted 
the attention of economists as instances of informal or semi-formal risk-pooling groups.
South Africa may be unique in that both formal and informal funeral insurance, 
as well as life insurance, are widely held. Traditional funeral societies compete with 
modern insurance companies in providing funeral insurance, and the latter also offer 
a range of life insurance policies. Traditional African communities coexist with a fully 
industrialised modern economy and world-class formal-sector financial institutions. 
South Africa is therefore close to being the ideal testbed for the ideas presented here.
The analysis of funeral insurance as a distinct form of insurance is the main contri­
bution of this paper. Its ancient roots and importance in the contemporary developing 
world are highlighted. It is also emphasised that even though the association between 
funeral insurance and funeral societies has been and continues to be important, the 
concept of funeral insurance should be distinguished from its implementation.
A model is presented in which funeral insurance is contrasted with life insurance. 
Whereas previous work on informal insurance has focused on the sustainability of the
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contract, this paper abstracts from organisational form and asks under what circum­
stances funeral insurance will be preferred to general life insurance. In order to focus 
on the mechanism of interest, none of the two insurance types are presented with a cost 
or efficiency advantage over the other. Funeral insurance is modelled as life insurance 
bundled with a constraint on the use of the payout. Therefore, funeral insurance can 
serve as an inter-generational commitment device when the preferences of the policy­
holder (parent) differs from those of the beneficiary (child). Conditions are derived 
under which each type of insurance is preferred: For low levels of wealth, and for high 
levels of income, the agent will take out funeral insurance. For intermediate levels of 
wealth and income she prefers life insurance, or a mix of life and funeral insurance 
at a non-binding level. For high levels of wealth and low income, the agent prefers 
not to take out any insurance. The model also contributes to the insurance literature 
by suggesting that even conventional life insurance is not necessarily motivated by 
altruism in the usual sense of the word.
The theoretical findings are held up against reality in the form of empirical analysis 
of data from South Africa. A large, nation-wide marketing survey usually available 
only in summary form is used here for the first time to run robust regressions of 
insurance choices on personal and household characteristics. The results of the analysis 
are consistent with one of the predictions of the theoretical model, but data limitations 
permit only a very limited empirical test.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section provides an intro­
duction to funeral societies and funeral insurance. The following section describes the 
importance of funeral and life insurance in contemporary South Africa. Thereafter a 
brief overview of the relevant literature is given, before the model is presented, solved 
and interpreted. Next is the empirical section, and finally a conclusion.
2.2 Funeral societies  and th e  h istory o f insurance
Funeral societies are mutual risk-pooling groups designed to ensure decent funerals 
for members and/or other persons nominated by them, typically close relatives or 
household members. On the death of a covered person, the group will provide some 
combination of cash, labour and goods towards the funeral. Many collect fixed cash 
premia at regular intervals, while some transact only when a death occurs.11
11 Funeral societies should be distinguished from rotating and accumulating savings and credit asso­
ciations (ROSCAs/ASCAs). In all these types of arrangement, a fixed amount of money is typically 
collected regularly from each member. But in a ROSCA payout rotates amongst the members in a 
systematic fashion, typically determined either randomly or by bidding. During a cycle of ROSCA 
operation, each member will receive the payout exactly once (Besley, Coate & Loury 1993). ASCAs op­
erate on a similar principle but, as the name suggests, funds may be accumulated and held or invested 
jointly rather than being paid out immediately after collection. In contrast to these arrangements, 
funeral society payouts are triggered by random events (the death of a covered person) and there 
is no guaranteed relationship between contribution and payout over the the period of membership. 
Therefore ROSCAs and ASCAs are fundamentally savings and credit devices (though various other 
functions have been suggested in the literature), whereas a funeral society is at the core a risk-pooling 
arrangement. Perhaps MIA - mutual insurance association - would be a suitable acronym?
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Funeral societies have a long history and global reach. Solon the Athenian states­
man (ca. 638-558 BC) passed a law regulating their activity (Parrott 1985). They 
were widespread during the Roman empire, operating on basic principles that are 
virtually indistinguishable from those found in many parts of the world today.12 In 
mediaeval Europe they were organised by professional guilds. During the industrial 
revolution in England, funeral societies could be set up as local community groups, 
or organised as large friendly societies (Cordery 2003). For a vivid description of the 
importance of burial societies in British working class life in the late 19th and early 
20th centuries, see Johnson (1985).
The history of funeral societies is yet to be written, but Van der Linden (1996) 
covers the history of mutual benefit societies more generally in 26 countries across Eu­
rope, North and South America and Asia. Though many of the institutions described 
also cover events other than death, funeral cover seems to have been an important 
component of most of them, and not uncommonly the only one. No doubt their endur­
ing popularity is in part due to the inherent insurability of death risk: Moral hazard 
is generally less of a problem than for other common risks.
Pure funeral societies still exist in rich countries, though they are now of little 
importance compared to formal insurance (public or private). But funeral societies 
are still popular in the developing world, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa.13
Funeral societies are often said to be informal insurance providers, but it is worth 
clarifying what is meant by ‘informal’ in this context. As Dercon et al. (2006) point 
out, funeral societies often operate on a clearly defined, sometimes written, set of rules. 
The terms of the ‘policy’ are known in detail, including who is covered, conditions of 
cover and size of premia and payouts. Often there is also a system of fines for non- 
compliance with these rules, and at least in South Africa it is not uncommon for 
funeral societies to have a special uniform which is compulsorily worn by members at 
meetings and funerals. Strict rules are the norm rather than an exception. However, 
most funeral societies are not registered with the authorities and hence not regulated. 
They are not part of the de-personalised formal economy. In particular, it is doubtful 
whether a member of a funeral society who feels unjustly treated has recourse to
12 “Early in the Empire, associations were formed for the purpose of meeting the funeral expenses 
of their members, whether the remains were to be buried or cremated, or for the purpose of building 
columbaria, or for both. These co-operative associations (collegia funeratlcia) started originally among 
members of the same guild [..] or among persons of the same occupation. They called themselves by 
many names, cultores of this deity or that, collegia salutaria, collegia iuvenum, etc., but their objects 
and methods were practically the same. If the members had provided places for the disposal of their 
bodies after death, they now provided for the necessary funeral expenses by paying into the common 
fund weekly a small fixed sum, easily within the reach of the poorest of them. When a member died, a 
stated sum was drawn from the treasury for his funeral, a committee saw that the rites were decently 
performed, and at the proper seasons [..] the society made corporate offerings to the dead.” From 
Johnston (1903).
13A non-exhaustive literature search identified academic work with references to burial societies in 
contemporary Botswana (Ngwenya 2003), Zimbabwe (Dhemba, Gumbo Sz Nyamusara 2002), Ethiopia 
and Tanzania (Dercon et al. 2006), Ghana (de W itte 2003), India (Rutherford 2000) and Thailand 
(Bryant & Prohmmo 2002) as well as South Africa.
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the enforcement apparatus of the formal judiciary. This clearly distinguishes funeral 
society membership from policies offered by formal insurance companies.14
However, funeral insurance is not provided only by funeral societies. A quick 
internet search for ‘funeral insurance’ at the time of writing this was enough to confirm 
that formal insurance companies currently offer specific funeral policies in several rich 
countries including the USA and the UK.
One might object that funeral societies offer more than insurance. After all, 
whereas formal insurance is ‘only’ a financial product, funeral society colleagues are of­
ten also friends who may provide a sense of belonging and support, especially in times 
of grief. Nonetheless, virtually all writers on the subject agree that participants think 
of their funeral societies as a financial arrangement first and foremost. In support of 
this, a nationally representative South African survey asked funeral society members 
why they belonged to these groups. The three most popular responses were “Help with 
funeral arrangements” (79%), “To help when there is a death” (53%), and “Provide 
funerals the family deserves” (24%). Many fewer selected the response “To provide 
comfort and support” (13%) or “To socialise” (4%) (FinMark Trust 2003). Likewise, 
Dercon et al. (2006) report that in both Ethiopia and Tanzania, the primary focus 
of funeral societies is to provide funeral cover. It is undeniable that funeral societies 
have social aspects, but these alone cannot explain the popularity of the institution.
The history of funeral insurance is closely linked with that of funeral societies, 
and even today funeral insurance is much more likely than life insurance to be offered 
informally. Nevertheless, formal-sector funeral insurance exists, and so do informal 
insurance groups which are not exclusively concerned with funeral cover. It is a key 
message of this paper that the concept of funeral insurance should be distinguished 
from the organisational form of the provider. Neither depends on the other, though 
funeral insurance appears to be popular in circumstances that favour informal provi­
sion.
2.3 Funerals and funeral insurance in Sou th  A frica
Funerals are expensive events in Africa15, and South Africa is no exception. Case, 
Garrib, Menendez & Olgiati (2008) find that funerals amongst black households in 
a region of KwaZulu-Natal on average costs a median annual income. Roth (2001) 
conducted in-depth interviews with twelve households in a township in Eastern Cape, 
ten of whom had recently been involved in the funeral of a relative. He reports that the 
average expenditure on a funeral in his small sample was 15 times monthly household 
income.
14It is possible that Bloch, Genicot & Ray (2008) have in mind another understanding of ‘informal’ 
when they write that most informal insurance is bilateral and that “our existing idea of insurance as 
taking place within an explicit “club” of several people may be misleading”.
ir,Arhin (1994) describes lavish funeral customs in Ghana, and Adamolekun (2001) does the same 
for Western Nigeria. Dercon et al. (2006) report “substantial” costs in Ethiopia and Tanzania.
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The high cost of funerals are related to their great cultural importance in Sub- 
Saharan Africa. Traditional belief holds that the spirits of the dead can influence the 
lives of the living and must be treated with respect. Often relatives will come from far 
away and the cost of catering for them for several days can be substantial (Roth 2001). 
But often there is also a strong component of ‘conspicuous consumption’, and a sense of 
shame if the deceased’s family cannot afford an elaborate funeral.16 Case et al. (2008) 
deem the importance of funerals to be ahead of births, graduations and weddings in 
traditional family and community life.
The social importance of funerals, and no doubt also the death toll of the AIDS 
epidemic, partly explain why both formal and informal funeral insurance are ‘big’ in 
South Africa. Porteous & Hazelhurst (2004) conclude that funeral society membership 
is around 18% of the population (8  million out of 45 million). As a proportion of 
black adults, membership is even higher. In the formal sector, funeral insurance is 
the single most popular type of policy, with about 8 % (3.5 million) of the population 
being policy-holders. Since a typical policy will cover close relatives as well as the 
policy-holder, the proportion of the population that is covered by some form of funeral 
insurance is substantially larger than these numbers suggest.
2.4 R e la ted  literature
This paper relates to earlier work on the demand for life insurance. Modern economic 
analysis of the problem starts with Yaari (1965), who introduces life insurance as a 
way of coping with uncertain lifetime in a model with either a bequest motive or a 
credit market combined with a non-negative terminal wealth requirement. Fischer 
(1973) characterises insurance demand functions in a discrete-time model. He finds 
that an agent who lives off his wealth is unlikely to ever purchase insurance, a result 
which will have a parallel in this paper. Lewis (1989) was the first to consider the 
point of view of the insurance beneficiaries, a consideration which will be important 
in this paper. He lets insurance demand be determined by the child beneficiary, on 
whose behalf life insurance is arguably purchased.
Economists have long studied the question of why people leave bequests. Some be­
lieve that bequests are accidental and caused by the combination of uncertain lifetimes 
and imperfect insurance markets. On the other hand, Bernheim (1991) uses evidence 
from the demand for life insurance to argue that bequests are intentional. This paper 
nuances the discussion by positing that even if they are intentional, bequests are not 
necessarily altruistic in the usual sense. Demand for insurance may be motivated by 
a concern for specific types of post-mortem expenditure that have more to do with 
preserving one’s own good name and afterlife than with ‘warm glow’ or an empathetic 
concern with the welfare of the next generation.
16In some funerals the price tag on the coffin is not removed, but displayed for everyone to see. 
Warnecke (1994) as quoted by Thomson & Posel (2002).
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In contrast to this paper’s focus on a specific type of insured event, much of the ear­
lier work on risk-coping in developing countries have looked at consumption smoothing 
in general (Besley 1995a, Morduch 1999, Dercon 2002). Townsend (1994) tests for, 
and rejects, full risk-sharing in Indian villages. This finding has been verified by later 
studies, and the robustness of the result has inspired a substantial body of theoretical 
work relating imperfect enforcement to bounds on the risk-sharing contracts that may 
be written (Ligon, Thomas & Worrall 2002).
Arnott & Stiglitz (1991) is perhaps the best-known article on the interaction of 
formal and informal insurance. The authors find that in the presence of moral hazard 
and formal insurance, informal insurance is beneficial if the informal insurers have an 
information advantage, but can be harmful if not. This paper abstracts completely 
from moral hazard, arguing that death-triggered insurance is much less likely to be 
subject to this problem than many other types of insurance. This is in line with 
Fafchamps & Lund (2003) who find that funerals are better insured with informal 
gifts and loans than other events such as crop failure and mild illness.
A small literature focuses on commitment devices in developing countries, a good 
example of which is Ashraf, Karlan & Yin (2006a). These are related to the theoretical 
literature on hyperbolic discounting (Harris & Laibson 2003). But not much is known 
about devices that operate between generations.
This paper parallels parts of the literature on a more well-known (to economists) 
form of group-based informal finance: The rotating savings and credit association 
(ROSCA). Levenson & Besley (1996) look at the determinants of ROSCA participa­
tion in Taiwan. In a situation semblant of that of funeral societies in South Africa, 
they deem ROSCA membership in Thailand surprisingly high (at least a fifth of all 
households are members) for a newly industrialised country.
Funeral societies have received relatively little attention from economists. Dercon 
et al. (2006) discuss funeral societies in Ethiopia and Tanzania, and Bold (2007) test for 
risk-sharing in Ethiopian societies. Bryant & Prohmmo (2002) ask why burial society 
premia in a village in North-Eastern Thailand are equal for all households irrespective 
of risk. A good source of information on the workings and characteristics of funeral 
societies in South Africa is Thomson & Posel (2002). Roth (2001) is a case study of 
formal and informal funeral insurance in a rural South African township. Ardington & 
Leibbrandt (2004) find a strong correlation between formal employment and take-up 
of funeral insurance. Keswell (2004) looks at the relationship between employment 
and membership of informal networks such as ROSCAs and funeral societies.
2.5 T heory
2.5.1 The model
There are two agents, a parent and a child, and two periods. The parent faces a 
risk of death. In the first period she allocates her starting wealth w between own
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consumption, insurance and savings. With probability q she survives to the second 
period, receives an income y and consumes all her resources before the game ends. But 
with probability 1 — q she dies at the end of the first period. If so, the child inherits her 
savings and receives any insurance payout. The child allocates her resources between 
the parent’s funeral and her own consumption before the game ends.
The parent’s expected utility at the beginning of the first period is
V  =  u  ( C j )  +  P {qu  (C2) + ( 1  -  q) <j> (/)} ,
where Ci, C2 are the parent’s consumption variables, /  is funeral expenditure in the 
case of death, and u()  and </>() are the instantaneous utility functions for consumption 
and the funeral, respectively. /3 is a discount factor.
If the parent dies at the end of the first period, the child is the active agent 
in the second period. She derives utility from the funeral as well as from her own 
consumption,
U =  l4> ( / )  +  (! -  7) u (c -  a) -
Here, 7  < 1 is a weight which determines how the child values funeral expenditure
relative to her own consumption, c. The constant a > 0 has the effect of increasing the 
emphasis on consumption for lower resource levels. It may be thought of as defining 
a minimum consumption level: As the child’s available resources decrease towards a, 
the child will prioritise consumption to the detriment of expenditure on the parent’s 
funeral.
Note that in this set-up there is no altruism in the usual sense of the word. How­
ever, both agents derive utility from the parent’s funeral. This may be thought of as 
a common concern for a public good: The family’s reputation or ‘name’. It may also 
be thought of as the parent’s utility from the anticipation of a dignified departure,
and for the child it may form part of the grief process.
There are two types of insurance, both of which pay out in the event that the 
parent dies. A life insurance payout can be disposed of as the child wishes, whereas a 
funeral insurance payout can only be spent on the parent’s funeral. This is the only 
difference between the two types. Both types of insurance are equally priced with 
premia equal to a  > 1 times the actuarially fair rate.
2.5.2 A solution
In order to arrive at an analytical solution, some further simplifying assumptions 
are made: The parent’s consumption in the first period is fixed. Then w can be 
renormalised to be net of first-period consumption, and the utility associated with 
it may be disregarded. Notation may also be simplified by writing C =  C2 . Time 
discounting is no longer important and may be ignored (/3 =  1), and it is also assumed 
that there are zero returns on savings.
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Also, specify
u(x) = <j) (x ) =  In (a;).
The logarithmic utility function has the advantage of being tractable, and also satisfies 
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA).
The parameters w , y and a are taken to be non-negative, and q and 7  must be 
contained in the interval (0,1). Actuarially unfair insurance requires a > 1. These 
parameter assumptions are quite innocuous, but a final assumption is more substan­
tial:
1 +  <7 -  ?
1 +  7 - (2-1)
Intuitively, insurance cannot be too unfair. The robustness of the theoretical findings 
with respect to relaxation of this constraint will be discussed below. Note that right- 
hand side is smaller than unity, so the inequality implies the natural requirement that 
the premium should not exceed the payout.
The assumptions required for an analytical solution to the problem are now in 
place. The child’s problem is to maximise
U = 7  In (/)  + (1 — 7 ) In (c -  a)
subject to her budget constraint
f  + c = W, 
where W  is the child’s total resources, and
f > F
where F  is the funeral insurance payout (which may be zero.) The solution defines 
f  (W, F); funeral expenditure as a function of child resources and funeral insurance 
cover.
The parent’s problem is to maximise her expected utility
V  =  g l n ( C )  +  ( l - ? ) l n ( / ( W , F ) ) ,
with respect to life and funeral cover L and F,  subject to the constraints
C  =  w s
W  = wd
ws = w -  a (1 -  q) (L + F) + y
Wd = w — a (1 -  q) (L +  F) + (L +  F)
L > 0
F  > 0.
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Here, ws and wd are the total available resources at the beginning of the second period 
in the cases of survival and death, respectively. In both cases, the amount saved from 
the first period is just the starting wealth minus insurance premium. In the survival 
case the parent receives the income y in addition, while in the death case the child 
receives any insurance payout. Negative insurance cover is ruled out.
The primary interest is in the parent’s decisions with regard to insurance cover, L 
and F.  The solution is found by applying the standard method of backward induction: 
The child’s solution is identified first, conditional on the parent’s decisions. The child’s 
solution is substituted into the parent’s insurance problem, which can now be solved 
as a single-period problem.
The following proposition characterises the parent’s optimal insurance decisions, 
L and F.
Proposition: There are three cases, depending on the magnitude of y relative to
w.
1. Binding funeral insurance. For
k w  — a
V >
with
the solution is
k -
1 — K,
7 - ( 7 ( 1 - < * ( ! - 9 ) ) ) '  
7 0  (1 -  q)
F  =  w + y
a
L = 0,
and the funeral insurance payout is binding on funeral expenditure.
2. Non-binding insurance. For
(a — 1 )w  — aqa kw — aE- L -  < y < —------- ,
1 — a (1 — q) 1 — k
total insurance cover is
(1  — a (1 — q)) y — (a — 1 ) w +  aqaF  + L = a (1 — a  (1  — q))
Moreover, the breakdown of cover into L and F  is indeterminate except that F  must 
satisfy
( i P a q  1 — a  (1  -  q)F  < 7   w H------------------ y — aa a
so that it is not binding on the child’s funeral expenditure.
3. No insurance. For
(a — 1) w — aqa
y K ,—  n—1 -  a ( l  -  q)
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the parent does not take out any insurance.
Proof’ The proof is in the appendix.
Note that as long as funeral insurance is not binding on the child’s funeral ex­
penditure, it is equivalent to life insurance. This must be so since the only difference 
between the two types of insurance is that funeral insurance payouts must be spent 
on the funeral. Hence in case 2, the parent is indifferent between a pure life policy, 
and any mix of life and funeral cover which sums to the same amount, as long as the 
funeral insurance constraint is not binding on the child. This case may therefore be 
called ‘non-binding insurance’.
The result is illustrated in Figure 2.1 and may be characterised as follows. Hold 
y fixed at an arbitrary level. For sufficiently low w, the parent takes out funeral 
insurance only. The level of cover is binding on the child’s expenditure decision. As 
w increases, an increasing amount of funeral cover is taken out until a boundary is 
crossed at which there is a discontinuity in the amount of insurance held and beyond 
which insurance is not binding. As w continues to increase, total cover decreases but 
the parent is indifferent to its breakdown in F  and L as long as F  stays below the 
level at which it binds the child. At some point insurance cover reaches zero. As w 
increases beyond this point the parent does not take out any insurance.
Intuitively, the parent has three options. The first is to incur the unfair insurance 
premium on the whole funeral expenditure amount by purchasing a binding amount of 
funeral insurance. The second is to ‘top up’ the child’s inheritance with non-binding 
insurance. In this case only a fraction 7  of the total inheritance will go towards funeral 
expenses, but the advantage is that the actuarially unfair insurance mark-up a  is only 
paid on the top-up as opposed to on all of the funeral expenditure amount. Finally, 
there is the option of not taking out any insurance, in which case the child will simply 
spend a fraction 7  of inherited wealth on the funeral.
At low levels of inheritable wealth w relative to survival-state income y, funeral 
expenditure in the absence of insurance is low relative to y. Therefore, the parent 
wishes to transfer resources from the survival-state to the death-state by taking out 
binding funeral insurance. As inheritable wealth increases relative to y , the marginal 
benefit of transferring resources from the survival state to the death state decreases, 
as does the willingness to pay the unfair mark-up on the insurance premium. At some 
point, the value of ‘topping up’ the inheritance with a smaller amount of non-binding 
insurance becomes preferable, because the advantage of not paying the actuarially 
unfair mark-up on the whole funeral expenditure outweighs the loss associated with 
the fact that the child spends only a fraction 7  of her resources on the funeral. Beyond 
this wealth level, the parent takes out non-binding insurance. As wealth increases 
further, there is a point beyond which the cost of the actuarially unfair insurance 
outweighs the benefit of consumption smoothing altogether. Beyond this point, the 
parent does not take out any insurance.
The least innocuous assumption underlying the above proposition is arguably (2.1).
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Intuitively it says that the insurance premium cannot be ‘too unfair’. Though this 
paper will proceed on the basis that the assumption holds, it is interesting to consider 
how the parent’s decisions would change if it were violated. A formal result will not 
provided, but it can be shown that the qualitative effect of violating the assumption 
is to eliminate case 2 of the proposition, namely the ‘non-binding’ case. Thus there 
would be only two cases, binding funeral insurance and no insurance. Effectively, 
there would be zero demand for life insurance.
In non-mathematical terms, the reason is as follows: Whether (2.1) holds or not, 
binding funeral insurance is preferred when wealth is sufficiently small relative to 
income. As wealth increases while income is held fixed, the gain from insurance 
diminishes, because wealth is available in both the survival and the death states. This 
holds for both life (or more generally, non-binding) and funeral insurance. There are 
three critical level as wealth increases: a) One beyond which non-binding is preferred 
to binding insurance, b) one beyond which no insurance is preferred to binding funeral 
insurance, and c) one beyond which no insurance is preferred to non-binding insurance. 
Assumption (2.1) determines the ordering of these critical levels. As long as the 
assumption holds, threshold a) is lower than b) and c). This gives rise to a region of 
non-binding insurance between a) and c). If (2.1) does not hold, then c) is lower than 
a), implying that the parent will transit directly from binding funeral insurance to no 
insurance as wealth increases.
2.5.3 M apping theory to data
The aim of the next section is to hold the theoretical findings up against the light in 
the form of empirical analysis of household data. In order to do this it is necessary 
to extract from the theory some predictions regarding the relationships of quantities 
that are observable in the data.
The main predictions from the model relate wealth and income to the insurance 
decisions taken by the parent. As will become clear below, the data makes it difficult 
to control for wealth with any precision. The analysis will therefore largely be limited 
to analysing how insurance choice depends on certain crude measures of wealth, when 
income is held fixed. The main testable prediction is that increasing wealth for a 
fixed level of income is associated with a transition from funeral insurance to life 
insurance. Increasing wealth further is expected to be associated with a transition out 
of insurance.
Since there is no information on insured amounts, premia or other contractual 
terms in the data, the focus of the empirical analysis will be on the binary take-up 
decisions of the household with respect to funeral and life insurance. As the insurance 
decisions are likely to be jointly determined, a natural choice of empirical specification 
is the bivariate probit:
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If L and F  are the binary decision variables, then let
L =
1 , if X(3l + £l > 0
0 , otherwise
(2 .2)
F  = 1, HX(3p'F£F'> Q
0 , otherwise
Here, X  is a matrix of explanatory variables common to both equations. It will 
include measures of wealth and income along with control variables. The error terms 
are bivariate normally distributed with expectation 0 , variance 1 and covariance p,
Given this specification and data, the parameters f3L, fdF and p can be estimated 
using maximum likelihood. The primary interest is in those components of /3L and 
(3F which relate to wealth and income.
Apart from variables relating to income, wealth and insurance cover, the model 
also has parameters for the probability of survival q, the weight of funeral expenditure 
in the child’s welfare function 7 , minimum consumption a, and insurance efficiency 
parameter a. These are not easily translated into observable quantities in the data 
available, and will therefore be captured in the error terms.
2.6 E m pirics
2.6.1 Data
The data are taken from the 2004 wave of the All Media and Products Survey published 
by the South African Advertising Research Foundation. It is part of a long-running 
series of surveys covering South Africans aged 16 and over. The sample of 24,489 
overrepresents the higher income brackets, but weights inversely proportional to the 
probability of selection are provided to allow inferences about the underlying popula­
tion. The weights are used throughout the following analysis. The survey’s emphasis 
is on commercial product usage, but there are also sections covering personal data, 
family and housing situation, and leisure activities.
However, the survey is primarily an individual, rather than a household, survey. 
The survey respondent is a randomly chosen person above the age of 16 in the selected 
household. Most of the questions relate to the survey respondent and there is limited 
household-level information. A further problem is that there is only binary information 
for a number of the most relevant variables. For instance, respondents are asked 
whether they have a life cover policy, but no further details on the policy are provided. 
The data appendix provides more detail on the construction of the variables used.
Total monthly household income data is provided as a discrete variable, i.e. as
(2.3)
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falling in one of 33 income ranges. The income variable used here is the logarithm of 
the midpoint of the reported income range.
The main theoretical predictions are the relationships between household wealth 
and income and insurance take-up. However, the available data limits the extent to 
which the predictions may be tested. The ideal would be to have sufficiently rich 
data to look at the effect of changing wealth while holding income constant, and 
vice versa. This is all the more important since wealth and income are typically 
strongly correlated. However, there is no precise measure of wealth in the data. In 
the following analysis, car and home ownership are used to proxy for wealth. This 
is fine as far as studying the predictions of wealth-holding is concerned, because it is 
possible to control for income at a more fine-grained level. But it makes it difficult to 
isolate the importance of income on insurance decisions, because it is not possible to 
control for wealth holdings to any level of accuracy.
Weighted summary statistics are provided in Table 2.1. They suggest that 22% 
of South Africans aged 16 or over belong to a funeral society. This is somewhat 
lower than earlier estimates (it corresponds to 6 .6  million members versus 8  million 
as suggested by Porteous & Hazelhurst (2004)). Furthermore, 12% personally have 
formal funeral insurance. Given the data it is not possible to distinguish those who 
do not personally have any formal or informal funeral insurance but is covered by 
someone else’s policy, from those who are not covered at all. 1 1 % of the population 
have life insurance.
2.6.2 Main results
As a graphical precursor to the results, consider Figure 2.2. Here the take-up of 
funeral insurance and life insurance are plotted against household income. The general 
pattern appears to be in line with the theoretical prediction that the take-up of funeral 
insurance is not very sensitive to income. On the other hand, life insurance take- 
up shows a strong positive relationship with income. But the chart does not hold 
wealth fixed. One could imagine a similar chart where total assets or wealth is on the 
horizontal axis, but scalar data on wealth is not available from the survey.
The empirical specification is given by (2.2),(2.3). The control variables which 
will be used are binary variables coding respondent age in decadal bands, rural lo­
cation, province, whether the respondent has own children and whether he/she is 
married/cohabiting. The observation weights are used in all regressions, and stan­
dard errors are robust and clustered at the province level.
The main results are presented in Table 2.2. Each bivariate probit regression is 
reported over two columns, one for funeral insurance and another for life insurance. 
In regression 1 the take-up variables are regressed on wealth with income as the only 
control variable. For funeral insurance the coefficients on the wealth variables are 
negative but not significantly different from zero. For life insurance the coefficients
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are positive and significant (but only marginally for home ownership). In regression 2 
the controls for age, rural location and province are included. For funeral insurance the 
wealth coefficients are still negative and now significant (but only marginally so in the 
case of home ownership). Income remains insignificant, while car ownership is negative 
and significant. For life insurance the coefficient on car ownership remains positive and 
highly significant, whereas the coefficient on home ownership is not. Regression 3 adds 
controls for having own children and being married or cohabiting. Though potentially 
endogenous, the latter two controls are interesting because insurance behaviour is 
likely to change over the lifecycle. The results are qualitatively similar to those for 
regression 2 .
Overall then, it seems that owning a car makes funeral insurance less likely and life 
insurance more likely, holding income fixed. This is in line with the predictions. The 
results for home ownership are similar in magnitudes, but the coefficients are mostly 
not significant or only marginally significant.
It is worth pointing out the potential hazard in putting household income and 
indicators of wealth on the right-hand side of all these equations. Clearly there are 
concerns of endogeneity and a real possibility of joint determination of income and 
wealth on the one hand, and insurance decisions on the other. For example, both 
might be related to variation in unobservable ability which is captured in the error 
terms. But it is difficult to avoid this problem given that the main predictions of 
the theoretical model concern precisely the relationship between insurance, income 
and wealth. The upshot is that all findings presented here must be interpreted with 
caution: They are indicative, rather than watertight.
These regressions were run on the sample as whole. But ethnic groups are still 
largely segregated in South Africa, and arguably have different cultures. It is also 
true that funeral societies are primarily associated with black (African) and coloured 
people, rather than with the white and Indian sub-populations. As both wealth and 
cultural affinity may be predicated on ethnicity, the above regressions may in fact be 
confounding cultural differences with wealth effects. To investigate this, the analysis 
is repeated for the subsample of black and coloured households alone.
The results are presented in Table 2.3. As above, and in line with theory, car 
ownership is found to be consistently predictive of life insurance. However, though 
the relation between home ownership and life insurance is positive in magnitude, it is 
not significant except in regression 1. In all three regressions, none of the coefficients 
relating car and home ownership to funeral insurance are significant at the 5 % level. 
Since all significant coefficients are in line with the predictions, it is probably fair to 
say that these results are at least weakly supportive of the theory.
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2.6.3 Funeral insurance and the informal sector
Hitherto the focus has been on funeral insurance as a distinct form of insurance, 
rather than on its implementation. However, no treatment of funeral insurance would 
be complete without at least a brief discussion of its close ties with the informal sector.
The availability of formal-sector funeral insurance, along with the existence of 
informal and semi-formal risk pooling groups that do not provide funeral insurance, 
provide evidence that the link between funeral insurance and the informal sector is 
not one of logical necessity or sufficiency. Nevertheless, a large proportion of the 
people who have, or have ever had, funeral cover obtained it by joining a funeral 
society. Likewise it seems that funeral insurance has been a particular preoccupation 
of informal and semi-formal insurance groups throughout history and remains so today.
It is natural to ask what caused these correlations of funeral insurance with the 
informal sector on the one hand, and of life insurance with the formal sector on the 
other. It could be that the societal parameters which favour funeral insurance are 
the same as those that favour informal sector solutions. Or there could be something 
inherent in funeral insurance which makes it more widespread in economies dominated 
by the informal sector.
It is often posited that informal sector finance may have an information and/or 
enforcement advantage over the formal sector. However, it is not immediately clear 
how these would favour funeral insurance over life insurance. It is also true that 
informal risk pooling groups may be able to offer moral support, comfort and friendship 
where formal insurers do not. But again it is not obvious how these factors would 
favour funeral insurance over life insurance.
Using the model above, funeral insurance can be associated with low wealth relative 
to income, low survival probability, and a low weight on the parent’s funeral in the 
child’s payoff function. To the extent that these factors are also associated with the 
informal sector, they may partly explain why funeral insurance is so often provided 
informally.
Though important, these matters will not be further discussed here. There is, 
however, one aspect of the link between funeral insurance and the informal sector 
which has a direct bearing on the empirical findings presented above: Since funeral 
insurance is primarily provided by the informal sector (read: funeral societies) even in 
South Africa, there is a possibility of confounding the correlates of funeral insurance 
with those of the informal sector more generally. These concerns may be partially 
alleviated by ignoring informal insurance and comparing formal funeral insurance 
with formal life insurance. That is the aim of the next set of regressions.
The results are presented in Table 2.4 . The only estimate which is consistently 
distinguishable from zero is the positive relation between car ownership and life insur­
ance, and this aligns well with the theory. Regression 1 finds a positive and significant 
relation between home ownership and funeral insurance, which runs counter to the
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predictions. However, when further controls are added in regressions 2 and 3 the 
coefficient is small, negative and not significant. Like in full-sample analysis, home 
ownership is positively related life insurance, but the coefficient is only significant in 
regression 1 . Again, the findings are at least weakly supportive of the theoretical 
predictions.
2.6.4 Further analysis
One concern with the findings so far is related to the fact that the survey was primarily 
an individual, rather than a household, survey. Some information, such as the income 
and asset ownership variables used here, was nonetheless collected at the household 
level. But importantly, the insurance take-up variables are specific to the respondent. 
In other words, the data tell us whether the respondent has personally taken out 
funeral or life insurance, but not whether the household as a whole has insurance. 
Some households that have insurance will not appear as such in the data because the 
respondent is not the main policy-holder. It is likely that the household head or his 
spouse are the policy-holders in most cases.
One way to counter this problem would be to restrict the analysis to the subsample 
of households where the respondent is likely to be a financial decision-maker, but it is 
not clear that the identification of decision-makers could be done with enough precision 
to be worthwhile. However, another option is to look at the sub-sample of households 
in which the respondent does personally hold insurance. Of course, this restriction 
would imply that it is no longer possible to draw any inferences regarding insured 
versus uninsured households. And there would still be under-reporting of a specific 
kind: Households with both types of insurance but in which the respondent only has 
one type, will be confounded with households with only one type of insurance. But 
arguably, measurement error is less of a concern with this restriction. In effect, the 
choice between funeral and life insurance is now observed at the household level.
In Table 2.5, columns 1-3 present the results of regressing life insurance take-up 
on the same variables and controls as before, but where the sample is restricted to 
households in which the respondent has personally taken out insurance. The results 
clearly indicate that given insurance take-up, increasing asset ownership conditional 
on income is associated with life insurance rather than funeral insurance. Columns 4-6 
repeat the exercise for holders of formal insurance only, i.e. it compares life insurance 
to formal-sector funeral insurance. The qualitative interpretation does not change, 
though in column 4 the coefficient on home ownership is not significant. Columns 7-9 
focus on the black and coloured subpopulation, with the same qualitative result.
In summary, the results of the empirical analysis are supportive of one of the 
predictions from theory. For all the specifications, it was found that asset ownership 
is positively related to life insurance take-up, as predicted. The negative relation 
between asset ownership and funeral insurance was not always significant, but neither
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was it found to be positive. However, data limitations has not allowed some of the 
key predictions of the model to be tested.
2 .7  D iscu ssion  and conclusion
The main contribution of this paper is the attempt to make precise the role of funeral 
insurance as distinct from life insurance. A model is laid out which abstracts from the 
organisational form of the insurance provider and focuses on a key difference between 
the two insurance types: The payout from a funeral insurance can be spent only on the 
funeral, whereas the payout from life insurance can be disposed of as the beneficiary 
pleases. The parent puts a higher weight on funeral expenditure than does the child. 
The parent may use funeral insurance to impose a minimum level of expenditure on 
her own funeral, but this is costly since insurance premia are actuarially unfair. Life 
insurance is identically priced but is preferred at higher wealth levels because less of it 
is required to obtain a certain level of expected utility. At very high levels of wealth, 
there is no demand for life or funeral insurance.
The central claim made is that the raison d’etre of funeral insurance is to solve an 
inter-generational conflict over resource allocation. In relation to the literature on life 
insurance and bequests, the model highlights the possibility that even if bequests are 
voluntary they need not be altruistic in the usual sense of the word.
Today’s South Africa is perhaps unique in that funeral insurance (formal and 
informal) and life insurance are both widespread. It is therefore the ideal setting for 
testing the theory of this paper. The empirical findings are broadly consistent with 
one of the model’s predictions, but data limitations precludes testing of some of its 
key implications.
Within the broad category of literature on informal finance, this paper has close 
parallels to the work on ROSCAs by Besley, Coate & Loury (1993). They too assume 
a world without credit. Like in this paper, a typically group-based financial contract is 
contrasted with a standard financial product. In their case, ROSCAs are shown to be 
ex-ante preferable to pure savings schemes for financing durables. Another parallel is 
that ROSCAs are typically associated with the informal sector, but that informality is 
hardly the defining attribute. A thorough understanding of ROSCAs is gained only by 
studying under what circumstances the particular contract is preferable to individual 
savings accounts, informal or not.
Case et al. (2008) defend the view that “social norms are held strongly and play 
an important role in setting funeral spending”, based both on their reading of the 
ethnographic literature and on their own experience in training local field workers. 
Roth (2001), in addition to belief in afterlife, also points to social mechanisms when 
explaining high funeral costs: elaborate funerals impart gravity to the meeting of 
relatives which takes place afterwards, they demonstrate family dignity and double as 
important social events in which “conspicuous consumption [is] clearly in evidence”.
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However, the notion that the immediate family of the deceased faces social pressure 
to spend substantial resources on the funeral does not contradict the view presented 
in this paper. The central claims made here are (1) that there may be a conflict of 
interest over how much to spend on funerals, with the deceased’s preferred level of 
expenditure exceeding that of his or her heirs, and (2 ) that funeral insurance can serve 
to constrain the survivors’ choices in this regard. But there are reasons to believe that 
the wider family or social group may also prefer a higher level of funeral expenditure 
than does the deceased’s immediate family. It is plausible that extended family and 
social relations benefit more from being related to or associated with someone of a 
high social status and a dignified funeral, than they do from the private consumption 
of the heirs of the deceased. Of course, they also benefit directly from the food and 
hospitality provided at the funeral.
So the deceased and her friends and extended family may share a preference for a 
larger funeral expenditure than the immediate family would prefer. Whereas friends 
and extended family are alive and can apply social pressure on the heirs, the deceased 
person may achieve a similar effect by purchasing funeral insurance while alive.
Funeral insurance has been documented through much of recorded history and is 
still popular in many parts of Africa. Though funeral societies have long been known 
to historians and has more recently started to receive the attention of economists 
and other social scientists, there has been little emphasis on the particularities of 
the insurance product they offer. Given its historical and contemporary importance, 
this is striking. It may appear that the process of economic development entails a 
transition from a world of informal or semi-formal funeral societies to one in which 
formal life insurance predominates. As such it is proper that substantial effort has 
gone into understanding contractual limitations of informal risk-pooling groups and 
their consequences for household behaviour. But arguably, our understanding of risk 
coping in developing countries would remain incomplete if we do not also understand 
the dynamics of insurance product demand.
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F>0 and binding 
L=0
L+F>0
F not binding
L=F=0
Figure 2.1: Illustration of proposition
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics (weighted).
Variable Mean
Standard
deviation
Respondent funeral society membership 0.22 0.41
Respondent has formal funeral insurance 0.12 0.32
Respondent has life insurance 0.11 0.32
Respondent age 37.1 16.1
Monthly household income (ZAR) 4146 6617
Household has car 0.27 0.45
Household owns 'proper' house 0.19 0.39
Rural 0.41 0.49
Observations 24489
Table 2.2: Regression results, main specification
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3
Funeral Life Funeral Life Funeral Life
Dependent variable insurance insurance insurance insurance insurance insurance
Household has car -0.0751
[.058]
.459***
[.042]
-.157***
[.0597]
.43***
[.0425]
-.141**
[.0603]
.409***
[.0425]
Household owns 'proper' house -0.0456
[.0457]
.0897*
[.053]
-.114*
[.0587]
0.0523
[045]
-.0949*
[.0533]
0.0583
[.0438]
Log household income 0.0525
[.0391]
.598***
[.0348]
0.0403
[.0349]
.595***
[.0257]
0.0371
[.0367]
.585***
[.0261]
Age, rural and province controls
Controls for own children and 
married/cohabiting status
Observations
No
No
24489
Yes
No
24489
Yes
Yes
24489
Weighted bivariate probit regression. The dependent variables are binary take-up indicators for funeral and life 
insurance. The respondent is coded as having funeral insurance if he/she has funeral insurance with a formal 
provider or if he/she attends a funeral society meeting weekly or monthly. The age controls are binary 
variables indicating that the respondent is aged 20 or over, 30 or over, etc. up to 80 or over. Robust standard 
errors, shown in brackets, are clustered at the province level. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * 
significant at 10%.
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Table 2.3: R egressions results, blacks and coloureds only
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3
Dependent variable
Funeral
insurance
Life
insurance
Funeral
insurance
Life
insurance
Funeral
insurance
Life
insurance
Household has car .0996*
[.0523]
.294***
[.0538]
0.0694
[.0513]
.285***
[.0463]
0.0649
[.0519]
.265***
[.0426]
Household owns 'proper' house 0.036
[.0505]
.178*
[.0933]
-0.0659
[.0588]
0.101
[.0846]
-0.0554
[.0592]
0.109
[.0833]
Log household income .111***
[.0423]
.68***
[.0403]
.104***
[.0347]
672***
[.0375]
.0986***
[.0375]
.666***
[.0373]
Age, rural and province controls
Controls for own children and 
married/cohabiting status
Observations
No
No
24489
Yes
No
24489
Yes
Yes
24489
Weighted bivariate probit regression. The dependent variables are binary take-up indicators for funeral and life 
insurance. The respondent is coded as having funeral insurance if he/she has funeral insurance with a formal 
provider or if he/she attends a funeral society meeting weekly or monthly. The age controls are binary 
variables indicating that the respondent is aged 20 or over, 30 or over, etc. up to 80 or over. Robust standard 
errors, shown in brackets, are clustered at the province level. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * 
significant at 10%.
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Table 2.4: R egressions results, formal insurance only
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3
Dependent variable
Funeral
insurance
Life
insurance
Funeral
insurance
Life
insurance
Funeral
insurance
Life
insurance
Household has car 0.114
[.0964]
.453***
[.043]
0.017
[.112]
.427***
[.0428]
0.022
[.114]
.407***
[042]
Household owns 'proper' house .117**
[.0569]
.101**
[051]
-0.0351
[.0388]
0.058
[.0446]
-0.0244
[.0354]
0.0638
[.0432]
Log household income .288***
[.0352]
.601***
[.0352]
.283***
[.0381]
.595***
[.0256]
.279***
[.0388]
.586***
[.0261]
Age, rural and province controls
Controls for own children and 
married/cohabiting status
Observations
No
No
24489
Yes
No
24489
Yes
Yes
24489
Weighted bivariate probit regression. The dependent variables are binary take-up indicators for formal funeral 
and life insurance. The respondent is coded as having funeral insurance if he/she has funeral insurance with a 
formal provider or if he/she attends a funeral society meeting weekly or monthly. The age controls are binary 
variables indicating that the respondent is aged 20 or over, 30 or over, etc. up to 80 or over. Robust standard 
errors, shown in brackets, are clustered at the province level. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * 
significant at 10%.
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Table 2.5: Regressions results, insurance holders only
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Life Life Life Life Life Life Life Life Life
Dependent variable insurance insurance insurance insurance insurance insurance insurance insurance insurance
Household has car .597*** .598*** .559*** .496*** .541*** .513*** .317*** .31*** .288***
[.0 7 0 8 ] [ .0 7 2 7 ] [.0 7 5 2 ] [.13 ] [ .1 2 6 ] [ .1 2 5 ] [ 0 7 9 8 ] [ 0 7 8 3 ] [ 0 7 5 8 ]
Household owns 'proper' house .22*** .189*** .182*** 0.0193 .114** .11** .269*** .214*** .216***
[ .0 6 8 4 ] [ .0 4 0 5 ] [.0 4 2 7 ] [ .0 8 1 1 ] [ .0 5 4 6 ] [.0 5 5 7 ] [ 0 8 4 ] [ 0 6 2 4 ] [ 0 6 3 ]
Log household income .752*** .72*** .712*** .559*** .509*** .503*** .76*** .72*** .714***
[.0 4 5 2 ] [ .0 2 9 2 ] [.0 3 0 6 ] [.0 4 8 6 ] [ .0 5 7 9 ] [ .0 5 8 4 ] [ 0 5 5 1 ] [ 0 4 2 7 ] [ 0 4 3 1 ]
Sub-sample
All
insurance
holders
All
insurance
holders
All
insurance
holders
Formal
insurance
holders
Formal
insurance
holders
Formal
insurance
holders
Black/
coloured
insurance
holders
Black/
coloured
insurance
holders
Black/
coloured
insurance
holders
Age, rural and province controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Controls for own children and 
married/cohabiting status No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 9712 9712 9712 6689 6689 6689 5793 5793 5793
Weighted probit regression restricted to the subsample of insurance holders. The dependent variable is the binary take-up indicator for life 
insurance. The age controls are binary variables indicating that the respondent is aged 20 or over, 30 or over, etc. up to 80 or over. Robust 
standard errors, shown in brackets, are clustered at the province level. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
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A  P r o o f o f  th e  p rop osition
Solve backwards from the child’s problem. It is straightforward to show that as 
long as the funeral insurance payout does not impose a binding constraint on funeral 
expenditure,
/  =  ■y (W — a)
c =  (1 — 7 ) W  + 7 a.
On the other hand, if the payout is binding, then clearly
f  = F
c = W - F .
Since funeral insurance only imposes a lower bound on funeral expenditure, and since 
the logarithmic utility function satisfies the usual conditions, the solution must equal 
the child’s unconstrained preference if this exceeds funeral insurance payout and ex­
actly equal the funeral insurance payout otherwise:
f ( W , F )  =  max (7  (W -  a) , F) 
c (W, F) =  W  — f  (W, F)
Moving on to the parent’s problem, note that as long as funeral insurance is not 
binding, it is equivalent to life insurance. Furthermore when funeral insurance is 
binding, there will be no life insurance. This is because as long as funeral insurance 
payout is binding on the child, any life insurance payout would be spent entirely on 
the child’s personal consumption from which the parent derives no utility. Thus it 
is sufficient to focus on three cases: No insurance, life insurance alone and binding 
funeral insurance alone.
Without any insurance, the parent’s expected utility is simply:
VN = q \ n ( C ) F ( l - q ) \ n ( f ( W :F))
= qln(ws) +  (1 -  q)\n('y(wd -  a))
= q In (w +  y) +  (1 — q) In ( 7  (w — a))
Assume next that the parent takes out only life insurance. Then her expected 
utility is
VL = q In O s) + (1 -  q) In (7 (wd -  a))
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with
ws = w +  y — a (1 — q) L
wd = w +  (1 — a (1 — g)) L.
The first-order condition yields:
^  _  — (a — 1 ) w +  (1 — a (1 — g)) y +  aqa
a (1  — a  (1  — q))
Thus L increases in y but decreases in w. Non-negativity requires
(a — 1) w — aqa
V > 1 -  a  (1 -  q)
if this does not hold then life cover must be zero.
The second-period wealth levels corresponding to the interior solutions with posi­
tive life insurance are:
w +  (1 -  a (1  -  q)) y -  (1  — q) aa
ws — q
Wd =
l - a ( l - q )  
w + (1 — a (1  — q)) y +  aqa
a
and expected utility with optimal, positive life insurance becomes:
VL =  gin (ws) + (1 — q) In ( 7  (wd — a))
= gin g +  In (w +  (1  — a (1  — g)) y — (1  — g) aa)
—gin (1 — a ( l  — g)) -f (1 — g)lnq — (1 — g )ln a
Next assume that the parent takes out only funeral insurance, and that it is bind­
ing. Expected utility is then
Vf = q\n (ws) +  (1 -  g) In (F) .
The first-order condition gives
=  w + y 
a
From this one may compute the next-period wealth levels and optimal expected utility 
for the case of binding funeral insurance:
ws = q(w + y)
1 +  ag 1 — a (1  — g)wd =  w--\------------------ ya a
Vp - glng — (1  — g) In a: + In (w +  y)
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The optimal F  clearly always satisfies non-negativity, but it was also assumed that 
the insurance is binding on the child’s funeral expenditure. That would require
which yields the condition
The optimal expected utility functions for each of the three main cases (life insur­
ance only, binding funeral insurance only, and no insurance) have been determined. 
Now the overall solution to the parent’s problem given a set of parameters may be 
found as follows: First check whether the non-trivial conditions for interior solutions 
are satisfied. (Life insurance must be non-negative, and funeral insurance must be 
binding on the child for the above solution to hold. The no-insurance solution is al­
ways feasible.) Then compare the optimal expected utilities for the feasible cases and 
select the greatest.
Note, however, that the life insurance solution will always dominate the no-insurance 
solution as long as optimal life insurance is positive. This is because no insurance is 
essentially a special case of the life-only scenario with L = 0 .
Thus there are four conditions that need to be taken into account when determining 
the solution for a given set of parameters. They are:
1 - 7 ( 1  -  a (I - q ) )
V f  > Vl 
VF > VN 
L > 0
F  binding
Using the above results and rearranging in terms of y, these may be written
V >
k w  — a  7  —
1 — K , with n =
7  (7(1 — q ( i  — g)))q < 1
70! (1 -  q)
y  > with k — ----7 0
gi-<?
y  >
(a — 1) w — aqa
y  >
1 -  a ( l  - q )
( 7  (1 +  aq) — 1) w — 7 aa
1 -  7(1 -  a ( l  -  q))
respectively. All four conditions divide w, y-space in two regions along a straight line. 
The boundary lines all have negative intercepts proportional to a, and positive slopes. 
Since non-negative wealth and income are assumed, it is the first quadrant which is
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of interest.
Given the above results and the stated assumptions it can be shown that along 
the y =  0 axis, the line defined by Vp =  Vp crosses at a lower value of w than the 
boundary for binding F, which in turn crosses at a lower value of w than the boundary 
for L = 0. The slope of these lines decline in the same order. Hence the three lines 
do not cross in the first quadrant: The Vp = Vp line is everywhere to the left of the 
boundary for binding F, which means that the binding F  solution is feasible whenever 
its value dominates the non-binding solution.
The boundary for binding F  in its turn is everywhere to the left of the L =  0 
boundary. Therefore, F  is binding whenever Vp > Vl, s o  Vp =  Vp is the effective 
boundary between a binding-F region and an L region. And since the boundary for 
binding F  is to the left of L =  0, funeral insurance can never bind where optimal L 
is zero. This means that the parent will not take out any insurance to the right of 
L =  0.
Therefore, Vp =  Vp and L = 0 divide the first quadrant in three regions which 
may be described as follows. Holding y fixed at any non-negative level and increasing 
w from zero, there is first a region in which binding funeral insurance of increasing 
quantity is preferred. (Due to the negative intercepts, this region is of positive measure 
even for y — 0.) As w increases further, a boundary is crossed after which life insurance 
is preferred. The quantity of life insurance decreases to zero as wealth increases. 
Beyond this point the parent prefers not to take out any insurance.
Finally, recall that life insurance cover of value L is equivalent to any mixture of 
funeral and life insurance of the same total value, where the funeral cover remains 
below the binding level. This concludes the proof.
B  D a ta  variable con stru ction
In the section ‘Financial surveys’, the survey asks: “Here is a list of different types of 
policies and investment plans which you can take out with a financial services com­
pany. Can you please tell me which, if any, you PERSONALLY  have? This excludes 
any cover or benefits provided by your employer/company” (original emphasis). Re­
spondents who have indicate either ‘Life cover policy’ or ‘Endowment, investment, 
savings or education plan/policy with life cover’ (original emphasis) are coded as hav­
ing life insurance. Those who indicate the option ‘Funeral insurance’, are coded as 
formal funeral policy holders.
In the ‘Sport, entertainment and leisure’ section, the following question is asked: 
“For the activities listed below, please indicate your personal frequency of each activity, 
if at all” (original emphasis). The options given were ‘weekly’, ‘monthly’, ‘yearly’ and 
‘not at all’. Respondents reporting that they attend funeral society meetings ‘weekly’ 
or ‘monthly’ are coded as funeral society members. A respondent is coded as having 
funeral insurance if he/she has a formal funeral policy or is a member of a funeral
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society. No information on premia, cover or conditions is provided for either type of 
insurance.
There are several caveats to keep in mind when interpreting these variables. First, 
it appears to be quite common for people to get funeral cover through their employer 
in South Africa, but this is explicitly excluded from the question above and therefore 
is not recorded in the data. Second, it is also quite common for funeral parlours 
to sell a form of funeral cover (illegally). These may not be recorded in the data 
since the survey explicitly asks for funeral cover with a “financial services company” . 
Third, some insurance companies masquerade as funeral societies. These may not 
be recorded in the data since they do not require their customers to attend regular 
society meetings.
In the survey, monthly household income is recorded not as a number but as being 
in one of 33 income ranges. These are coded to a scalar income variable by using the 
midpoint of each band. The highest band, ZAR 40,000 and above, is coded as ZAR 
60,000. 1% of households report this income band.
The respondents are asked “How many motor cars, station wagons, bakkies and 
mini-buses/kombis, including company cars, are there in your household? Please 
exclude motor bikes, scooters and trucks.” The household was coded as having a car 
if the response was one or more.
The household is coded as owning a ‘proper’ home if all of the following are satis­
fied: It owns its dwelling. The dwelling is a ‘House’, ‘Cluster House’, ‘Town House’ or 
‘F lat’, as opposed to a ‘Matchbox House’, ‘Traditional H ut’, ‘Hostel’, ‘Hotel /  Board­
ing House’, ‘Compound’, ‘Room in Backyard’, ‘Squatter Hut’, ‘Caravan’ or ‘Other’. 
The dwelling is electrified and has water on tap, a hot water tank, a toilet and a sink.
The ‘Rural’ indicator is set to 1 if the household’s community size is reported to 
be “Less than 500/Rural”.
The respondent is coded as having own children if he/she answered yes to the 
question: “Do you have any young or unmarried children of your own?” There is no 
information on children more generally.
The respondent is coded as married/cohabiting if he/she reported “Married or 
living together” under marital status.
8 6
3 Liquidity constraints: A  robust 
analysis using panel data
3.1 In trod u ction
Credit constraints are a standard assumption in development economics, but there is 
surprisingly little robust evidence that such constraints are present and binding on 
household behaviour. Furthermore, many observations that are consistent with liquid­
ity constraints are equally consistent with precautionary saving or a simple Keynesian 
model where consumption varies with current income. Recent work on credit con­
straints in rich countries has exploited the idea that under standard assumptions and 
perfect capital markets, there should be no jump in consumption associated with an 
anticipated increase in income. This paper applies that methodology to a large panel 
data set of black South African households. Having established that expenditure 
jumps are present, further evidence is presented indicating that the jumps are more 
likely to be due to liquidity constraints than to precautionary saving behaviour or 
Keynesian consumption.
Credit market imperfections are central to current development economics theory. 
And in models of household behaviour in developing countries, such imperfections 
are frequently operationalised as a constraint on the amount of credit available to 
the household (often taken to be zero). But given how often credit constraints are 
assumed, there is little evidence of their presence. In his entry on development eco­
nomics in the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Ray (2008) discusses credit 
market failure and constrained credit as a key theme of the field, but writes that 
“[t]he direct empirical evidence on the existence of credit constraints is surprisingly 
sparse”. Banerjee (2003) surveys the evidence for capital market imperfections in 
developing countries. In this context, perhaps the most telling piece of evidence he 
presents is the often wide dispersal between interest rates on saving and borrowing 
in many parts of the developing world. But as Banerjee & Duflo (2005) write, this is 
only suggestive of credit constraints. 17
In fact, many observations that are consistent with credit constraints are explained 
equally well by Keynesian consumption or precautionary saving behaviour. In partic­
ular, this applies to observations that consumption responds to anticipated increases 
in income, as well as to observations of ‘excess sensitivity’ of consumption with respect 
to temporary income shocks which have only a small impact on permanent income. 
Apart from the direct interest in establishing whether credit constraints are present, 
this relates to the long-standing debate on whether poor household optimise within 
their constraints ( “poor but rational”) or not (Duflo 2006). In particular, finding
11 Morduch (1990) tests for liquidity constraints in a developing country context in his unpublished 
PhD thesis.
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that the consumption behaviour of poor households is not guided by forward planning 
could have large consequences for the study of development.
This paper uses data on a large panel of black South African households to in­
vestigate the response of household expenditure to a large, anticipated increase in 
income. The public, non-contributory old age pension scheme is widely known in the 
population, and take-up amongst Africans is high and largely predicted by age. An ap­
proximate Euler equation is derived, from which it is clear that a jump in expenditure 
associated with an anticipated increase in income is as consistent with precautionary 
saving as with a binding liquidity constraint. Furthermore, the consumption jump 
can also be explained by Keynesian consumption. The prediction that consumption 
should not respond to the anticipated income change is rejected, even when allowing 
for household-specific trends. Furthermore, evidence is presented that household sav­
ings increase when a member crosses the age-qualifying age, making the precautionary 
saving story less likely. Finally, a change in the age at which the child support grant 
lapses is used to robustly identify an anticipated decrease in household income. This 
allows for a test of liquidity constraints versus Keynesian consumption behaviour. 
Liquidity constraints cannot be rejected in favour of Keynesian consumption, though 
the power of the test may be problematic.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows. It is one of a small number 
of studies that provide explicit tests of the standard consumption model with per­
fect capital markets using expenditure data from a developing country. Uniquely, it 
relies on large panel data set and a large and highly anticipated source of income 
to do so. The use of fixed-effects estimation and clean identification provides for a 
robust rejection of the standard model with perfect capital markets amongst black 
South Africans. This is also the first paper to attempt the distinction between liquid­
ity constraints, precautionary saving and Keynesian consumption as explanations of 
expenditure jumps in a developing country. By showing that liquidity constraints is 
a more likely explanation of household behaviour than Keynesian consumption, the 
paper also contributes to the debate on whether people in developing countries are 
‘poor but rational’.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section provides an 
overview of related literature. In the theory section, an approximate Euler equation 
which incorporates liquidity constraints and a precautionary saving motive is derived 
from a standard consumption model, and the relevant implications for empirical work 
are drawn out. The evidence section provides some background on the old age pension 
and child support grants in South Africa and describes the data before presenting the 
empirical specifications and results. Finally, there is a brief discussion and conclusion.
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3.2 R e la ted  literature
Hall (1978) extended the standard additive consumption model18 to the case with sto­
chastic earnings. The paper’s influential central finding is that, conditional on today’s 
consumption, no other information available today is informative about consumption 
tomorrow .19 In other words, consumption should respond to income changes only to 
the extent that these reflect changes in permanent income. This prediction has sub­
sequently been exploited by many economists to construct tests of the perfect capital 
markets assumption. One line of research looks at the effect on consumption of an­
ticipated or unanticipated changes in income (see Browning &; Lusardi (1996) for a 
review). Recently, two papers have argued that households in the United States and 
Spain adjust their consumption in response to significant and regular changes in annual 
income, but not in response to irregular and small payments because the computa­
tional cost of doing so outweighs the potential utility gain. Hsieh (2003) exploits the 
annual payout of petroleum dividends to residents of Alaska as an anticipated change 
in permanent income. He does not find excess sensitivity of consumption related to 
the petroleum payout, but on the other hand he confirms earlier results when he finds 
that the same households do over-react to tax refunds, which are smaller and harder to 
predict on average. Similarly, Browning & Collado (2001) find that the consumption 
patterns of Spanish households working in sectors with regular bonus payments do 
not differ significantly from those of households in other sectors. The findings in this 
paper go the other way, indicating that at least in one developing country context, 
the standard model with perfect capital markets is rejected even with respect to very 
large and highly predictable increases income.
Altonji & Siow (1987) were the first to exploit the prediction that forward-looking 
but liquidity-constrained agents should react differently to positive and negative changes 
in income. This paper follows theirs in referring to models where consumption varies 
with current income as ‘Keynesian’, though elsewhere in the literature this is also 
referred to myopia. Flavin (1985) tests liquidity constraints versus Keynesian con­
sumption on US data, but relies on an instrumental variable technique and aggregate 
data rather than a source of anticipated income in a panel of households. Deaton 
(1992) investigates how closely simple ‘rules of thumb’ based can approximate the 
optimal solution to the standard consumption model. These rules of thumb typically 
depend positively on current income, and are hence a form of Keynesian consumption 
as defined here.
Deaton (1991) studies savings behaviour in the presence of liquidity constraints, 
and uses simulations to study the effectiveness of precautionary saving in smoothing
1S These models assume intertemporally additive utility, constant discount factors and consumers
who maximise (expected) present discounted utility over the remainder of the life-time. I follow
Browning & Lusardi (1996) in referring to these as standard consumption models, though their origins
lie in Modigliani’s life-cycle and Friedman’s permanent income hypothesis models.
19Parker (1997) presents consumption model which combines Hall (1978)’s framework with the 
durable-goods model of Mankiw (1982), and derives similar predictions.
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household consumption.
One of the few articles to provide a direct test of a prediction from the standard 
consumption model in a developing country is Paxson (1992). The starting point for 
her influential paper is the prediction that the propensity to consume out of unex­
pected income should be much smaller than that for expected income. In other words, 
a large proportion of windfall gains should be saved. In line with the prediction, she 
finds that saving amongst agricultural households in Thailand is responsive to posi­
tive income shocks resulting from rainfall variation. Rosenzweig & Wolpin (1993) find 
evidence of credit constraints among farmers in India, and Banerjee & Duflo (2008) 
do the same for Indian firms.
Development economists have given much more attention to how limitations in con­
tract enforcement prevents full inter-household risk-pooling between forward-looking 
but liquidity-constrained poor consumers. Townsend (1994) inspired a set of papers 
testing for and mostly rejecting full risk-sharing across households. These papers ef­
fectively assume imperfect capital markets, since otherwise there would be no need to 
smooth across households. Ligon, Thomas & Worrall (2002) is a recent contribution 
to this tradition.
One strand of the literature uses direct survey questions to elicit credit constraints. 
Typically, respondents are flagged as credit constrained if they report having tried to 
borrow but were denied credit, or if they report being discouraged from applying for 
credit because they felt that they would be rejected. For instance, Barham, Boucher 
& Carter (1996) uses this type of survey information to look at whether the presence 
of credit co-operatives in regions of Guatemala relaxes credit constraints. Rasmussen 
(2002) employs a similar methodology to data from South Africa. She finds that a 
high proportion of the households in her sample are credit constrained.
This is not the first paper to exploit the South African old age pension as a source 
of exogenous income variation. Case & Deaton (1998) look at how various expenditure 
categories respond to the pension income, but they do not analyse total expenditure, 
nor do they focus on liquidity constraints. Edmonds (2006) finds that receiving the 
pension leads to a decrease in child labour and an increase in school attendance and 
interprets this as evidence of liquidity constraints, but does not consider Keynesian 
consumption as an alternative explanation. Duflo (2003) finds that young girls living 
with a pension-eligible grandmother are in better health. The latter two both argue 
that the their findings are indicative of credit constraints. But their use of cross-section 
data sets makes it difficult to rule out certain other possible explanations, including 
a re-allocation of family resources when the income increases, or indeed Keynesian 
consumption, as alternatives to constrained liquidity.
3 LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINTS 90
3.3  T heory
3.3.1 A consumption m odel with liquidity constraints
The following derivation of an Euler equation from an additive consumption model 
with liquidity constraints follows Browning & Lusardi (1996). Though it will become 
clear that the resulting equation is approximate and that not all predictions are unam­
biguously related to the underlying model parameters, it has two attractive properties. 
First, it is (approximately) linear when a CRRA utility function is specified. Second, 
it is fairly general in that it relates the consumption pattern to household characteris­
tics, impatience, the interest rate and general uncertainty (allowing for precautionary 
saving) as well as to liquidity constraints.
An agent lives for T  periods. In each period t she sets current consumption q  s o  
as to maximise
T - t
Et ^ T 5 Ju{ct+j,Z t+j) 
j =o
subject to
wT — (1 "1 ^v) Wt—l T  Ut ct
wT > 0
for t ^  t  ^  T '. Here, S (E (0,1) is a discount factor, and the instantaneous utility 
function u satisfies v! > 0 and u" < 0. Utility is a function both of consumption 
and of other characteristics Zt . The first constraint defines the evolution of wealth:
Wealth at the end of period r, wT, is the wealth remaining at the end of the previous
period rcT_i, augmented by the interest rate rT, and adjusted for current-period labour 
income yT and consumption. The second constraint is the liquidity constraint: Non­
negative wealth at the end of every period implies that the agent cannot borrow. 
However, note that the following analysis is robust to allowing some borrowing, i.e. a 
negative rather than zero lower bound on wealth.
Uncertainty may be present in future labour income, household characteristics or 
interest rate, but the model is agnostic about its form.
The first-order conditions with respect to consumption yield the Euler equation
u' ( ct, Zt) =  Etd ( 1  +  rt+i) u' ( c t + i ,  Z t + 1 ) +  A f ,
where uf denotes the derivative of the instant utility function with respect to the first 
argument (consumption). The Kuhn-Tucker multiplier Xt is always non-negative, and 
positive when the liquidity constraint binds in period t. An immediate consequence 
of this equation is that ceteris paribus, a binding liquidity constraint tends to reduce 
current consumption.
3 LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINTS 91
In order to obtain more specific predictions, assume a CRRA utility function
( ct
\ e aZt )u (c t,Z t) =
1 -  p
for constants p and a. Note that the role of Z  in this specification is to scale con­
sumption, like in a conversion to adult equivalents.
With this specification, the Euler equations become
ct P (zT z^ \ = Et6 (I + rt+1) c ?  (  )  +  Xtl,aZt J  ~  * td ^ + n + 1 > ° t+1 y e a Z t+1 J
which may be written
S(l  + rt+I) p t n ) " '  =  1 -  A ,c f ( e ^ ) 1^  + • ' m
with Evt-i-i =  0. Even if the uncertainty in the model was fully specified, it would be 
difficult to derive the precise distribution of To do so would require a solution for 
q , which is not in general available analytically. In any case, the variance of the error 
term vt+1 , which will be denoted of+1, is a function of the underlying uncertainties 
and is a measure of how these uncertainties map into the unpredictability of future 
consumption.
By rearranging, reindexing by subtracting 1 from all time indices, taking logs on 
both sides and using Taylor expansion approximations to logarithms, one obtains
i i l n <5 / ( , a ( p - l ) / 7  ry \  i \  j> i a Z t - i ^ - P  , {e<lZtInc*—lncf_i ~ ----- 1-----1--------------- (Zt — Zt-\)-\—— -\-\t-\Ct_i (e ) -I---------—
P  jO Z Z
(3.1)
where et is a higher-order remainder term with Eet = 0 .
This approximate equation relates changes in (log) consumption to various para­
meters of the model. The first term on the right-hand side shows that impatience 
(lower <5) has the expected effect of increasing consumption today relative to that of 
tomorrow. Interest has, again as expected, the opposite effect. The third term on 
the right-hand side captures the general notion that changes in other characteristics, 
such as household demographics, may explain changes in the household’s consump­
tion profile over time. The fourth term on the right-hand side predicts precautionary 
consumption behaviour: The more uncertainty there is, the greater the propensity to 
save for a rainy day, and this depresses current consumption relative to future con­
sumption. (Consumption increases over time as the agent’s buffer stock of savings 
builds up in expectation.) The next two terms are increasing in \ t - i  and show that a 
binding liquidity constraint to depress consumption in that period and hence increase 
consumption growth.
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3.3.2 Implications
Several previous empirical tests of the standard consumption model with perfect credit 
markets rely on the prediction that an anticipated change in income should not in itself 
have any effect on consumption. Rejections of this prediction have been taken as evi­
dence of liquidity constraints. In the light of the Euler equation above, which explicitly 
incorporates the possibility of liquidity constraints, it is clear that these constraints 
are indeed a possible explanation for a change in consumption levels associated with 
a change in income. A household that expects an increase in income would, in the 
absence of liquidity constraints, like to smooth its consumption by borrowing before 
the income increase happens. But a liquidity constraint may prevent the increase from 
happening until the higher income is realised. In terms of the equation, recall that a 
binding liquidity constraint is associated with At > 0 , and that A* =  0  corresponds to 
the absence of a binding constraint. Clearly a binding constraint is associated with a 
steeper increase in income.
The model rules out borrowing, but not saving (otherwise the household would 
simply consume its income in each period). This is probably realistic, though the 
return on savings may be low and uncertain. When a household faces an anticipated 
decrease in income, the relevant technology is savings and not credit. This gives rise 
to an asymmetry of predictions: In the presence of constraints on liquidity (but not 
on savings), an anticipated increase in income may be associated with a contempo­
raneous increase in consumption. But an anticipated decrease income should not be 
accompanied by a correspondingly steep drop in consumption, because the household 
is able to smooth its consumption profile using savings.
More generally, a change in the level of consumption in a household can have sev­
eral possible causes. These causes may be loosely classified as ‘within-trend’, ‘trend- 
breaking’ or ‘model-breaking’. Even without any changes in the right-hand side vari­
ables, consumption may be on an increasing or decreasing trend due to the effect of 
impatience (which tends to put the household on a decreasing consumption trend), 
interest (saving to achieve higher consumption tomorrow) or uncertainty (savings as 
a buffer).
Consumption may also be breaking out of its trend, in response to changes in the 
right-hand side variables. The possible causes are a change in the rate of return on 
savings, changes in ‘other relevant characteristics’ such as family demographics or a 
change in the level of uncertainty about future consumption.
Liquidity constraints can come under either of these two categories: In the presence 
of liquidity constraints, current consumption tends to be suppressed, implying an 
increasing trend in consumption. But liquidity constraints could also move from being 
binding to non-binding and vice versa, which would have a ‘trend-breaking’ effect on 
consumption.
The third and final category of explanations for changes in the consumption level
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is that the model is misspecified. It could be that the “'true’ utility function is not 
CRRA, or that Z  enters the model in a more complex manner than the above allows 
for. Or it could be a rejection of the (arguably) core assumptions of the model, namely 
that utility is temporally additive and that consumers are expected-utility maximisers. 
Keynesian consumption violates even these most basic assumptions of the standard 
model. Extreme Keynesian consumers do not plan ahead at all. Instead, they simply 
consume a fixed fraction of current income. Considered as a theory of household 
behaviour, extreme Keynesian consumption is simplistic. But it does capture a sense 
of myopia or lack of forward planning which can serve as a benchmark against which 
to measure the meticulously planning households of the standard models. Specifically 
the consumption of a Keynesian household will track that of its income, regardless 
of whether income increases or decreases, and regardless of whether the change is 
anticipated or not.
The aim of the rest of the paper is to use an anticipated source of income to examine 
household data for changes in consumption behaviour, and attempt to distinguish 
between the possible theoretical explanations for these.
3.4 E v id en ce
3.4.1 The old age pension and the child support grant
The South African old age pension is a non-contributory, means-tested public benefit 
scheme, originally set up in the 1920s to provide a retirement income for the minority 
of white workers who did not have pension arrangements through their employer. In 
1989, the government committed to removing racial inequalities in the system, and 
from 1993 onwards the new scheme was fully operational throughout the country. In 
rural areas the money is distributed from a sophisticated network of mobile paypoints 
reaching each beneficiary once a month. Today the pension is a major source of income 
amongst the poor all over the country, and in many households the main breadwinner 
is a pensioner. See Case & Deaton (1998) for more detail.
To qualify for the pension, the applicant has to be old enough as well as pass a 
means test. Only people whose wealth and income are below certain levels qualify for 
the grant. The means test is set at a level where most white elderly fail to qualify, 
but a large majority of black elderly easily pass the hurdle. Hence for black people 
the pension can largely be regarded as a universally available and secure monthly 
income stream, beginning at the lower qualifying age (60 for women, 65 for men) and 
continuing until death. It is independent of the economic situation of family members, 
except the spouse for married pensioners. From an econometric perspective, it provides 
a convenient source of nearly exogenous income variation amongst people around the 
qualifying age.
Given the popularity, reach and financial importance of the pension, it is a highly 
anticipated source of income. The qualifying age limits are also widely known. (Duflo
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2003, Case & Deaton 1998)
The child support grant was introduced in 1998 to replace the earlier state main­
tenance grant. It is paid to the primary care-giver (most often the mother) of young 
children. It is in principle means-tested, and a large proportion of black mothers with 
age-eligible children qualify. From the beginning it covered children up to and includ­
ing the age of six, but from 2 0 0 2  there was a gradual expansion to older children. 
For the 2001 and 2002 surveys used in this study, the upper age limit was six. When 
the 2003 survey was conducted, the upper age limit was eight years. See Rosa & 
Mpokotho (2004) for more details on the child support grant.
3.4.2 Data
Since the year 2000, Statistics South Africa has conducted a Labour Force Survey twice 
a year. It is designed as a rotating panel survey, but the longest series of longitudinal 
household observations is substantially shorter than it could have been, due to several 
‘fresh starts’ which involved drawing all-new samples. This study uses the September 
2001, September 2002 and September 2003 waves of the survey. The surveys are 
nationally representative. Only households headed by a black (‘African’, in South 
African terminology) person are considered here. After dropping 175 households due 
to missing data on the gender, age or population group of one or more household 
members, there remains 36,208 households in the panel, of which 11,962 are observed 
twice and 6 ,6 6 8  are observed three times.
The expenditure variable is constructed as follows. In each of the surveys, the 
households were asked: “What was the total household expenditure in the last month? 
Include everything that the household and its members spent money on, including 
food, clothing, transport, rent and rates, alcohol and tobacco, school fees, entertain­
ment and any other expenses.” The answer options were: R 0-399, R 400-799, R 
800-1,199, R 1,200-1,799, R 1,800-2,499, R 2,500-4,999, R 5,000-9,999, R 10,000 or 
more, “Don’t know” or “Refuse”. The monthly expenditure variable used in this pa­
per was coded as follows: For each of the intervals, the midpoint is used. For the 
“R 10,000 or more” option, expenditure is set to R 15,000. For the last two response 
options, monthly expenditure is coded as missing. It is the logarithm of the resulting 
number that is used here as the measure of household expenditure.
A household is coded as age-eligible for the old age pension if there is at least one 
woman aged 60+, or one man aged 65+, in the household, and age-eligible for the 
child support grant if at least one child below the upper age limit is present in the 
household at the time of observation.
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3.1. In Figure 3.1, take-up of the old 
pension is plotted against the age of the oldest male and female household members. 
Age-eligibility appears to be a strong predictor of pension take-up; though perhaps 
more cleanly for women than for men.
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3.4.3 Identification and main results
The baseline empirical specification is given by
Yu =  oti +  fit +   ^Lit +  Xitfi +  en.
Here, Yu is the expenditure of household i at time (survey) t. On the right-hand side, 
c*i is a household fixed effect, fit is a time (survey) dummy, and La is an indicator for 
whether household i receives, or is age-eligible for, the old age pension in year t. Xa  
is a vector of control variables, and ea is the error term.
The coefficient of interest is 7 . Given the specification, it is only identified within 
households that move from a non-pension to a pension state or vice versa. Disregard­
ing deaths and other changes in household composition (which will be controlled for 
through X ), this will only happen when a female household member turns 60, or a 
male household member turns 65, in the second or third wave of the survey. In the 
eligibility specification the identifying assumption is that, conditional on household 
demographics and other controls, there is nothing special about turning 60/65 other 
than that one becomes eligible for the pension. This assumes that all other changes 
to do with ‘entering retirement,’ are either a direct consequence of qualifying for the 
pension, or are controlled for in the regression.
Throughout the analysis, age-eligibility as well as actual take-up of the old age 
pension will be used to identify the impact of the pension income on consumption. 
This is due to possible endogeneity in the take-up decision: It may be that a person’s 
decision of when to apply for the pension is co-determined with other unobserved 
characteristics which may also impinge on expenditure.
For this reason, it is useful to confirm that the eligibility criterion actually predicts 
pension take-up before moving on to the main results. Figure 3.1 has already provided 
a strong indication that this is the case. Table 3.2 regresses a binary variable indicating 
pension receipt on the eligibility dummy. In the first column, household and year fixed 
effects are included but no other control variables. The regression in the second column 
includes household demographics (gender-specific count variables for the number of 
family members in the age groups 0-4, 5-14, 15-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54 and 55+, 
and household size). In both these regressions, the coefficient is large (.48 and .39) 
and highly significant. In the third column, further count variables for the presence 
of older household members are included. There are variables for people aged 55+, 
60+, 65+ and 70+, separately for women and men. The coefficients on female and 
male age-eligibility, i.e. on the variables 60+ and 65+, respectively, are large and 
significant (.41 and .22). Though some of the other variables accounting for older 
household members are also positive and significant, these two dominate. Note also 
that the coefficient on female age-qualification is twice as large as the coefficient on 
male age-qualification. It seems reasonable to conclude that age eligibility is a strong 
predictor of pension take-up, but that there is a non-degenerate distribution in the
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age at pension take-np.
The baseline results, looking at the response in the level of household expenditure 
to the pension, are presented in Table 3.3. In column 1 household expenditure is 
regressed on a dummy variable indicating whether the household receives the old age 
pension (1) or not (0). There are no control variables, apart from household and 
survey fixed effects. The coefficient of interest is positive at .20 and highly significant. 
Column 2 includes controls for household demographics (the same as above). The 
coefficient drops to .13 but remains highly significant. In column 3, the variables 
controlling for the presence of older household members by age bracket are included. 
The coefficient drops to .11 but is still significant at the 1% level. This indicates that 
household expenditure responds positively to the anticipated increase in household 
income.
Though these results are interesting, there is a possible endogeneity problem. The 
decision to take up the pension, conditional on eligibility, may be correlated with 
household unobservables captured in the error term. The coefficient on pension receipt 
potentially confounds the effect of the pension income with these unobservables. The 
next three columns therefore presents reduced-form versions of these results, where 
household expenditure is regressed on age-eligibility for the pension rather than actual 
take-up. Given that not all age-eligible households in the sample receive the pension, 
the expectation is that the magnitude of the coefficients will drop somewhat, and this 
is indeed what happens. Column 4 replicates the regression in column 1 , except that 
expenditure is regressed on age-eligibility rather than pension receipt. The coefficient 
is somewhat lower at .15 but still highly significant. Column 5 includes household 
controls, and though the coefficient drops to .08 the qualitative finding is unchanged. 
In column 6  the count variables for the presence of older household members are 
included. This is equivalent to splitting the household eligibility variable into female 
and male age-eligibility. Female age-eligibility is highly significant at .10, but male 
age-eligibility is no longer significant. This is consistent with the finding above that 
men’s pension take-up is less well predicted by eligibility.
In order to interpret these results, refer back to the Euler equation (3.1). Basic 
household demographics are controlled for, so these cannot account for the expenditure 
response. Though of course it is difficult to rule out unobserved characteristics which 
change over time, the household fixed effects capture anything that is time-invariant 
at the household level. The Euler terms involving the discount factor and interest rate 
may be responsible for an increasing or decreasing trend in expenditure, though the 
year fixed effects will capture any changes that affect the sample as a whole. But if 
taking up the pension is associated with a decrease in consumption uncertainty (which 
seems likely) as well as an increase in income, then these results cannot rule out that 
the observed change in consumption is due to a reduced need to for precautionary 
saving. Finally, the finding may be explained by liquidity constraints.
Some of these concerns may be alleviated by introducing household-level trends
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in consumption in the regressions. This is computationally infeasible given the size 
of the data set. One could allow for trends at a more aggregate level, such as survey 
cluster or province, but this would defeat some of the purpose of the exercise since 
inter-household variation in these trends are hardly implausible even at a modest level 
of aggregation.
A viable alternative is to first-difference the expenditure variable. Hitherto the 
idea has been to study changes in expenditure levels in response to the change in 
income. But by first-differencing the expenditure variable, it becomes possible to look 
at the response in expenditure growth instead. This would eliminate linear household 
consumption trends from the analysis, such as those reflecting a constant discount 
factor, interest rate or precautionary incentive. Referring to the Euler equation (3.1) 
again, differencing the equation would eliminate everything on the right-hand side 
which does not change over time.
On the other hand, doing so entails a loss of statistical power since the coefficient 
of interest can then only be identified off households which are both observed in all 
three surveys, and which undergo a change in eligibility status during the period of 
observation.
The empirical specification for the difference analysis is
Yu — y^t-i = on -f- g,t 7 La + Nit/3 +  £u,
where ai capture a household-specific trend in consumption, Jit capture economy-wide 
shocks to consumption growth and 7 , the new coefficient of main interest, identifies a 
change in the growth rate rather than level of expenditure, as a response to pension 
take-up or eligibility.
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 3.4, which is a close parallel 
to Table 3.3 except that the dependent variable has been first-differenced. Columns 
1-3 identify a strong surge in expenditure trend associated with the take-up of the 
pension (the coefficients are .33, .23 and .22 and highly significant), even when house­
hold demographics and counts of older household members are included. Columns
4-6 are again reduced-form regressions where de-trended expenditure is regressed on 
age-eligibility rather than actual take-up. The aim is again to overcome potential en­
dogeneity in the take-up decision, at the cost of a downward bias of the coefficients of 
interest. The regression in column 4 includes no controls except fixed household and 
year trends. The coefficient of interest is .25 and significant at the 1% level. However, 
when household demographics are included, the coefficient drops to .1 2  and is only 
marginally significant (i.e., at the 10% level). And when the counts of older household 
members are included, both female and male age-eligibility becomes insignificantly 
different from zero. One interpretation of these findings is that the effect found earlier 
is fully accounted for by household trends and changes in household demographics. 
But it is equally possible that there really are liquidity constraints, but that the com­
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bination of first-differencing, including fixed-effects and a full set of household controls 
as well as relying on a reduced-form regression has reduced effective power to the point 
where the behavioural response to the pension income is no longer discernible.
Some readers may be concerned that a major life change (‘retirement’) might 
systematically coincide with the qualifying age for the pension and bias the results. 
However, for the majority of the black population who are either unemployed or 
employed in the informal sector, there is no well-defined concept of ‘retirement’ in the 
sense of reaching the end of an employment contract. This is illustrated by the fact 
that only 2.6% of black women in the 60-64 age group receive employment-related 
pensions, and the equivalent number for black men in the age group 65-69 is 7.2%. 
Withdrawal from the labour market is much more likely to caused by the pension 
income (Ranchhod 2006), or to have already happened (Bertrand, Mullainathan &; 
Miller 2003), than to coincide with it in a way which might bias the identified effect 
on consumption.
3.4.4 Using household savings to test between liquidity constraints and 
precautionary motives
Within the general consumption theory outlined in this paper, the results so far are 
compatible with either liquidity constraints or precautionary saving, or both. If a 
household is fairly certain of a future income stream, it would be expected to smooth 
consumption by borrowing. On the other hand, the old age pension represents not just 
a sizeable income, it is also a secure income for life. Employment income is uncertain 
by comparison, especially in the informal labour market. Therefore, becoming eligible 
for the pension is likely to be associated with less uncertainty in consumption and a 
reduced need for precautionary saving. These two effects go in the same direction and 
are therefore potentially confounded in the analysis above.
However, a consideration of household savings may allow a distinction to be made. 
If the jump in expenditure is solely due to liquidity constraints, then one would expect 
the household to dig into any savings in the run-up to becoming eligible. In the absence 
of uncertainty, the household will as far as possible try to smooth consumption across 
the income discontinuity, and this is inconsistent with maintaining positive savings. 
Put differently, a liquidity constraint cannot truly bind as long as savings are positive. 
Pension take-up should therefore be associated with an increase, or at least not a 
decrease, in household savings.
On the other hand, assume that the jump in consumption is entirely due to precau­
tionary saving. Entering a phase of greater consumption certainty reduces the need 
to keep a buffer of savings. Therefore, the prediction is a fall in savings. This suggests 
a seemingly straightforward method of distinguishing between the two mechanisms: 
If behaviour is primarily guided by liquidity constraint, savings would be flat (at 0) 
or increase as income increases. By contrast, if the expenditure response to increased
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income is due to precautionary saving, then household savings should decrease when 
income increases.
However, the data impose some limitations on this exercise. Only binary informa­
tion on savings is available, in the form of the household’s response to the question 
“Does this household, or a household member, own any of the following financial 
assets?” Yes/No responses are provided to each of the following options: Bank sav­
ings accounts, stokvels (ROSCAs), pension plans or retirement annuities, unit trusts, 
stocks or shares, cash loans expected to be repaid, life insurance, or any other sav­
ings. It is therefore possible to construct an overall savings indicator as follows: The 
household is coded as having savings (of some form) if it answered ‘Yes’ to at least 
one of these options, and otherwise not.
Clearly the analysis is limited to identifying households who move from being 
savers to non-savers or vice versa. Households who adjust their amount of savings 
from one positive amount to another cannot be discerned from those who do not 
adjust their (positive) savings at all.
Another potential problem with the data is related to how the respondents un­
derstand the question, in particular the last option, ‘Any other savings’. There may 
be a tendency not to count modest amounts of cash kept in a purse or wallet as sav­
ings, whereas the same amount held in a bank account may be thought of as such. 
The resulting measurement error may lead to under-reporting of savings for those 
households who do not use a bank account or other non-cash savings technologies. If 
households are less likely to hold their savings in cash after the increase in income, 
then an estimate of the effect of the income on savings may be biased upwards.
Notwithstanding the limitations, it is interesting to look at what happens to the 
constructed savings indicator as the households become eligible for the pension. The 
results of these regressions are reported in Table 3.5. Here, the dependent variable 
is the binary savings indicator, but otherwise the regressions closely match those 
reported in Tables 3 and 4. The precautionary saving story unambiguously predicts a 
reduction in savings, while the liquidity constraints hypothesis is related to either no 
change or an increase in household savings. It is therefore natural to take the liquidity 
constraints story as the null hypothesis in these regressions, to be rejected in favour 
of precautionary saving if the coefficient on pension take-up or eligibility is negative 
and significant.
In columns 1-3, pension take-up is associated with a significant increase in the 
propensity to have some savings, in the order of 6-7 %-points, even when house­
hold demographics and the presence of older household members are controlled for. 
Columns 4-6 are again reduced-form regressions, relating savings to pension age- 
eligibility. Column 4 finds a positive and significant effect of eligibility on savings. 
When household demographics are controlled for in columns 5 and 6 , the coefficients 
of interest are small and not significantly different from zero. In summary, the sav­
ings variable seems to either stay constant or increase in response to increased income.
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Overall, there is no evidence of a decline in savings, and the null hypothesis of liquidity 
constraints cannot be rejected in favour of precautionary saving.
3.4.5 Expenditure response to an anticipated reduction in income
Above it was found that household expenditure (even when de-trended) responds 
positively to an anticipated increase in income. Moreover, the response of household 
savings to the anticipated increase in income seems to point in the direction of liquidity 
constraints, rather than precautionary saving, as an explanation for the consumption 
behaviour. However, this conclusion still rests on the assumptions of the standard 
model from which the Euler equation was derived. In this section the aim is to contrast 
the general framework of forward-looking but liquidity-constrained households with 
the stark Keynesian alternative in which households simply consume a fixed fraction 
of their income.
More advanced versions are considered in the literature, but they share the critical 
feature that current consumption is a positive function of current income. Deaton 
(1992) considers several rules of thumb with this feature, of which his benchmark rule 
is ‘consume all cash on hand up to mean income, and 30 per cent of any excess’.
A Keynesian model of consumption compares well to the standard model as far as 
the results so far are concerned: For Keynesian households, an increase in income is 
accompanied by an increase in consumption, even if the change is anticipated. Further­
more, if consumption is a positive proportion of income, and savings are the difference 
between income and consumption, then savings must also be a fixed proportion of 
income. Therefore, the basic Keynesian model predicts household savings to increase 
when income does, which is supported by the findings in the previous section.
But an anticipated reduction in income may help distinguish between the mod­
els: If consumers are liquidity-constrained but forward-looking, then an anticipated 
decrease in income should not have any effect on expenditure because the required 
technology to smooth consumption is savings, not credit. On the other hand, Keyne­
sian consumption would predict expenditure to decrease in line with income.
It is important to be clear that this strategy to differentiate between liquidity 
constraints and Keynesian consumption relies on the presence of an effective savings 
technology. Anyone can save in cash at home or on their person, but the expected 
return on savings may be negative if there is considerable risk of loss, appropriation 
by household members or theft. Even during apartheid, the South African post office 
offered a savings account which was available to the whole population. But it is 
possible that distance or transport cost to the nearest branch, mistrust in the system 
or illiteracy may have effectively blocked off this opportunity to some potential savers. 
Since the end of apartheid, most if not all banks offer savings accounts to anyone, 
though high fees and fear of intimidation may still act as barriers. Informal savings 
devices, for example in the form stokvels (ROSCAs), remain popular amongst black
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South Africans. Taken together, it seems reasonable to assume that savings technology 
of some form is available to most South African households, and certainly more readily 
accessible than credit.
The South African child support grant is available to ‘primary carers’ (predomi­
nantly, mothers) of young children. There is a means test which will be ignored in this 
study because most black households easily pass it. Instead the focus is once again 
on the age cut-offs. Originally the grant covered any number of biological children 
up to and including the age of 6 . So as a first pass, one could look for a drop in 
household expenditure when children turn 7. If there is such a drop, it could be taken 
as evidence for Keynesian behaviour rather than credit constraints.
But this is not entirely satisfactory. In the previous section, identification re­
lied partly on the assumption that households where a, say 55-59-year-old woman is 
present is not substantially different from a household with a 60-64-year-old woman, 
except that the latter household would be age-qualified for the old age pension. In 
the case of children, it is less clear that a child with a 6 -year-old is comparable to a 
7-year-old. Young children develop fast and progress through the education system, 
so arguably an age difference of a single year may be associated with considerable 
changes in household behaviour even if other circumstances were fixed. For this rea­
son, a change in the age cut-off for the child support grant will be exploited here. From 
1 April 2003, the upper age limit went up from 6  to 8 years. So in the first two rounds 
of the survey data, collected in September 2001 and September 2002, household with 
children up to and including 6  years were age-qualified for a child-support grant. But 
in the final round used here, conducted in September 2003, households with children 
up to and including 8 years were age-eligible.
If the household consumption pattern over time is determined by Keynesian be­
haviour as opposed to liquidity constraints, then expenditure for a household with a 
child aged 7 in 2003 should be higher than the expenditure for a household with a 
child aged 7 in 2002, because only the former household is eligible for the grant. To 
see whether this is the case, run a regression of the form
Y i t  ~  Y i , t - 1 =  +  H t  +  l O n  +  5 C i t  *  / f = 2 0 0 3  +  X i t f i  +  E \t .
Note that consumption is again first-differenced to account for within-household con­
sumption trends. Here, Cu denotes the presence of a child age 7 in household i and 
year t. The indicator It^s  is 1 if £ G S' and 0 otherwise. If households are subject to 
constraints on liquidity but not on savings, the coefficient S should be zero: There is 
no difference between the consumption growth behaviour of a household with a child 
who turns seven in 2 0 0 2 , and that of a household with a child who turns seven in 
2003, apart from what can be explained by the macro time-trend or changes in other 
characteristics. But Keynesian households will reduce consumption in line with the 
lapse of the child-support grant. Therefore, a household with a 7-year-old in 2002
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should decrease its consumption compared to the previous year, whereas a household 
with a 7-year-old in 2003 should not. In other terms, the coefficient 5 is zero under the 
standard model with liquidity constraints, and positive under the Keynesian model.
Table 3.6 presents the results of this regression. In column 1 the regression is 
run without control variables apart from household and survey fixed effects. The 
coefficient of interest is negative but not significantly different from zero. In column 2 
household demographics are added as control variables but the coefficient of interest 
changes little and remains insignificant. In column 3 basic further controls are added 
in the form of variables counting the number of children in age categories from 0  up 
to 9 years of age. The coefficient of interest remains virtually unchanged and still not 
significant.
Thus the coefficient is far from being significantly different from zero. The mag­
nitude is also negative at around 0 .1  for all three regressions, which goes against the 
Keynesian model. The upshot is therefore that the null hypothesis of a standard 
model with forward-looking households and liquidity constraints cannot be rejected 
in favour of the Keynesian model.
Though it is likely that the relevant population was reasonably well informed of the 
basic qualifying requirements for the child support grant, the above analysis implicitly 
assumes that the changes in the qualifying age were also known. The analysis does 
not permit a clear distinction between the behaviour of forward-looking but ’surprised’ 
households who learnt that their 7-year-olds were still receiving the grant in 2003, from 
that of non-forward-looking Keynesian households. Both types of households would 
be expected to consume more than their counterparts in 2 0 0 2  before the reform. 
The results presented here, a negative coefficient not significantly different from zero, 
are therefore weakly indicative of forward-looking households who were aware of the 
changes in the rules.
3.5 D iscu ssion  and conclusion
There are a number of caveats to the findings of this paper. One is that there is 
no direct data on consumption, so that household expenditure is used as a proxy 
here. But the two are not always the same. For instance, the purchase of a durable 
good often entails an up-front expenditure, but the good is typically “'consumed’ over 
several periods. Likewise, debt repayment may be regarded as an expense. But the 
idea of credit is precisely to separate in time the outlay associated with a good, and 
its consumption.
It is also clearly a limitation that the expenditure data is discrete. Binning the 
data entails a loss of information. Arguably, this makes it harder for the econometric 
tests to detect changes in expenditure since only movements across the bin boundaries 
are observed. This will tend to make it harder to reject a null hypothesis than it would 
be if the data were scalar. In terms of the findings, this may mean that the rejection of
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precautionary saving and Keynesian consumption are less robust than they could be if 
expenditure was measured with more precision. In the case of Keynesian consumption, 
this concern is accentuated by the fact the child support grant is quantitatively less 
important than the old age pension.
This paper has assumed that savings technology is readily available, but this may 
not be the case. Besley (1995a) provides a number of reasons why savings may not be 
an available or attractive way to achieve smooth consumption in a typical developing 
country setting. On the other hand, South Africa has a relatively well-developed 
formal financial system. Though it has been difficult for poor people (without formal 
employment) to obtain fully-fledged bank accounts, savings accounts are more easily 
available. In particular, the post office has a reasonable presence even in rural areas 
and their savings books were available to anyone even during the Apartheid era, and 
in the sample studied here a full 48% report having savings in some form.
Many economists are quick to point to liquidity constraints when they suspect 
failures of the traditional consumption model. Indeed, the assumption of constrained 
credit is a staple of economic development theory. Yet direct and rigorous tests of this 
assumption, of the type that has recently gained popularity in analyses of rich-country 
data, is scarce. Moreover, in many cases findings consistent with liquidity constraints 
are equally compatible with precautionary saving or Keynesian consumption, and few 
studies have attempted to distinguish between these in a developing country context. 
This paper tests and rejects the standard model with perfect capital markets using 
data on a panel of black South African households. It also provides evidence that 
liquidity constraints, rather than precautionary saving or Keynesian behaviour, drive 
the observed excess sensitivity of consumption to anticipated income changes.
But the significance of the findings presented here goes beyond a mere cemen­
tation of what is already widely assumed in the theory of development economics. 
Credit constraints have implications for welfare. At the micro-level, efficient credit 
markets allow consumption smoothing and boost income through efficient allocation 
of resources for investment. At the macro-level, these investment misallocations are 
widely believed to impede growth. Credit markets matter for development, and effec­
tive development policy must be sensitive to whether or not households face liquidity 
constraints.
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Figure 3.1: Household take-up of old-age pension by age of oldest member
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The thick line shows the fraction of households that receive the old age pension, as a 
function of the age of the oldest female household member. In order to focus on take-up as 
a function of female eligibility, households with men aged 55+ are excluded from this 
graph. Similarly, the thin line shows the household take-up rate of the pension as a 
function of the age of the oldest male household member. Households with women aged 
55+ are excluded from the graph. Recall that women are age-eligible from the age of 60, 
and men from the age of 65. Age-eligibility is clearly a strong predictor of pension take-up. 
The data is from the September 2003 survey.
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Table 3.1. Descriptive statistics.
Mean St. Dev.
Household size 3.91 2.74
Household receives the age-old pension 0.21 0.40
Household is age-eligible for pension 0.25 0.52
Household receives the child support grant 0.11 0.31
Log monthly expenditure 6.30 0.92
Household has savings in any form 0.48 0.50
Number of household-year observations 
Number of households observed once 
Number of households observed twice 
Number of households observed three times 
Total number of households
61,458 
17,577 
11,964 
6,651 
36,192
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Table 3.2. Household age-eligibility predicts pension take-up.
Dependent variable: Pension take-up (binary)
1 2 3
Household is age-eligible .487***
[.00904]
.392***
[.0108]
Men 55+ -.0202*
[.0111]
0.00067
[0117]
Men 60+ .108***
[016]
Men 65+ (age-eligible) .224***
[0219]
Men 70+ 0.00557
[0188]
Women 55+ .116***
[.0101]
.0576***
[0105]
Women 60+ (age-eligible) .413***
[0156]
Women 65+ .0981***
[0141]
Women 70+ .0693***
[0122]
Household demographics 0-54 years No Yes Yes
Observations 61409 61409 61409
Households 36168 36168 36168
Linear regressions. The dependent variable is an indicator for 
whether the household receives the old age pension (1) or not (0). All 
regressions include household fixed effects. The household 
demographics not reported are variables for the number of female 
and male household members in each of the age groups 0-4, 5-14, 
15-24, 25-34, 35-44 and 45-54, and household size. Robust standard 
errors, shown in brackets, are clustered at the level of the survey 
primary sampling unit. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * 
significant at 10%.
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Table 3.3. Expenditure response to pension income
Dependent variable: Household expenditure
1 2 3 4 5 6
Household receives old-age pension .195***
[.0199]
.126***
[.0219]
.107***
[0234]
Household is age-eligible for pension .153***
[0157]
.0825***
[0213]
Men 55+ .0633**
[.0265]
.0879***
[033]
.0518*
[0273]
.087***
[033]
Men 60+ -0.0578
[0373]
-0.0457
[0373]
Men 65+ (age-eligible) 0.013
[0405]
0.0374
[0404]
Men 70+ 0.0553
[0407]
0.0552
[0407]
Women 55+ -0.00431
[021]
-0.0309
[0252]
-0.00847
[0234]
-0.0247
[0252]
Women 60+ (age-eligible) .0584*
[0313]
.103***
[0305]
Women 65+ 0.0127
[0295]
0.0229
[0294]
Women 70+ -0.0121
[0307]
-0.00444
[0307]
Household demographics 0-54 years No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 60506 60506 60506 60532 60532 60532
Households 35877 35877 35877 35889 35889 35889
Linear regressions. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the imputed monthly household 
expenditure. All regressions include household fixed effects. The household demographics not reported 
are variables for the number of female and male household members in each of the age groups 0-4, 5-
14,15-24, 25-34, 35-44 and 45-54, and household size. Robust standard errors, shown in brackets, are 
clustered at the level of the survey primary sampling unit. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * 
significant at 10%.
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Table 3.4. Response in first-differenced expenditure to pension income
Dependent variable: Differenced household expenditure
1 2 3 4 5 6
Household receives old-age pension .326***
[.0632]
.231***
[.0736]
.226***
[.0796]
Household is age-eligible for pension .245***
[.05]
.124*
[.0684]
Men 55+ .154*
[.0905]
0.106
[.106]
0.14
[.0911]
0.0988
[.106]
Men 60+ 0.0249
[.124]
0.0523
[.124]
Men 65+ (age-eligible) 0.0567
[.145]
0.107
[.143]
Men 70+ 0.0477
[.148]
0.0548
[.149]
Women 55+ .149**
[.0662]
.158**
[.0764]
.162**
[.0714]
.176**
[.076]
Women 60+ (age-eligible) 0.0203
[.102]
0.109
[■1]
Women 65+ -0.0132
[.0972]
0.0105
[.0972]
Women 70+ -0.0732
[.0888]
-0.0561
[.0888]
Household demographics 0-54 years No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 24119 24119 24119 24123 24123 24123
Households 17739 17739 17739 17742 17742 17742
Linear regressions. The dependent variable is the first-differenced logarithm of the imputed monthly 
household expenditure. All regressions include household fixed effects. The household demographics 
not reported are variables for the number of female and male household members in each of the age 
groups 0-4, 5-14,15-24, 25-34, 35-44 and 45-54, and household size. Robust standard errors, shown in 
brackets, are clustered at the level of the survey primary sampling unit. *** significant at 1%, ** 
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
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Table 3.5. Response in household savings to pension income
Dependent variable: Household has savings in any form (binary indicator)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Household receives old-age pension .07***
[.0132]
.0592***
[.0144]
.0644***
[0159]
Household is age-eligible for pension .0309***
[0107]
0.0101
[0133]
Men 55+ 0.0156
[017]
0.0308
[0205]
0.016
[0173]
0.0298
[0204]
Men 60+ -0.0222
[0222]
-0.0154
[0221]
Men 65+ (age-eligible) -0.0408
[0269]
-0.0278
[0267]
Men 70+ .0507*
[0272]
.0512*
[0273]
Women 55+ -0.021
[0136]
-0.0189
[0157]
-0.00692
[0145]
-0.0157
[0157]
Women 60+ (age-eligible) -0.00998
[0209]
0.0169
[0203]
Women 65+ 0.012
[0207]
0.0183
[0206]
Women 70+ -0.00621
[0217]
-0.00174
[0216]
Household demographics 0-54 years No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 61409 61409 61409 61458 61458 61458
Households 36168 36168 36168 36192 36192 36192
Linear regressions. The dependent variable is 1 if the household has any savings of any form, and 0 
otherwise. All regressions include household fixed effects. The household demographics not reported 
are variables for the number of female and male household members in each of the age groups 0-4, 5-
14,15-24, 25-34, 35-44 and 45-54, and household size. Robust standard errors, shown in brackets, are 
clustered at the level of the survey primary sampling unit. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * 
significant at 10%.
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Table 3.6. Response in first-differenced expenditure to the foreseeable lapse 
of the child support grant____________________________________________
Dependent variable: Differenced household expenditure
1 2 3
Presence of child aged 7 0.092 0.0546 0.0552
[.0593] [.0602] [.0717]
Presence of child aged 7 in 2003 -0.111 -0.0975 -0.0997
[.0824] [.0821] [.0869]
Household and survey fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Household demographics No Yes Yes
Controls for number of children aged 0, 1, 2, ... , 9 No No Yes
Observations 24123 24123 24123
Households 17742 17742 17742
Linear regression of the first-differenced logarithm of imputed household 
expenditure on a binary variable indicating the presence in the household of a child 
aged 7, and and indicator for the presence of a child aged 7 in 2003. The 
coefficient on the latter should be zero under the null hypothesis of forward-looking 
households and liquidity constraints. The null hypothesis is not rejected. The 
household demographics are variables for the number of female and male 
household members in each of the age groups 0-4, 5-14,15-24, 25-34, 35-44 and 
45-54, 55+ as well as household size. The controls for the number of children are 
count variables for children of age 0 ,1 ,..., 9 in the household. Robust standard 
errors, shown in brackets, are clustered at the level of the survey primary sampling 
unit. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
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